WERNER JAEGER

ARISTOTLE

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE HISTORY OF HIS DEVELOPMENT



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Fundamentals of the History of His Development

BY

WERNER JAEGER

TRANSLATED

WITH THE AUTHOR'S CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS

BY

RICHARD ROBINSON



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ARISTOTLE

ception of the 'theoretical' life has helped to determine its features. Socrates had concerned himself solely with man, and not with that which is above the heaven or under the earth. The *Theaetetus*, on the other hand, speaks of the philosophical soul as 'geometrizing' and 'astronomizing'.[1] She is indifferent to what is near at hand; she despises precisely those practical activities that occupied the lives of Socrates' favourite hearers; and she roams in lofty distances, as is solemnly quoted from Pindar.

The *Theaetetus* unmistakably refers to the forthcoming appearance of the *Parmenides*. The latter was pretty certainly written before the former's sequels, the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*; hence it was probably finished when Aristotle entered the school, and cannot in any case be much later. Those who suggest that Aristotle was the author of the objections which this dialogue raises to the theory of Ideas, are making the unlikely supposition that he took the initiative in a revolutionary manner while he was still extremely young and had only just entered the society. The dialogue shows that before Aristotle the Academy had already gone far in criticizing the hybrid character of the Ideas, half substances and half abstractions. It could not be long before the two were separated. Plato himself, indeed, thought that he could overcome the difficulties; nevertheless he prepared the way for what happened when he recognized it as in principle correct to make laborious logical and ontological examinations of the Ideas, as is done in this dialogue and in later ones. Aristotle's speculations cannot be linked up with the *Phaedo* or the *Republic* and the Idea-theory as it appears in them.

In the *Theaetetus* Theaetetus and Theodorus are opposite types. One represents the young generation of mathematicians, who are interested in philosophy; the other the old, who will not hear of it, though they are experts in their own subject. It was not an accident that Plato's relations to famous mathematicians found expression in a dialogue precisely at this time. For about the year 367 Eudoxus of Cyzicus brought his school to Athens, in order to discuss with Plato and his followers the problems that interested both parties.[2]

[1] *Theaet.* 173 E–174 A.

[2] Tannery's conjecture (*Histoire de l'astronomie*, p. 296, n. 4) is confirmed by

This event attracted a good deal of attention, and from that time on we constantly find members of this school of mathematicians and astronomers in communication with the Academy. Helicon and Athenaeus are examples. As early as the *Republic* we can observe the effects of Theaetetus' discovery of solid geometry. After their intercourse with Eudoxus, Plato and his followers took a very great interest in the attempts of the Cyzicenian school to explain the irregular movements of the planets by simple mathematical suppositions. This was not the only way in which Eudoxus stimulated them. He tremendously enlarged their notions of geography and human culture by bringing exact reports of Asia and Egypt, and by describing from extended personal experience the status of astronomy in those parts. His contribution to ethical questions was also important. The problem of the nature and meaning of pleasure and pain, which was to be so central in Aristotle's ethics, led to one more great debate within the Academy in Plato's later years. Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Aristotle contributed works *On Pleasure* to it; Plato contributed the *Philebus*. Many years afterwards Aristotle, who met Eudoxus right at the beginning of his stay in the Academy, could still speak of his personal impression with real warmth, when he was recalling the stimulus that Eudoxus gave. Eudoxus also raised difficulties about the Ideas and suggested an alteration of the theory.[1] In every field Plato's school began to attract more and more strangers, some of them of the most diverse types. His travels had brought him into close connexion with the Pythagoreans gathered round Archytas at Tarentum. Their influence reached as far as Sicily, and in Sicily at this time there flourished the medical school of Philistion, whose importance was so great that we must reckon

the *Life* (Rose, p. 429, l. 1) according to which Aristotle entered the Academy under Eudoxus. Some excerptor must have misunderstood the statement and taken Eudoxus for an archon. What his authority told him was simply that Aristotle's entry coincided with Eudoxus' presence. Cf. Eva Sachs (who follows F. Jacoby), op. cit., p. 17, n. 2.

[1] For Aristotle on Eudoxus' character and theory of pleasure see *Eth. Nic.* X. 2. For the latter's proposed reformulation of the Idea-theory see *Metaph.* A 9, 991a 17; and at greater length in the second book *On Ideas* (Rose, frg. 189), which has been preserved by Alexander in his commentary on the passage. Eudoxus proposes to regard participation as the immanence of the Ideas in the things, and to this Aristotle strongly objects. That participation was the most debated problem of the time is clear from Plato's later dialogues.

of visual and aesthetic development in the Greek mind, and (3) the long-neglected study of οὐσία or substance, to which Plato gave new material by the problem of the one and the many, and living and tangible content by the invention of the Ideas. The last element was (4) the dualism of the Orphic myth of the soul, to which his whole constitution inclined him, and which, watered by his fertile imagination, took firm root in the new conception of being.

When we consider these four elements it is not difficult to suppose that he affected the ordinary educated person as a mixture of poet, reformer, critic, and prophet. (The strictness with which he imposed his new method on himself would not at first make any difference to this impression.) Hence it is not surprising that, in view of the gulf between him and all other science, both ancient and modern, he has been called a mystic and expelled from the history of thought. If this simple solution were right, however, it would be very hard to understand why he has had such a great influence on the destinies of human knowledge; and the fact that he was the sun around which revolved persons like Theaetetus, Eudoxus, and Aristotle, that is to say, the most talented pioneers of scientific research that the fourth century produced, is sufficient to condemn the cheap wisdom whose notion of the complexity of intellectual currents is so inadequate that it would strike the most revolutionary of all philosophers out of the history of knowledge, because he discovered not merely new facts but also new dimensions.

Aristotle saw as clearly as Eudoxus that Plato, in his philosophical work, had welded together scientific discoveries, elements of myth, and mysterious spiritual realms to which the eye of knowledge had never penetrated. This weld was by no means the mere result of the creator's subjective inclination; it was necessarily determined by the historical situation, the elements in which were later analysed by Aristotle with a profound understanding alike of the creation and of its creator. At first, however, he abandoned himself without reserve to this incomparable and indivisible world, as is shown by the fragments of his early writings, and it was precisely the non-scientific elements in Plato's philosophy, that is, the metaphysical and religious parts of it, that left the most lasting

imprint on his mind. He must have been unusually receptive for such impressions. It was their conflict with his own scientific and methodical tendencies that later gave rise to most of his problems; and their strength is beautifully shown by the fact that he never sacrificed them, although in scientific matters he went beyond Plato at every point. In Plato he sought and found a man to lead him in a new life, just as in his dialogue *Nerinthus* he makes the simple Corinthian countryman, enthralled by the *Gorgias*, abandon his plough to seek and follow the master.

Plato explains the connexion between knowing the good and following it in his seventh letter. The knowledge which according to Socrates makes men good, and that which is commonly called scientific knowledge, are distinct. The former is creative, and can only be attained by souls that have a fundamental affinity to the object to be known, namely, the good, the just, and the beautiful. There is nothing to which Plato right down to the end of his life was more passionately opposed than the statement that the soul can know what is just without *being* just.[1] This, and not the systematization of knowledge, was his aim in founding the Academy. It remained his aim to the end, as is shown by this letter that he wrote in his old age. Let there be a communion (συζῆν) of the elect, of those who, once their souls have grown up in the atmosphere of good, are able by virtue of their superior equipment to share at last in the knowledge that is 'like a light kindled by leaping fire'. It seems to him, Plato says, that the search after this knowledge is a thing not for the mass of mankind, but only for the few who with a slight hint can find it for themselves.[2]

[1] *Ep.* VII. 344 A. [2] Ibid. 341 C–E.

CHAPTER II

EARLY WORKS

ARISTOTLE wrote a series of works in dialogue form. The fragments that remain of them are not studied as much as they should be, partly because it is pleasanter to leave such troublesome work to philologists, but also because of the conviction, which has always obtained in the Peripatetic school, that the true Aristotle is to be found in the treatises. Even if we only wish to understand the treatises, however, the fragments of the lost dialogues can teach us a great deal. If we knew nothing else about the relation between the two kinds of writing, it would be highly significant to be able to determine that the dialogues, modelled on those of Plato, belong almost entirely to Aristotle's early years, and that in his later period he practically abandoned literary activity (since the treatises are merely the written basis of his very extensive activities as teacher and lecturer). There are indeed exceptions to this statement. *Alexander or Colonization* must, to judge from its title, have been a dialogue belonging to the time when Alexander's racial policy in Asia obliged Aristotle to make public announcement of his disapproval to the Greek-reading world. This straggler therefore had a special reason in Aristotle's political position. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is true of the collection of 158 Constitutions, which was intended for publication and was written in a clear and lively style, as we can tell from that of the Constitution of Athens. In spite of these exceptions, however, it remains true to say that in the course of his development Aristotle radically altered his views about the necessity of presenting science in literary form, and about the relation between literary and truly productive work.

With Plato the primary impulse was originally the formative one. He did not write in order to set out the contents of his doctrine. His desire was to show the philosopher in the dramatic instant of seeking and finding, and to make the doubt and conflict visible; and that not in a mere intellectual operation, but in the fight against pseudo-science, political power, society, and

his own heart; for the spirit of Plato's philosophy necessarily collided with all these forces. According to his original view of it, philosophy is not a sphere of theoretical discoveries but a reorganization of all the fundamental elements of life. Consider, for example, the paradoxical picture of the philosopher in the *Theaetetus*, or the duel between the Socrates of the *Gorgias* and Callicles, who represents the egoistical, might-is-right view of state and society. These dialogues have nothing but the name in common with the didactic conversations of Giordano Bruno, Hume, or Schopenhauer. Plato was writing the philosopher's tragedy. Unlike his imitators he never gave mere theoretical differences of opinion under a stylistic veneer.

The *Theaetetus*, which is contemporary with Aristotle's entrance into the Academy, is the first of a group of dialogues that are radically different from the earlier ones both in form and in content; and it ushers in the transference of Plato's main philosophical interests to methodological, analytical, and abstract studies.[1] In this group the equilibrium between the aesthetic and the philosophical elements in Plato's mind is destroyed for the sake of the latter. The discords, clearly perceptible to delicate ears, begin to appear in the *Theaetetus*. They are due not so much to the lack of outward polish in the form as to the conquest of Plato's dramatic impulse by his abstract interest in method, to the consistent pursuit of a single question along a single level track. A man can indeed find Plato the dramatist even here, so long as he is able to detect reversal of fortunes (περιπέτεια) and complication (πλοκή) even in the development of methodological and abstract ideas. But in spite of the artistic elaborateness of its construction it remains significant that this very dialogue seems to most modern philosophers Plato's 'greatest philosophical achievement'. It is in fact almost a treatise, positive though critical; and it is not an accident that in the introduction Plato refers to his previous

[1] J. Stenzel was the first to give any thorough account of the connexion between Plato's philosophical development and his form. See his address 'Literarische Form und philosophischer Gehalt des platonischen Dialogs', *Jahresbericht d. Schlesischen Gesellschaft für vaterl. Kultur*, 1916; reprinted in *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der platonischen Dialektik*, &c., Breslau, 1917, pp. 123 ff. For the late dialogues see the chapter on 'Die neue Methode', pp. 45 ff.

method of writing dialogues, and announces simplifications the aim of which is to give greater scientific lucidity and directness to the exposition.[1]

The *Sophist* and the *Statesman* show more clearly the difficulty that Plato now has with the dialogue form. The application of the method of division to a particular conception, descending step by step from the universal to the particular, is such an undramatic and monotonous procedure that at the beginning of the *Sophist* the leader of the discussion is obliged to tell his interlocutors not to interrupt him too often, or preferably to listen to a continuous speech.[2] This amounts to openly abandoning Socrates' 'obstetric' method of discussion, and announcing that from now on the dialogue form is nothing but an unessential stylistic ornament. The *Timaeus* and the *Philebus* are not exceptions; what they offer to the reader as dialogue is merely a transparent veil of style thrown over a purely doctrinal content. It is not any vivacity in the conversation that gives the *Timaeus* its tremendous effectiveness. The *Philebus* could be transformed without difficulty into a methodical and unified treatise much like Aristotle's *Ethics*. In the *Laws* the last trace of scenic illusion is gone. The delineation of character (ἠθοποιία) is consciously renounced; and the whole is a solemn address or proclamation, not by Socrates but by Plato himself, the stranger from Athens.[3]

As was logical, the figure of Socrates, after having been rele-

[1] *Theaet.* 143 B. The *Theaetetus* retains the outward form of a Socratic dialogue, and frequently makes express reference to Socrates' midwifery. But this very selfconscious reflection on the nature and limits of the Socratic method, which is strongly emphasized, shows that Plato is now purposely using the old form of cross-examination (ἔλεγχος) merely to clear the ground for his question about the definition of knowledge. Stenzel rightly points out the close connexion between the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*; the latter solves the problems raised by the former, and it does not use 'midwifery'. Cf. Socrates' final words at *Theaet.* 210 C: 'These are the limits of my art; I can no farther go.'

[2] *Soph.* 217 D. It is true that they are still going to give remark for remark (ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος), it being assumed that the answerer will always say yes; but that is something quite different from the old 'obstetric' conversation 'by question and answer', where the questioner puts forward no views but only gets the answerer to do so.

[3] The author of the *Epinomis* judges the real state of affairs correctly in 980 D. He makes the Athenian remind the two others of a famous passage of the *Laws* in words that absolutely abandon all dramatic reality: 'if you remember; for, to be sure, you made notes (ὑπομνήματα) at the time'. Here we are suddenly in the middle of a lecture.

gated to minor roles from the *Sophist* onwards, is finally dropped in the *Laws*. In the *Philebus* he appears once more, for the last time, because this dialogue discusses questions that had been raised by the real Socrates. (The answers are obtained, however, by means of methods that would never have occurred to him.) In this last period the separation between the historical Socrates and Plato's own philosophizing is complete. And that is another sign that his general tendency towards science, logic, and dogma is seeking self-expression. The last fruit of the theory of Forms was the methods of classification and abstraction, which are what Plato means by dialectic in the narrow sense of his later works. These methods had revolutionized the form of the controversial dialogue that arose out of the Socratic cross-examination. They had made it psychologically meaningless and almost turned it into a treatise. No further progress was possible in this direction. It was only a question of time before the great art of the classical Platonic dramas died out, for its root was dead. This was the moment at which the young Aristotle began to take a hand.[1]

All members of the Academy wrote dialogues, though none wrote more and weightier ones than Aristotle. This fact is significant for the relation of the new generation to Plato. They all used the dialogue as a ready-made form, without asking themselves how far such an imitation was possible. The Greeks naturally tended to imitate everything once it was 'discovered'; and they had not yet realized that Plato's dialogue in its classical perfection was something absolutely inimitable, the flower of a unique combination of historical necessity, individual creative power, and particular experience. His pupils regarded the dialogue as the established vehicle for giving living form to esoteric philosophy, and hence every one desired to see the master's effect on himself reproduced in such a medium. But the more they realized that, because of the intimate unity of his personality, life, and works, Plato was an indivisible

[1] No one has yet tried to connect Aristotle's dialogue with the development of Plato's form. R. Hirzel (*Der Dialog*, p. 275) does not even put the question. Using a merely general impression of Plato's dialogues, he can only see the Aristotelian type as opposed to it. He regards the two kinds as due simply to the difference in the characters of the two authors, and does not do justice to the factors inherent in the situation.

magnitude that could not be taken over as a whole without producing either a dead scholasticism or a literary dilettantism, the more they consciously set themselves to find fundamentally new forms for that which was scientific and objective in him and so could be detached. These attempts properly took their departure not from the dialogues but from Plato's oral teaching. It is significant both of the youthful Aristotle's natural affinity to Plato and of his inability to view him objectively that he did not at once take this way, but began by continuing the dialogue. Clearly he found the essential Plato more alive, more powerful, and more objective, in the dialogue than in any other form.

The remaining fragments of his dialogues, together with the reports of antiquity and the imitations of later writers (he had an especially powerful influence on Cicero), enable us to infer that Aristotle invented a new kind of literary dialogue, namely the dialogue of scientific discussion. He rightly saw that the shadow-existence of the 'obstetric' question and answer must be done away, since it had lost its real function by becoming a mere cloak for 'long speeches'; but, while Plato in his later days was tending to replace dialogue by dogmatic lecture, Aristotle set speech against speech, thus reproducing the actual life of research in the later Academy. One of the speakers took the lead, gave the subject, and summed up the results at the end. This naturally put narrow limits to the delineation of personality. The art of writing the speeches was taken over from rhetoric and developed in accordance with the precepts of Plato's *Phaedrus*. The dialogue now depended for its effect more on its character (ἦθος) as a whole than on the *ethopoeia* of particular persons; and, while it lost in aesthetic objectivity, it presumably gained in unity of mood and tendency. It was, therefore, only logical for Aristotle finally to make himself the leader in his own dialogues.

This alteration, while it did not restore the original Socratic purpose of the dialogue (that was irretrievably lost), gave it once more a real content, one that corresponded to the new form of the conversations in which it had always had its root. Instead of the arena of arguments, with the dramatic thrust and counter-thrust of eristical duels, there were long theoretical examinations and demonstrations, conducted according to strict method. The change may be deplored; but it was inevitable, as Plato had

recognized when he abandoned 'obstetric' conversation and the delineation of character. The historians of literature, who do not see what inner forces were at work, suppose themselves to have established that Aristotle brought about the decline of the dialogue. On the contrary, he merely performed the inevitable transition to another stage. The dialogue of discussion is simply an expression of the fact that the scientific element in Plato finally burst its form and remoulded it to suit itself. It was not a mere matter of aesthetics; it was a development of the philosophic mind, which necessarily produced its own new form.

It is customary to apply the casual remarks of later writers about the characteristics of Aristotle's dialogue to *all* of them, but the mere titles show that that is impossible. *Eudemus or On the Soul* and *Gryllus or On Rhetoric* cannot have been very different from the earlier Platonic type of which the *Phaedo* and the *Gorgias* are examples. One of the fragments of the *Eudemus* still retains the Socratic technique of question and answer.[1] Whether Aristotle appeared as leader of the discussion in dialogues of this type is to be doubted. Those in which we are told that he was the leader, the *Statesman* in two books and the *Philosophy* in three, were obviously almost didactic works, and thus entirely different.[2] Plato's example ought to be enough to

[1] Frg. 44. (I give the numbers of the fragments according to the Teubner edition of Rose's *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, 1886. They are different from those in the earlier Academy edition.) There is, however, no midwifery about this question and answer. It is the learner who asks questions, while the other gives him systematic information. The conversation is reported by a third person, as in the earlier Plato. Aristotle thus does not use the principle laid down at the beginning of the *Theaetetus*.

[2] Frgs. 8, 9, and 78. The last passage (Cic. *Ep. ad Quintum fr.* III. 5, 1) seems to refer not merely to the *Statesman* ('de praestante viro') but also to the books *On Justice* ('de republica', cf. next note), which Cicero must have known. As soon as we look at the passages concerned without presuppositions, it becomes obvious that there is no point in the attempts to explain the 'contradiction' in Cicero's statements about the *mos Aristotelius*. In *Ad Att.* XIII. 19, 4, he says it is Aristotelian for the author himself to lead the discussion. In *Ad fam.* I. 9, 23, he calls the style of his books *De Oratore* Aristotelian, although he is not himself the leader in them. In each place he is right. Aristotle did not take the lead in all his dialogues; in the *Gryllus* and the *Eudemus* he certainly did not appear at all. It is Aristotelian to have a series of long speeches; it is Aristotelian to have a special introduction to each book of a dialogue; it is Aristotelian to put oneself into the dialogue. But there is no passage which says that a dialogue is not Aristotelian unless it exhibits all three of these peculiarities at once. We must not try to squeeze a single and constant type of

prevent us from supposing that Aristotle had a fixed form which he never changed. As a matter of fact, his development as a writer of dialogue includes all stages from 'obstetric' conversation to the pure treatise. It runs parallel to his development as a philosopher, or rather is its organic expression.

It is often possible to show that particular Aristotelian dialogues are modelled on particular Platonic ones, especially in their contents. The *Eudemus* is related in this way to the *Phaedo*, the *Gryllus* to the *Gorgias*, and the books *On Justice* to the *Republic*.[1] The *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, like the *Symposium* and the *Menexenus*, were naturally suggested by Plato's dialogues of the same name. The *Protrepticus*, which was not a dialogue, reveals the influence of the protreptic passages in Plato's *Euthydemus*, even to verbal echoes. Plato may have appeared as a speaker in the dialogues.

The style also shows very close dependence. It seems indeed that Aristotle soon attained his own manner, a style whose only aim was to be pure and clear, such as naturally belongs to the pure scientist;[2] but the *Eudemus*, for example, contained myths; and it had other lively graces, such as frequent similes, partly based on well-known Platonic models, which were famous in later antiquity. In the simile of the subterranean men coming up into the light and seeing the heaven, the power of the language carries one away. The myth of Midas echoes the apocalyptic style of the Fates in the last book of the *Republic*. Cicero praises the golden stream of the prose in Aristotle's

Aristotelian dialogue out of our authorities. The same is true of the statement that Aristotle attacked the theory of Forms 'in the dialogues'.

[1] That the books *On Justice* are modelled on the *Republic* can be inferred with certainty from (1) the existence of so many corresponding dialogues and (2) the fact that Cicero in his *De Republica* makes use of both works. In Plato's *Republic* the political philosophy develops out of the problem of justice, just as it must have done in the books *On Justice*. The *Republic* must have already obtained the subtitle *On Justice* by the time of Aristotle, a fact important for the history of the origin of the subtitles of the Platonic dialogues.

[2] The only mark of good style laid down by previous rhetoricians that Aristotle recognizes is lucidity (*Rhet.* III, 1404^b 1, 1414^a 19; *Poet.* 1458^a 18. Cf. J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 30). Lucidity is said to include everything. This ideal is intended not so much for practical oratory as for the creation of a pure and scientifically accurate style. It was dropped again by Theophrastus and all later students of rhetoric. They bowed to the taste of the times, but Aristotle thinks of knowledge as a force that must alter everything, language included.

dialogues. Rhetorical affectations are entirely absent; clear and exact in thought, fine and moving in character, these writings appealed to the best men of later antiquity. It is evidence of their intellectual breadth that Crates the Cynic and Philiscus the cobbler read the *Protrepticus* together in the shop, that Zeno and Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Posidonius, Cicero, and Philo, were strongly influenced in religious considerations by these works of Aristotle's youth, and that Augustine, who came to know the *Protrepticus* through Cicero's *Hortensius*, was led by it to religion and Christianity.[1] The Neo-Platonists lived by Aristotle's dialogues as much as by Plato's; and the *Consolatio* of Boethius sounds the last medieval echo of the religious element in them. As works of art antiquity did not mention them in the same breath with Plato's, though it valued them greatly; but their religious influence on the Hellenistic age was almost more important than Plato's thoroughly distant, objective, and non-inspirational art.

But what was Aristotle's *philosophical* relation to Plato in those works? It would be strange if the influence of his model had been confined to the choice of subject-matter, and to details of style and content, while the general attitude to Plato was one of rejection, as it later became. *Symposium, Menexenus, Sophist, Statesman*—were they really written to outdo Plato's dialogues of the same names, and to show how the questions discussed in them ought to have been handled? Did the disciple obstinately and pedantically dog the master's footsteps in order to reduce each one of his works to shreds in turn? Before ascribing to him such a malady of taste and tact men should have given more serious attention to the other possibility that the purpose of these dialogues was simply and solely to follow Plato, in philosophy as well as in all other respects.

The understanding of the dialogues has had a curiously unfortunate destiny ever since the recovery of the treatises through Andronicus in the time of Sulla. At that time they

[1] For the *Protrepticus* in the cobbler's shop see frg. 50. For Augustine's conversion by the *Hortensius* see *Confess.* III. 4, 7: 'Ille vero liber mutavit affectum meum et ad te ipsum, domine, mutavit preces meas et vota ac desideria mea fecit alia. Viluit mihi repente omnis vana spes et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili et surgere coeperam, ut ad te redirem' (cf. also VIII, 7, 17).

were still much read and highly thought of; but they soon began to lose ground, when the learned Peripatetics undertook the exact interpretation of the long-neglected treatises and wrote commentary after commentary upon them. The Neo-Platonists made some use of them, in contrast to the treatises, as sources of uncontaminated Platonism; but a strictly Peripatetic interpreter like the acute Alexander of Aphrodisias does not know what to make of them, though he must have read most of them. More naïve in philological matters than was necessary at that time, he explained the relation between them and the treatises by saying that the latter contained Aristotle's true views, and the former the false opinions of other persons![1] It was therefore recognized at that time that there were contradictions between the two kinds. The unsuccessful efforts of the later Peripatetics to explain this puzzling state of affairs can be detected in the notorious tradition about the difference between the exoteric and the esoteric writings. Students naturally looked for an explanation of the dialogues in the treatises. They found it in the phrase 'exoteric discourses', which occurs several times and in some instances can easily be referred to the published dialogues. In opposition to these exoteric discourses, which were intended for the outside world, they then set up the treatises as a body of secret esoteric doctrine, although there is no hint of any such notion or expression in Aristotle. Thus the relation between the contents of the dialogues and those of the treatises appeared to be like that of opinion to truth. In some passages, indeed, Aristotle must have been purposely deserting the truth, because he thought that the masses were incapable of grasping it. Even the difficulty of the technical terms in the treatises, which gave later scholars many headaches, was pressed into the service of this mystical interpretation, and a letter was forged in which Aristotle wrote to Alexander that the terms were purposely made obscure in order to mislead the uninitiated.

[1] Elias in Arist. *Categ.* 24^b 33: 'Alexander explains the difference between the lecture-notes and the dialogues differently, namely that in the lecture-notes he gives his own opinions and the truth, while in the dialogues he gives the opinions of others, which are false.' In spite of the *naïveté* of the expression the commentator surely represents the essence of Alexander's view correctly. Contradictions between the two kinds of writing were noted as early as Cicero (*De Fin.* V. 5, 12). In those days they were ascribed to the literary form of popular writing.

Modern criticism has been sceptical about this mystification, which is obviously a late invention originating in the spirit of Neo-Pythagoreanism.[1] Nevertheless it has not got rid of the prejudice against the dialogues.[2] This is, of course, more difficult for the moderns than it was for the ancients, because we now have only fragments to work with. Rather, therefore, than believe these few but precious remnants, scholars have relied on 'the authorities', and especially on two statements, one in Plutarch and one in Proclus, both coming from the same source, which speak of the criticisms of the Idea-theory that Aristotle made in his *Ethics*, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics*, 'and in his exoteric dialogues'.[3] These passages seemed to provide unshakable proof that in the dialogues Aristotle had already adopted the position in which he stands in the critical works. It was therefore necessary either to put his 'defection' from Plato early during his stay in the Academy or to put the dialogues later. It was not difficult to find another 'authority' for the first supposition. Diogenes Laertius says that Aristotle fell away while Plato was still alive, whereat Plato remarked, 'Aristotle has kicked me, as foals do their mothers when they are born.'[4] Under the influence of these passages Bernays, in his colourful book on Aristotle's dialogues, made a determined attempt to explain away every

[1] It was Andronicus' revival of the study of the treatises that first raised the problem of the relation between these sources of 'pure' Aristotelian doctrine and the exoteric writings, which up to that time had been almost the only Aristotle read. This revival occurred during the full tide of Neo-Pythagoreanism, which in accordance with its nature always looked for a special secret doctrine in all previous thinkers. This notion was then applied to Aristotle's writings.

[2] Just recently two works have appeared in which for the first time it is recognized that the contents of the dialogues are Platonic. In 'Über Aristoteles' Entwicklung' (*Festgabe für Georg von Hertling*, Freiburg, 1913), Dyroff has collected in a brief form numerous echoes of Plato in the dialogues. His point of view is mostly systematic. He does not go closely into the particular works, as indeed was impossible in his limits. His paper did not come into my hands until these studies had been written down. It confirms me in my view; yet we now need exact interpretation, as is shown by Dyroff's view of the dialogue *On Philosophy*. A. Kail's dissertation for the doctorate at Vienna (*Diss. Phil. Vindob.* XI. 67) also reached me subsequent to my own investigations. He discusses the *Eudemus* and the dialogue *On Philosophy* only. His general standpoints, which are von Arnim's, are right, and he gets good results in detail, but philosophically he is not profound. Neither of these works has any notion of linking up the problem of the dialogues with that of the growth of the treatises.

[3] Frg. 8.

[4] Diog. L. V. 2.

something of the nature of an Idea. We are expressly told this, and it is now for the first time possible really to understand it.[1] Aristotle himself has left us an important piece of evidence that throws light on the facts of his development. When attacking the theory of harmony in his work on the soul he quotes his earlier writing. He takes from the *Eudemus* the second and scientific argument, which he develops somewhat, but he silently abandons the argument from the substantiality of the soul.[2]

The second fact that we discover by our analysis is that the young Aristotle was completely independent of Plato in the sphere of logic and methodology. Though dependent on him for his view of the world, he is here quite free, and perhaps even has a slight feeling of superiority. His reduction of Plato's proof to its elements, and the technical excellence of the two proofs that he constructs out of them, reveal long experience in these things; and the knowledge embodied in the doctrine of the categories forms the presupposition of his corrections. It is nothing against this that the work which we have on the categories cannot have been written before the days of the Lyceum, and is not by Aristotle himself at all. (It is characteristic of the period of naturalism and empiricism, which arose in his school after his death.) The fundamental attitude embodied in the doctrine of the categories, and the main portions of the doctrine itself, had been developed before Aristotle dared to shake the metaphysical foundations of Plato's philosophy.[3]

[1] Arist. frg. 46 (Rose, p. 52, l. 19): 'And in the Eudemus he shows that the soul is a Form' (εἶδός τι). The important point is the absence of any genitive such as 'of a body' or 'of something'; and we must not follow Bernays (op. cit., p. 25) in supplying one and then explaining that the expression was purposely made ambiguous in order to conceal a secret opposition to Plato. Simplicius thought it contrary to Aristotle's usual view.

[2] Arist. *De An.* I. 4, 408^{a} 1 ff.

[3] The *Categories* cannot be an early work because the Lyceum is given as an example of the category of place; and this undoubtedly refers to the school, which also provided several other examples of logical conceptions. One need only think of Coriscus; the point of the frequent use of his name as an example becomes clear when one imagines the lectures in Assos, at which he was present. In the *Categories* Aristotle's doctrine of first and second substance is made nominalistic; this cannot be removed or explained away; and the very form is un-Aristotelian. The importance of these slight and unintentional verbal indications must not be underestimated. Moreover, the author assumes that the doctrine of the categories is already known; he takes up only a few questions. All this, however, does not prevent us from seeing that most of the details are Aristotelian in content; the *Eudemus* shows how early in his development they must be placed. Ernst Hambruch shows in his 'Logische Regeln der plat. Schule in der arist. Topik' that a large number of important items of logical knowledge contained in the *Topics* were discovered during Aristotle's time in the Academy (*Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Askanischen Gymnasiums*, Berlin, 1904).

This shows how weak was the original connexion between logic and metaphysics in Aristotle's mind, as opposed to Plato's. He is the real father of logic and devoted an immense amount of acute thinking to it. But he never recognized it as a part of philosophy and as having its own proper object; he always treated it merely as an art or faculty (δύναμις) with special formal rules, more or less like rhetoric. He had already become the first specialist in logic before he deduced from his new doctrine of abstraction consequences that ran counter to the theory of Ideas.

The influence of his studies in logic can also be seen in some of the other fragments of the argument for immortality in the *Eudemus*, and especially in his fondness for what he called dialectic. By this word Aristotle means, in contrast to Plato, all those arguments that rest on merely probable premisses and have only subjective cogency. Plato himself makes extensive use of them in his dialogues. Alongside the strictly apodictic arguments they serve to support the proof as peltasts serve alongside hoplites. (The eristic side of Plato's and Aristotle's logic must always be kept in mind.) They do not possess complete scientific exactitude (ἀκρίβεια). Nevertheless, who could despise the weight of the arguments for an after-life that Aristotle makes out of the religious beliefs of nations, the customs of ritual, and the most ancient myths?[1] Even in his treatises he usually starts from the general view or from the opinions of great men. He tries to combine rational and purely philosophical knowledge with the kernel of truth that lies hidden in those sources. Because of this he has been accused of a tendency towards 'common sense' by those who love the radical and the extreme (and since the Romantic revolution we have generally reckoned such persons as the most profound thinkers, at any rate in the intellectual sphere). As a matter of fact this dialectic conceals a peculiar theory of experience, in the historical and concrete sense of the word. In giving a hearing not merely to his own

[1] Arist. frg. 44 (Rose, p. 48, ll. 11–22).

reason, but also to what has historically been believed, to the collective experience of men or to the ideas of famous persons, Aristotle is not so much lazily relying upon the general opinion as displaying insight into the limitations of every merely intellectual argument about such matters.

To sound the metaphysical depths of the *Eudemus* we must go to the myth of Midas and Silenus. When the king asks him what is the highest good (τὸ πάντων αἱρετώτατον), Silenus unwillingly reveals the misery and wretchedness of man's estate. The style shows the influence of the speech of maid Lachesis, daughter of Ananke, in the tenth book of the *Republic* (617 D ff.). In word and shape Silenus breathes the melancholy humour of nature's earthbound stupor. A cleverly disguised Platonic terminology conveys the principles of the dualist philosophy. 'It is altogether impossible that men should attain to the highest good; they cannot share in the nature of the highest (μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου φύσεως). For the highest good for all men and women is not to be born (τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι). But, if they are born, the best —and *this* men can attain—is to die as quickly as possible.'[1]

The special attraction, the real oracle, of these elevated words lies in their intentional ambiguity. Popular wisdom recommended torpid resignation; the best thing is to die. In this naïve pessimism there is no hope whatever of another and a perfect world, or of a higher existence beyond the grave. Aristotle, on the contrary, introduces into Silenus' words the fundamental conception of Plato's metaphysics. Τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι is not merely 'not to be born'; it also means 'not to enter into Becoming'. To Becoming the *Philebus* (53 C ff.) opposes the pure Being of the world of Ideas as at once its complete opposite and its highest aim. All that is valuable, all that is perfect, all that is absolute, belongs to Being; all that is bad, imperfect, and relative, belongs to Becoming. Whereas Aristotle in his later ethics differs from Plato in that he seeks not for an absolute good but for the best for man (ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν), in this dialogue he is completely on Platonic ground. It is still self-evident to him that when we discuss the highest value we must think of the transcendental Being or the absolute Good, and not of what the Greeks called happiness (εὐδαιμονία). In the absolute Good no

[1] Arist. frg. 44 (Rose, p. 48, l. 23—p. 49, l. 11).

earthly activity can share. We must get back as quickly as possible out of the realm of Becoming and Imperfection into the unseen world of Being.

Aristotle's Platonism comes out most clearly in the main subject of the dialogue, the doctrine of immortality. Later on he held that the essential problem of psychology was the connexion between the soul and the bodily organism, and he claims to have been the first to recognize the psycho-physical nature of mental phenomena. The first result of the discovery of these psycho-physical relations was inevitably to undermine the Platonic belief in the permanence of the individual soul, and the only part of his original conviction that Aristotle could retain was the belief that pure *Nus* is independent of the body. All the other functions of the soul, such as reflection, love and hate, fear, anger, and memory, involve the psycho-physical unity as their substratum and disappear together with it.[1] This disbelief in the immortality of 'the whole soul' (this is the only historically accurate way of describing what moderns often anachronistically call individual immortality) appears quite early in Aristotle. Among the treatises Book Λ of the *Metaphysics* tends to limit survival to *Nus*, and this was written soon after Plato's death.[2] And even in an excerpt made by Iamblichus out of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* we read: 'Man has nothing divine or blessed except the one thing worthy of trouble, whatever there is in us of *Nus* and reason. This alone of what we have seems immortal and divine.'[3] This limitation causes him to value *Nus* all the higher; it is actually God in us—which recalls the doctrine of '*Nus* entering from outside'. His ethical doctrine of happiness and his theological doctrine of the thought of thought depend on this view. It is therefore comprehensible that as early as the Neo-Platonists men began to try to refer the arguments of the *Eudemus* to *Nus* alone. Themistius connects up this difficult question with the problem of how to understand the conception of the soul in the *Phaedo*, which likewise contains certain ambiguities.

[1] For the inseparability of the mental functions from the body see *De An.* I. 1, 403^a 16, *et passim*. For the difference between the separate *Nus*' and the psycho-physical functions see I. 4, 408^b 18–30.

[2] Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 3, 1070^a 24.

[3] Arist. frg. 61.

Themistius indeed, or his source, ascribed to the *Phaedo* the secret intention of making only *Nus* eternal, but here he is confusing the intention of Plato's arguments with their consequences.[1] The myths of the punishment of sins and of the rewarding of souls in the after-life inevitably involve the survival of 'the whole soul', and lose all sense if applied to Aristotle's *Nus*. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the more 'earnest' of the proofs in the *Phaedo* (to use Themistius' expression) prove the eternity of reason only, for instance that from recollection and that from the soul's kinship with God. The fact is that Plato did not clearly distinguish the two problems in his dialogues; they were first mastered in the discussions in the Academy, which gave rise to Aristotle's cautious later formula. In the *Phaedo* we can still clearly discern the original currents of thought that were united in Plato's religion of immortality. The one comes from the Anaxagorean speculations about pure *Nus*; this rested on an apotheosis of scientific reason, and constituted the philosophical high-water mark of fifth-century rationalism. The other current is of opposite origin. It arises out of the Orphic belief in another life, out of the cathartic religion that preaches repentance and purification in order that the soul (ψυχή) may not suffer the most frightful penalties on the other side. In this there is no speculation; it is the ethical and religious feeling of the independence and indestructibility of the soul's essence. In Plato these two currents coalesced into a seeming unity. This unity was based, however, not on a real kinship in its elements, but on the marvellous combination of rational clarity and fervent religious longing in Plato's own soul. Beneath the probe of the analytical intellect the creation breaks up again into its original parts.

After all this it cannot surprise us that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle follows the view of the *Phaedo* even in holding that 'the whole soul' is immortal.[2] This realistic view is the only one that can give religious comfort to the heart of man, which cares nothing for the eternity of the impersonal reason, without love

[1] Arist. frg. 38.

[2] This is perfectly clear from Themistius' words, which imply that it would need 'interpretation' to apply the *Eudemus*' proofs of the survival of the soul to *Nus* alone.

and without memory of this life. But Aristotle has wrestled with doubts, and they have left traces in his notion of Platonic recollection. We know that in his psychology he rejects recollection along with the Idea-theory and the survival of 'the whole soul'.[1] The *Eudemus*, on the other hand, is still based on this theory. But at the time of writing it Aristotle had already put to himself, and attempted to answer by Plato's methods, the psychological question whether consciousness is continuous in the life after death. This is the question on which immortality in the sense meant in the *Phaedo* later seemed to him to founder. The continuity of consciousness depends on memory. Whereas he later denies that *Nus* possesses this, in the *Eudemus* he tries to save it for the soul that has returned to the other world. He does this by enlarging Plato's recollection into a doctrine of the continuity of consciousness in all three phases of the soul's existence—its former existence, its life on this earth, and its life after death. Alongside the Platonic view that the soul remembers the other world he sets his thesis that it remembers this one. He supports this by an analogy. When men fall ill they sometimes lose their memories, even to the extent of forgetting how to read and write; while on the other hand those who have been restored from illness to health do not forget what they suffered while they were ill. In the same way the soul that has descended into a body forgets the impressions received during its former existence, while the soul which death has restored to its home in the other world remembers its experiences and sufferings (παθήματα) here.[2] Life without a body is the soul's normal state (κατὰ φύσιν); its sojourn in the body is a severe illness. Our Lethe of what we beheld in our previous lives is only a temporary interruption and obscuration of our memories and of the continuity of our consciousness. Since nothing of this kind is to be feared when we grow well again, i.e. when our souls are freed from their bodies, this view appears to guarantee the immortality of 'the whole soul'. The validity of the proof depends on the correctness of its presupposition, that man's knowledge is a recollection of 'the visions there' (τὰ ἐκεῖ θεάματα). The personal immortality that the *Eudemus* teaches necessarily stands or falls along with this Platonic dogma. Plato

[1] *De An.* III. 5, 430ª 23; Metaph. A 9, 993ª 1.

[2] Arist. frg. 41.

CHAPTER IV

THE *PROTREPTICUS*

1. FORM AND PURPOSE

NEXT to the *Eudemus* the *Protrepticus* is for us the most important work of all those written before Plato's death, both because of the extent to which it is preserved and because of its actual significance. First, however, we require a proof that it *was* written before Plato's death, for as yet scarcely the shadow of one has been offered. Even the problem of its literary form, though much discussed until recently, has not been completely explained. Still less has any attempt been made to determine its philosophical contents.

The *Protrepticus* holds an exceptional position among Aristotle's early writings. It is addressed to Themison, a prince of Cyprus. Although we know nothing further of this man and his circumstances, it is easy to imagine what sort of person a small enlightened despot would be at the beginning of the Hellenistic age. We know two other Cyprian princes from Isocrates' encomium to Evagoras and his open letter to Evagoras' son Nicocles. The address to Nicocles is a protreptic; it prescribes to the young ruler the best principles of just and intelligent government. In the fourth century the schools competed in this way for the attention of the temporal powers, in order to obtain influence in politics. We do not know whether it was through his Cyprian friend Eudemus that Aristotle came to know Themison. We must certainly suppose that the purpose which his letter served formed part of the far-reaching political activities of the Academy at that time.

Aristotle addressed Themison in the introduction. He there said that Themison's wealth and position made him peculiarly suitable for philosophy.[1] This is not a piece of flattery, as it seems at first sight. We must remember that on Plato's view the only persons who can hope to realize the greatest good in the state, and to give help to suffering humanity, are philosophers who obtain political power, or kings who devote themselves

[1] Arist. frg. 50.

seriously to philosophy. Thus Plato too holds that riches and power are indispensable instruments of the Idea.[1] Themison is to help to realize the political philosophy of the Academy.

The form of the work is closely connected with this purpose, and this is one of the matters in which we suffer from having usually treated the two questions separately. The protreptic form took its origin in the new educational method of the sophists. It is not a development of the Socratic method. It by no means necessarily demands the dialogue dress, although that has often been regarded as the natural thing for Aristotle's exoteric writings.[2] When Cicero in his *Hortensius* put the ideas of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* into dialogue form, he thought it necessary to announce the alteration even in the title. And the form of the protreptics that are preserved, although they belong to the time of the emperors, allows us to infer that a protreptic was an exhortation, something like the Hellenistic proselytizing sermon, which is connected with it in form and spirit, and which has been taken over by the Christian church. Probably protreptic ideas were often converted into dialogues, as has happened in the *Tablet* of the so-called Cebes. Whether this was so with Antisthenes' *Protrepticus* is not certain, but everybody knows that Plato did it with Socratic arguments in the *Euthydemus*. In that dialogue Socrates gives to the sophists who are taking part in the conversation examples of a protreptic discussion with a pupil, in his own peculiar form of question and answer, just as he often makes fanciful play with the sophistic forms of expression. Aristotle expressly follows this classical example of Platonic protreptic—but only in content. In form he here for once takes the path not of Plato but of Isocrates.

The form of a personal letter is not the only thing that Aristotle borrowed from this source; for exhortation (παραίνεσις)

[1] The author of the second Platonic letter is expressing a thoroughly Platonic notion when he says (310 E): 'It is a natural law that wisdom and great power attract each other. They are always pursuing and seeking after each other and coming together.'

[2] In our catalogues of Aristotle's works, both in Diogenes and in Hesychius and Ptolemy, the *Protrepticus* is listed among the exoteric writings, which are given first. But this implies nothing about its form, since it is possible that other writings besides the dialogues were exoteric. The *Protrepticus* would be reckoned exoteric just as much if it were in the form of a speech or an open letter.

was a standing part of the Isocratean method of education. To address oneself to a particular person is a very ancient point of style in every kind of moral maxim and didactic speech. In the period during which the accepted means of exerting a spiritual influence on mankind was poetry, we can follow the address to an individual from Hesiod's exhortations to Perses down to the didactic poem of Empedocles and the maxims that Theognis addressed to Cyrnus; the schools were still using the latter for the moral education of boys at the time of Socrates and the sophists. The sophists replaced this old-fashioned maxim-poetry with a new prose form, which began to compete successfully with the traditional method.[1] The pattern of a prince that Isocrates gives us in his *Ad Nicoclem* is the sophistic counterpart of the pattern of chivalry in Theognis. Both belong to the same genus. Aristotle's *Protrepticus* is, however, more than a philosophical pattern for princes. It proclaims the new ideal of the purely philosophic life, which Plato demanded from the man of action as much as from any one (for to exhort a practising politician to cultivate the 'theoretic life' is a Platonic trait, foreign to the later Aristotle). Incidentally this work is not, as is generally said, 'dedicated' to Aristotle's princely friend. The dedication of dialogues and treatises belongs to the literary customs of Hellenistic courtesy; no such artificial usage was known to the better period. With Aristotle the address to a particular person is still the living expression of the mood of earnest ethical exhortation. It is organic to the protreptic style as such.

There are other traces of the imitation of the Isocratean exhortation or παραίνεσις. It is true that even here we find the peculiar form that stamps everything coming from Aristotle, the predominance of the arrangement of chains of thought in apodictic syllogisms. It is true that precisely here this form could win easy and ingenious victories. ('Ought we to philosophize?' was the question that preoccupied every exhortation to the study of philosophy. Aristotle's answer came pat. Either we ought to philosophize or we ought not. If we ought, then we

[1] P. Wendland gives the true account of the development of the prose protreptic out of the maxim-poetry of the Ὑποθῆκαι in his *Anaximenes von Lampsakos* (Berlin, 1905), pp. 81 ff. Cf. Isocr. *Ad Nicocl.* 3.

ought. If we ought not, then also we ought (in order to justify this view). Hence in any case we ought to philosophize.[1] Most of the remaining fragments have a similar syllogistic form.) Nevertheless, the ideas of the older exhortations often shine through this veil of dialectic. The interplay between the old store of ideas and the new and striking way of supporting them comes out particularly clearly in one of the longer fragments. This passage survived long enough to get into the Byzantine anthologies; its original, unabridged form has lately been discovered in a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus.[2]

'Believe that man's happiness lies not in the magnitude of his possessions but in the proper condition of his soul. Even the body is not called blessed because it is magnificently clothed, but because it is healthy and in good condition, even if it lacks this decoration. In the same way only the cultivated soul is to be called happy; and only the man who is such, not the man who is magnificently decorated with external goods, but is himself of no value. We do not call a bad horse valuable because it has a golden bit and costly harness; we reserve our praise for the horse that is in perfect condition.'

Or again:

'Just as a man would be a ridiculous figure if he were intellectually and morally inferior to his slaves, in the same way we must believe a man miserable if his possessions are more valuable than himself. . . . Satiety begets wantonness, says the proverb. Vulgarity linked with power and possessions brings forth folly.'

These ideas are not peculiar to Platonic wisdom, but the apodictic form of exposition is new. The frequent 'we must believe' is itself one of the technical devices of sophistic exhortation. Isocrates in his address to Nicocles, and the author of the protreptic *To Demonicus*, begin their maxims in this way no less than fifteen times. Our philosophical analysis will show that Aristotle effectively transformed not merely the inexhaustible storehouse of ancient Greek proverbial wisdom, but also Plato's ethics and metaphysics. He makes the hortatory content of the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo* coalesce with the uniform prose of the Isocratean protreptic. This synthesis is the fruit of the young Platonist's efforts to make technical rhetoric at home in the Academy, and to turn it into a scientific discipline.

In this way the *Protrepticus* comes to be a manifesto on behalf of Plato's school and its notion of the aim of life and culture.

[1] Frg. 51. [2] Frg. 57. Cf. *Pap. Oxyrh.*, vol. iv, pp. 83 ff.

Isocrates had been combining mind-training, by means of formal exercises in writing and speaking, with instruction in the principles of ethics and of practical statesmanship. His circle now found itself publicly opposed by a new competitor. The *Protrepticus* showed that the Academy could hold its own in the sphere of rhetoric. Besides this, its contents must have seemed to the followers of Isocrates an open attack on their ideal of culture. Isocrates' polemical remarks on the Platonic ideal of educating the young by means of pure philosophy, and his recommendation of the banal viewpoint of utility in education, designed to suit the psychology of the average Philistine—these things had long called for an answer from the Academy. In the *Protrepticus* Aristotle refuted the trivial proposition that the value of knowledge is to be measured according to its utility in practical life. But what refuted banausic persons even more convincingly than the acuteness of his syllogisms was the demonstration, renewed in every line, of his own intellectual superiority. He showed that neither a good style of writing, nor a sensible disposition of one's life, nor a productive statesmanship—the aims towards which Isocrates professed to lead—is possible without solidity in the ultimate principles of human conviction.

It appears that the school of Isocrates did not fail to produce a rejoinder, and that an accident has preserved it for us among the speeches of Isocrates. It is the anonymous exhortation *To Demonicus*, a wretched piece of work by an inferior mind, betraying the spirit of sheer envy and competitiveness. The author can be recognized as a pupil of Isocrates by the arsenal from which he draws his intellectual weapons—the arrangement and the commonplaces of the speech show that it cannot have been written appreciably later. Presumably it is preserved simply because it was commissioned by the school. In the introduction the author explains his intentions in the following manner.[1]

'Those who compose protreptic discourses addressed to their own friends are, no doubt, engaged in a laudable employment; yet they do not occupy themselves with the most vital part of philosophy. Those, on the contrary, who point out to the young, not by what means they may cultivate skill in mere dialectic (δι' ὧν τὴν δεινότητα τὴν ἐν τοῖς

[1] [Isocr.] *Ad Demon.* 3.

λόγοις ἀσκήσουσιν),[1] but how they may win repute as men of sound character, are rendering a greater service to their hearers, in that, while the former exhort them to proficiency in argument, the latter improve their moral conduct.'

This appears to be directed against a protreptic addressed to a friend from a philosophical point of view, consciously theoretical, and calling for the study of dialectic. Surely no such work can have become sufficiently famous to seem dangerous to the Isocratean circle, except the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle. This fits in specially well with what the follower of Isocrates says about his opponent's hostile attitude towards life and the world, as displayed in his view of the aim of education. It was the first philosophical protreptic, and so far as we know the only one, definitely to put the controversial question whether we really ought to educate merely for 'life'. Against the bourgeois world of Isocrates it set up its bold demand for 'the theoretic life'. We need not, however, content ourselves with general considerations; it is possible to give more tangible proof of its influence on the *Ad Demonicum*.[2]

Ad Demon. 19: 'Do not hesitate to travel a long road to those who profess to offer some useful instruction; for it were a shame, when merchants cross vast seas in order to increase their store of wealth,

Arist. frg. 52 (Rose, p. 62, l. 7). 'We ought not to shun philosophy, if philosophy is as we think the possession and use of wisdom, and wisdom is one of the greatest goods. We ought not to sail to the pillars

[1] The author's notion of philosophy is that of Isocrates, which resembles our notion of general culture. The 'skill in argument' that he condemns, and the 'cultivation' of this, is, as Wendland saw, not the cleverness of the rhetorician. He is not opposing protreptics on behalf of rhetoric, but logical or dialectical philosophy; cf. Isocr. *Hel.* 2, where the same things are again described as 'excessive interest in arguments' (περιεργία ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). In the *Antidosis* (258 ff.) dialectic, geometry, and astronomy are associated as forming the opponent's characteristic educational programme. As in the speech *To Demonicus*, they are said to be useful indeed as intellectual disciplines (265), but not helpful for great actions and ideals.

[2] In his excellent discussion of the *Ad Demonicum* P. Wendland (op. cit., pp. 92 ff.) calls attention to its relations to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and points out the parallel given in the text. Although he does not draw it, it seems to me the inevitable consequence of these observations that the *Ad Demonicum* is mainly aimed at the *Protrepticus*, and was actually written with the intention of setting up another goal against the ideal of that work. It is not of course necessary that the echo followed immediately on the appearance of Aristotle's work, but it was certainly written while he was still alive. During the next hundred years the influence of the *Protrepticus* was constantly increasing (cf. Arist. frg. 50), which makes such a criticism of it perfectly comprehensible.

that the young should not endure even journeys by land to improve their understanding.'

Cf. the beginning of this section: 'Believe that many precepts are better than much wealth; for wealth quickly fails us, but precepts abide through all time; for wisdom alone of all possessions is imperishable.'

of Hercules and run many dangers for the sake of wealth, while we spend neither labour nor money for wisdom. Verily it is slavish to long for life instead of for the good life, and to follow the opinions of the many instead of demanding that the many follow our own, and to seek for money but pay no attention whatever to the noble.'

The correspondence between the two passages cannot be accidental, for the following reason. In Aristotle the picture of the sailors risking all dangers in their hunger for wealth provides a very good contrast to the men who must make sacrifices in order to cultivate the highest goods. The pupil of Isocrates, on the other hand, brings it in loosely, just as a rhetorician would collect tricks of style in his reading and afterwards make use of them. He is unable to get the proper effect with it. His antithesis seems strained and frigid. To the borrowed image of the seafaring merchants he opposes the safe travel of the student overland, going to Athens to attend the university. His surprising admonition that 'many lectures' are worth more than 'much wealth' is for once not altogether lacking in originality, for in the school of Isocrates instruction was expensive.

2. PRESERVATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

In his penetrating book on Aristotle's dialogues Bernays directed the attention of philologists to the works of the Neo-Platonists, by giving some examples of their predilection for these dialogues.

This brought forth excellent fruit in 1869, when Ingram Bywater showed that there are large portions of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in Iamblichus' work of the same name, where they lie buried under numerous excerpts from Plato's dialogues.[1] As luck would have it, Bernays had by that time completed his researches; and his conclusion, that Aristotle never had a Platonic period, barred him from understanding the new discovery. Even Bywater himself remained entirely convinced by Bernays's argument. His delight at his find led him to hasty

[1] *The Journal of Philology*, vol. ii, pp. 55 ff.

publication, without any careful attempt to make sure of what he had got, or to establish the limits of the new fragments.

The *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus is a reader for beginners in philosophy. It is put together out of such works as taught a genuinely Pythagorean doctrine according to the Neo-Platonists subsequent to Porphyry. These were (1) their own, (2) the writings, mostly spurious, of the older Pythagoreans whom they quote, and above all (3) those of Plato and the early Aristotle, who were regarded as genuine esoterics. The sacredness of these writings is an example of the tremendous power then exercised by tradition as embodied in books; we see it also in contemporary Christianity and Judaism, and later in Islam. Out of loosely connected passages from Plato's dialogues, mostly well-known ones, Iamblichus weaves a variegated carpet. The transitions are inadequate and stereotyped, so that the seams are everywhere visible at first sight. The conversational parts are transformed into continuous prose, not without serious inaccuracies. Although it is not explicitly said that Plato and Aristotle are being quoted, there is no question of an attempt to deceive, for every scholar was familiar with the passages. Even so, it is a sorry piece of work, and gives evidence of the fact that literary culture and scientific independence were steadily declining at the time. Iamblichus took account of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* because it was the archetype of this form of writing, if for no other reason; and he got his excerpts from his own reading of it. The Neo-Platonists were attracted by the ascetic and religious character of the book. They considered it evidence of Aristotle's supposed Platonism, or at any rate a means of reconciling the contradictions between Plato and the Peripatetic doctrine. One may go so far as to say that the Neo-Platonists caused a revival of the book, for almost every one of them reveals traces of it.

We now come to the determination of the extent of the excerpts in Iamblichus, a task already attempted by Bywater, Hirzel, and Hartlich.[1] The main portion of his book, chapters 5–19, is made up of quotations from Plato's dialogues. In chapters 6–12 this series is interrupted by passages from Aristotle.

[1] Hirzel, *Hermes*, vol. x, pp. 83 ff. Paul Hartlich, 'De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole' (*Leipz. Studien*, vol. xi, Part 2, Leipzig, 1889).

principles and occupied in their realization (ἀρετή), or the life of the pure intellect (φρόνησις). These three points correspond exactly to the sequence of the chapters: (1) chaps. 7–9, (2) chap. 10, and (3) chaps. 11–12. Now it is possible to doubt how far these chapters are copied from an Aristotelian source (it is shown below that as a matter of fact they are all excerpts from the *Protrepticus*); but no one is going to believe that in the order given to them in Iamblichus they constitute a single continuous fragment of Aristotle. Therefore Iamblichus himself must be responsible for the introductory words in which the scheme of the six following chapters is announced. What he does is to take this outline and fill it out with selected passages from his source (although no doubt the three divisions of the outline are themselves copied from the same source). This is clear at the start; after announcing his plan he makes no attempt to smooth over the transition to verbal quotation, but begins with Aristotle's schematic phrase ἔτι τοίνυν (p. 41, l. 15). The proof thus inaugurated extends down to p. 43, l. 25, and forms on the whole a single train of thought, though p. 42, l. 5, is undoubtedly abbreviated. At l. 25 of p. 43 some more excisions begin, but the conclusion of the preceding part (p. 43, ll. 22–5) shows how close was its original connexion with the argument that follows (p. 43, l. 27, to the end of chapter 7). It is obvious that all this consists of disconnected quotations from an earlier author, and the style and the ideas reveal at every turn that that author is Aristotle. It was a very unmethodical proceeding to exclude these pages merely because there seemed to be no external evidence for them, when they are surrounded on all sides by demonstrably Aristotelian passages.

The main thought of the first section (p. 41, l. 15—p. 43, l. 25) is specifically Aristotelian, and so is the way in which it is developed. In order to determine what is favourable and advantageous for each nature, the author makes use of the notion of τέλος. The 'aim' of every nature must be sought in some significant activity, some living effectiveness that it has. In the mass of its effects or functions (ἔργον) one will stand out as its peculiar strength (οἰκεία ἀρετή) over against all other individuals or species; this is the work that is essential to it and constitutes its τέλος. The task of every nature is determined

by its inborn capacity. The scale of functions according to their value is given by nature, for the instrumental ones are always biologically the lower, and the governing ones the higher. Such is the relation, for example, of the bodily to the mental functions. In this sense the ἔργον of the mental capacities has greater value than that of the bodily. The highest of all is that capacity of the soul whose value does not lie in effecting a mere result (ἔργον) distinct from its own activity (ἐνέργεια). This capacity does not aim at the production of any external object, and in it activity and product are one. Its name is *phronesis*, which is perhaps to be rendered as 'pure reason'. *Phronesis* has only itself for object and aim, and produces nothing but itself. It is pure intuition (θεωρία). In the conception of intuition being, action, and production, are resolved into a unity. The highest form of life is neither ordinary production nor ordinary action, but the contemplative vision of the intellect, which is active and productive in a higher sense. The following elements in this can be seen at a glance to be Aristotelian in content: the comparison of the pleasures of contemplation with those of the disinterested use of the eyes; the importance of the notion of function and work (ἐνέργεια, ἔργον); the distinction between functions performed *in* activities and those that are merely performed *through* them; the distinction between the productive, the practical, and the theoretical activities; and the identity of subject and object in the active intellect.[1] In the doctrine of levels, which is presupposed here and receives express mention somewhat further on, we have the fundamental principle of Aristotle's teleology, namely that in every sphere of reality the higher levels include the lower. Lastly, Aristotle was familiar with the doctrine of the three lives and three points of view, the hedonistic-sensual, the ethical, and the intellectual.

Besides this internal evidence we have a convincing external proof. In the chapter on the original form of the *Ethics* it will be shown that large and connected portions of the *Eudemian Ethics* correspond exactly in content and language to the excerpts that Iamblichus has preserved. Some of them are

[1] The conception of ἔργον, which is one of the most important elements in Aristotle's theory of value, is present throughout the passage. It appears in the following places: p. 42, ll. 5, 15, 19, 20, 22; p. 43, ll. 6, 9, 18, 21.

passages of which the author of the *Eudemian Ethics* expressly says that he is taking them from 'the exoteric works'. Now if we compare these passages with the excerpts in Iamblichus we find that the latter are the archetypes. It follows that the work from which Iamblichus took these quotations was one of those lost works of Aristotle the application to which of the word 'exoteric' was so long in dispute, but is now beyond doubt. Now Iamblichus' seventh chapter is one of these excerpts. Therefore it must be Aristotelian. It is equally certain that it must be from the *Protrepticus*, since this is true of the other passages in the *Eudemian Ethics* that are known to be borrowed, and since the whole train of thought is protreptic in tone.

In his later lectures Aristotle frequently touched on the question of the value of the different kinds of life, and put the choice before his hearers. In such places he invariably distinguished the life of pleasure and gain, the life of action, and that of the student and philosopher. The *Protrepticus* is the origin both of the question and of the answer, which is that the life of pure knowledge is preferable to all other modes of human existence, even from the ethical point of view.

But the significance of the quotation in Iamblichus' seventh chapter is still not exhausted.

Every reader of the *Metaphysics* has been carried away again and again by the force of its opening pages. Aristotle there develops with irresistible power the view that, far from its being contrary to man's nature to occupy himself with theoretical studies, the pleasure of seeing, of understanding, and of knowing, is rooted deep within him, and merely expresses itself differently at the different levels of his consciousness and culture. It is really the fulfilment of man's higher nature; it is not a mere means to the satisfaction of the rising standards of civilized life, but the highest absolute value and the summit of culture; and of all studies the highest and most desirable is the one that produces the most exact science, and realizes in its perfect form the disinterested vision of pure knowledge. The protreptic power of these ideas will be felt by all who have learnt through experience the supreme value of this activity when pursued for its own sake. Knowledge has never been understood and recommended more purely, more earnestly, or more sublimely;

and it is still a dead letter to-day for those who cannot pursue it in this spirit. Now to teach us to understand it in this profound sense was what Aristotle aimed at in the *Protrepticus*, and the famous introduction to the *Metaphysics* is in essence nothing but an abbreviated version of his classical exposition of the matter there. This is shown by a comparison of Iamblichus' seventh chapter (p. 43, l. 20), which develops the same idea at greater length, and carries the argument into more detail. We find that the introductory chapter of the *Metaphysics* is simply a collection of material extracted from this source for the purpose of a lecture, and that it is not even quite firmly cemented into place.

Protr., p. 43, l. 20

Thought and contemplation . . . is *the most desirable of all things for men*, as is (I think) the sense of sight, which a man would choose to possess *even if nothing were going to come of it except the sight itself*.

Again, if we *love* sight *for itself*, this is sufficient proof that all men *love* thought and knowledge exceedingly. . . . But what distinguishes life from non-life is perception, and life is determined by the presence of this capacity. . . . *The power of sight differs* from the other senses *by being the clearest, and this is the reason why we prefer it to all*. If then life is to be chosen because of *perception*, and if *perception is a kind of knowledge* which we choose because it enables the soul *to know*, and if *as we have said above the preferable one of two things is that which has more of the same thing*,[1] it necessarily follows that sight is the most desirable and honourable of the senses, but that wisdom is more desirable than this and all the other senses, and even than life itself, since it has *a better grasp of truth*.[2] Therefore all men seek wisdom above all things; for they *love* wisdom and *knowledge because they love life*.

Metaph. A 1, 980^a 21

All men by nature *desire* to know. An indication of this is the *delight* we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness *they are loved* for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but *even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing* (one might say) *to everything else*. The reason is that this, *most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things*. By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation. . . .

The meaning of the concise word ἀγάπησις in the second sentence of the *Metaphysics*, namely the love of an activity for its own sake, receives much clearer expression in the

[1] Reading ὅτι instead of ὅτιπερ. [2] Reading κυριωτέρα οὖσα.

corresponding passage of the excerpt from the *Protrepticus*, as was necessary in an exoteric exposition. Every word is obviously Aristotelian; but the excerptor has put together several distinct passages from the *Protrepticus* because of the similarity of their contents, and as the weld is pretty roughly made the whole gives a tautologous effect. It is, however, quite impossible to suppose that we have here a mere paraphrase of the passage in the *Metaphysics*. These excerpts definitely go beyond what is said in that work. This is especially clear in the emphasis put on correct logical reasoning, which corresponds to the picture of Aristotle's early manner that we have received from the *Eudemus*. Examples are the use as a premiss of the topical principle that of two objects that which possesses a valuable quality in a higher degree is itself valuable in a higher degree;[1] and the use of definitions in order to prove that wisdom is good by means of the conception of life. Both in the *Metaphysics* and in the *Protrepticus* the method of proof is dialectical, and this also agrees with what we observed in the *Eudemus*.

The first two chapters are of this nature throughout, and since they teach the same fundamental principle as the *Protrepticus*, namely the self-sufficiency of pure theoretical knowledge, it is natural to suppose that they are substantially or wholly borrowed therefrom. This can easily be demonstrated in detail. In both writings the conception of pure knowledge is developed by contrasting it with the activity of the practical man, which rests on mere experience or routine. It is not the empirical and practical man who stands higher, but the theoretical and contemplative one; for empiricism never attains that insight into the causes and reasons for phenomena which the theoretical man possesses owing to his mastery of the universal. The more empirical you are, and the more you rely on perception (πρόσθεσις), the less exact your knowledge. The only truly exact knowledge is that of what is most knowable, namely those most general principles (τὰ πρῶτα) which form the subject-matter of the highest theoretical studies. It may well be that in practice

[1] In the *Eudemus* the logical proposition that the identity of the object depends on the identity of the attributes was employed to refute the doctrine that the soul is a harmony of the body. In referring the greater value of the object to the presence (ὑπάρχειν) of more valuable attributes Aristotle is here proceeding in a similar manner.

the mere empiric will have more success than a theorist who has had no actual experience, but the former never attains to action that really depends on secure principles and on insight into the necessities of the case; he remains 'banausic'. The concealed polemic against banausic persons and their contempt for theory, which is continuous throughout the first chapters of the *Metaphysics*, was modelled on the *Protrepticus*, in which Aristotle had refuted the attacks of the empiricists in detail. Fortunately we still possess a fragment that goes deeply into the arguments of the opposite side (frg. 52; Rose, p. 59, ll. 17 ff.).

'That philosophy is useless in practical life may be seen in the following manner. The best example that we have is the relation between the theoretical or pure studies (ἐπιστῆμαι) and the applied disciplines that are subordinate to them (ὑποκείμεναι δόξαι). For we notice that the geometricians are quite unable to apply their scientific proofs in practice. When it comes to dividing a piece of land, or to any other operation on magnitudes and spaces, the surveyors can do it because of their experience, but those who are concerned with mathematics and with the reasons for these things, while they may know how it *ought* to be done, cannot do it.'

The demand for exactitude (ἀκρίβεια) in scientific knowledge is another thing that is strongly emphasized in the *Protrepticus*. It is there brought into connexion with the doctrine that science is knowledge of reasons and first principles, for only the universal and the principles can be known with exactitude. In some passages there is even a verbal correspondence. The parallel between the two writings is equally complete in the derivation of the higher and the highest levels of knowledge from the lower and naïve ones. But naturally we must not expect Aristotle to repeat himself mechanically page after page; verbal echoes remain the exception. The most decisive consideration is that these ideas were originally intended for the *Protrepticus*. They belong there by their essential nature, whereas in the lectures on metaphysics they are an external addition, arbitrarily tailored to suit the requirements of an introduction.

Immediately after the long passages of Iamblichus' third book referred by Rose to the *Protrepticus* there follows a description, also from the *Protrepticus*, of the gradual development of philosophy out of the other 'arts' (frg. 53). Presupposing Plato's theory of catastrophes, this work taught that after the

devastations of the great flood men were at first obliged to devote themselves to the discovery of the mere necessities of food and life (τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὸ ζῆν πρῶτον ἠναγκάζοντο φιλοσοφεῖν). When things were going better they invented the arts that serve for recreation, such as music and the like. It was later still, when their need of necessaries was fully supplied, that they turned their attention to liberal studies and pure philosophy. Aristotle no doubt has the mathematical disciplines especially in mind when he speaks of the enormous advances made by the pure sciences in recent times (i.e. during Plato's generation). The same observation reappears in the *Metaphysics* (A 1, 981^b 13–982^a 2). There it is strangely out of relation to its context, whereas in the *Protrepticus* it served to show that, once the stimulus to philosophical studies has been given, they exercise an irresistible attraction over men's minds. The original reference to mathematics still obtains in the *Metaphysics*, where the mathematical inquiries of the Egyptian priests are cited as the beginning of the third era. The distinction between necessary and liberal arts also comes from the *Protrepticus*. In fact, everything in the first two chapters of the *Metaphysics* is taken therefrom. We must assume that this is true also of the outstandingly Platonic theological section 982^b 28–983^a 11, although our material fails us here.[1]

With regard to Iamblichus' ninth chapter, the end of it (p. 52, l. 16—p. 54, l. 5, frg. 58) is recognized as certainly belonging to

[1] In two famous places where he is praising the divine blessedness of pure philosophical contemplation (*Metaph.* A 2, 982^b 28, and *Eth. Nic.* X. 7, 1177^b 31) Aristotle exhorts men not to be afraid of setting their thoughts on divine and immortal things, thus contradicting the ancient Greek precept. It is notorious that in both these passages he borrows a number of ideas and descriptive formulae from the *Protrepticus*; and his reversal of the ancient exhortation is protreptic in the highest degree. Now the author of the protreptic *Ad Demonicum*, who (as was shown above) made polemical use of Aristotle's work in several places, writes in § 32 as follows: 'Think immortal things by being lofty of soul, and mortal things by enjoying in due measure the goods that you possess.' Although he here understands 'thinking immortal things' in a purely moralistic and non-speculative sense, he does at any rate allow it a certain value; and this shows that he has been induced by Aristotle to correct the traditional exhortation, which would hear nothing of such high thinking. Hence it is as good as certain that the famous call 'to make ourselves immortal as far as we can' (*Eth. Nic.* 1177^b 33) originally appeared in the *Protrepticus*, and was borrowed thence for the *Ethics* and the introduction to the *Metaphysics*.

the *Protrepticus*. In content it forms part of Aristotle's reply to the objection that philosophy is useless for life. We know from Cicero that he actually used the division of goods into necessary and valuable in themselves (ἀναγκαῖα and δι' αὑτὰ ἀγαπώμενα or ἐλεύθερα), and also the beautiful description of the isles of the blest, whose inhabitants, having no earthly needs, are wholly devoted to pure contemplation.[1] Nevertheless, Iamblichus has largely obliterated the force of the passage. Aristotle was not merely painting a pleasant picture. He also intended to show mankind isolated, as it were, from the needs (χρεία) of life. In using an image for such a purpose he was following Plato in the *Republic*, where the story of Gyges is employed in order to observe the behaviour of a man who can do whatever he likes, without having to take any account of other men and their judgements. It is commonly held that Iamblichus gives the original more truly than Cicero. This is wrong. Cicero says: supposing we were on the islands of the blessed, what need should we have of oratory, since there are no judicial proceedings there? What need should we have of the virtues of justice, courage, temperance, and even ethical prudence? Only knowledge and pure contemplation would still be desirable. It follows that we love knowledge for its own sake, and not because of its usefulness or of any need of ours. Iamblichus omits all this, and thereby obscures the point of the picture. Cicero has preserved the tenor of the original on the whole pretty accurately. His only alteration is the addition of eloquence to the four cardinal virtues adduced in the *Protrepticus*. This was obviously done because of Hortensius, who reckoned not philosophy but eloquence the highest good.

The proof of Cicero's superior accuracy is to be found in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here again a reminiscence of his early work has influenced Aristotle's pen.[2] The subject is the same as that of the *Protrepticus*, namely pure contemplation. He contrasts it with the life of action. The latter requires many external aids for the realization of the ethical disposition (ἡ ἐκτὸς χορηγία ἡ ἠθική). Generosity requires money. So does justice, if you wish to return equals for equals. Courage requires strength. Temperance can be tested only by the

[1] Frg. 58.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* X. 8, 1178^a 24–^{b} 5.

opportunity to abandon one's self-control. How else can a good disposition be exercised? And without exercise it never reaches fulfilment. The knower, on the other hand, needs no external aid in order to exercise his virtue; on the contrary, such aids could only be a hindrance to him. There, moreover, Aristotle represents contemplation (θεωρία) as isolated and independent of the necessities of life. The idea is somewhat differently turned; Plato's doctrine of the four virtues is consciously rejected; through the inclusion of generosity the whole regains in effectiveness what it loses in enthusiasm through the suppression of the isles of the blest. In spite of retouching, however, the original picture is still recognizable, because the old method of presenting the thought is retained. The essential point, both here and in Cicero, is the disappearance of the 'ethical virtues' in the state of pure bliss that belongs to intellectual vision. This proves that Cicero's version is the more complete.

The first part of the ninth chapter also comes from the *Protrepticus*. This is as certain from the contents as it is from the style. Aristotle starts by dividing the causes of becoming into nature, art, and chance, a distinction that he makes in other places as well, though nowhere so pregnantly as here.[1] It is a characteristically Aristotelian view that nature is purposive in a higher degree even than art, and that the purposiveness that rules in handiwork, whether art or craft, is nothing but an imitation of the purposiveness of nature. The same view of the relation between these two things is often briefly expressed in the second book of the *Physics*, which is one of Aristotle's earliest writings. It is occasionally alluded to in other places also, but never so well developed and articulated as here. An expression like the following is strikingly original: 'Nature does not imitate art,[2] but art nature; and art exists to help and to make up what nature leaves undone' (p. 49, l. 28). The means

[1] We shall meet this tripartite division of the causes of becoming again in the dialogue *On Philosophy*. There its authenticity has been doubted, but in reality it is a part of the mechanistic physics that obtained before Plato. In *Laws* X. 888 E, Plato had already used it precisely as Aristotle does in the *Protrepticus*, to show that nature (φύσις) is not behind art (τέχνη) in intellect and resourcefulness, and to develop his new conception of φύσις by this means. The realistic manner in which the idea is worked out in the *Protrepticus* shows how closely Aristotle followed the later Plato even in his philosophy of nature.

[2] That it did was the view of the Presocratic sophists, who were thoroughly imbued with the rationalist spirit, and taught the existence of a mechanical adaptation of means to end in nature, and especially in the human organism. Traces of such a system are preserved in Xen. *Mem.* I. 4, 6 ff., and Arist. *Part. Animal.* II. 15. Aristotle's philosophy of nature depends on an entirely different attitude, as he himself says here. It is *teleological*. Far from nature's exhibiting 'incipient' tendencies to rival the art of our machines, all arts are merely man's attempt to compete with organic and creative nature; and this competition necessarily takes place in another medium (that of artificial construction), in which it is never possible to speak of an end (τέλος) in the highest or organic sense.

taken to recommend this view are again indubitably Aristotelian. He offers examples from agriculture and from the care that the higher organisms require before and after birth. He establishes the proposition that there is a universal purposiveness in organic nature by examples from the mechanics of the human body and its self-protecting devices.[1] Everything comes into being for the sake of an end. An end is that which always appears as the final result of a development, in accordance with natural law and by a continuous process, and in which the process attains its completion. Thus in the process of becoming the mental is later than the physical, and in the mental realm the intellectual element in its pure form is again the later. Therefore Pythagoras was right in calling pure contemplation the end of man, i.e. the completion of human nature. To the question what we are born for he replied, 'to gaze upon the heavens'. Anaxagoras also expressed himself to the same effect.

Anaxagoras' apophthegm reappears in the *Eudemian Ethics*,

[1] Bernays (*Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, vol. i, p. 23) believed Heraclitus to be the originator of the proposition that art is an imitation of nature, because the author of the *De Mundo* (5, 396^b 7 ff.) explains the process of natural becoming as being a harmonious amalgamation of opposites, and proves this from the example of the arts, which he declares to be nothing but imitations of nature; but what the *De Mundo* quotes from Heraclitus in this connexion ('that which agrees and that which differs, that which produces harmony and that which produces discord') shows no trace of such a view. So far as concerns the inference from art to nature, and the conclusion that the latter is the archetype, this view is Peripatetic and has nothing to do with the sage of Ephesus. Democritus has a similar but distinct doctrine when he calls men the pupils of the animals, of the spider in weaving and mending, of the swallow in building, and of the songbirds in song (frg. 154). (With the last cf. Lucretius V. 1379. Lucretius also derives cookery (l. 1102) and sowing and grafting (l. 1361) from the imitation of nature, which he certainly got from Democritus by way of Epicurus). But Aristotle is concerned with something entirely new. He refers the proposition that art is an imitation of nature to the teleological character of all human construction, and grounds it in the teleological view of nature.

Plato, who strongly emphasized the element of intellectual knowledge in it, and examined the special nature of this 'knowledge'. It now took to itself the Form or standard as its object, and thus became the intellectual intuition of the good and the beautiful in themselves. The Form had first occurred to Plato in connexion with Socrates' problems, that is to say, in the ethical sphere; but as it widened its sway until it finally became the general principle of all being, *phronesis* received more and more content. It became the Eleatic science of being. It became the Anaxagorean *Nus*. In a word, it became pure theoretical reason, the opposite of what it had been in Socrates' practical sphere. At this point Plato divided his system into dialectic, ethics, and physics. From then on there were several *phroneseis*. Frequently the word meant no more than 'special science'; gymnastics and medicine, and all disciplines whatsoever, were *phroneseis*. This development can be understood only by means of the development of Plato's philosophy as a whole, and its final division into three philosophies. At the same time a development took place in the theory of the first principles, in the course of which the Form became mathematical, and ended in a theology and a monadology. In the *Protrepticus phronesis* has this meaning almost exclusively. It is *Nus*, metaphysical speculation, that which is really divine in us, a power wholly distinct from the other faculties of the soul; as it is in the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus*, in the *Laws* or the *Epinomis*.

Whereas the *Protrepticus* understands *phronesis* in the full Platonic sense, as equivalent to philosophical knowledge as such, when we come to the *Metaphysics* the conception has disappeared. The *Nicomachean Ethics* also presents a wholly different picture. In this work the *phronesis* of the *Protrepticus* is definitely rejected. In the sixth book considerable space is devoted to the question of the position of *phronesis* among the intellectual faculties. Everywhere a polemical intention appears between the lines. Aristotle reduces the word to its meaning in ordinary usage, i.e. to the sense that it had before Plato. He deprives it of all theoretical significance, and sharply distinguishes its sphere from that of *sophia* and *Nus*.[1] In common

[1] *Eth. Nic.* VI. 5 ff. Ordinary usage is emphasized in 1140ᵃ 25 and 29; ᵇ 8, 10, and 11; and 1141ᵃ 25, 27, and ᵇ 5. [Tr.—Σοφία is practically identical with 'wisdom'.]

usage it is a practical faculty, concerned both with the choice of the ethically desirable and with the prudent perception of one's own advantage. Such is Aristotle's later terminology. He is at the farthest remove from the standpoint of his early period when he concedes *phronesis* to animals.[1] In connexion with ethics it now means an habitual disposition of the mind to deliberate practically about everything concerning human weal and woe[2] (ἕξις πρακτική). He insists that it is not speculation but deliberation, that it is concerned not with the universal but with the fleeting details of life, and that it therefore does not have the highest and most valuable things in the universe for object, and in fact is not a science at all.[3] What all this amounts to is the public recantation of the Platonic views in the *Protrepticus*. Whereas he there described metaphysics as 'the *phronesis* of the kind of truth that was introduced by Anaxagoras and Parmenides and their followers', he here expressly lays it down that such persons as Anaxagoras and Parmenides are not called *phronimoi* but *sophoi*, precisely because while they inquired into the eternal laws of the universe they did not understand their own advantage.[4]

Beneath this change in terminology lies a change in the fundamental principles of Aristotle's metaphysics and ethics. To Socrates *phronesis* had meant the ethical power of reason, a sense modelled on the common usage that Aristotle restores to its rights in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Plato analysed the nature of this ethical insight more exactly, and derived it from the contemplation of eternal Norms, and in the last resort from the Good. This changed it into the scientific apprehension of independent objects; but Plato was justified in retaining the name *phronesis*, in as much as the knowledge of true being was in fact a knowledge of the pure Norms by reference to which man should order his life. In the contemplation of the Forms being and value, knowledge and action, coalesce. When the theory of Forms was abandoned being and value fell apart, and dialectic thereby lost its direct significance for human life, which to Plato was an essential feature of it. The distinction between

[1] *Eth. Nic.* VI. 7, 1141ᵃ 27.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* VI. 5, 1140ᵇ 4 and 20.

[3] *Eth. Nic.* VI. 8, 1141ᵇ 9 and 14; 1141ᵃ 21 and 33 ff.; 1142ᵃ 24.

[4] Frg. 52 (p. 59, l. 3, in Rose). *Eth. Nic.* VI. 7, 1141ᵇ 3–5.

metaphysics and ethics became much sharper than before.[1] To one looking backwards from this point of view Plato appears 'intellectualist', because he based ethical action entirely on the knowledge of being. Aristotle drew a line between the two. He discovered the psychological roots of moral action and evaluation in character (ἦθος), and from then on the examination of ἦθος took the foremost place in what came to be called *ethical* thought, and suppressed transcendental *phronesis*. The result was the fruitful distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which had lain together as yet unseparated in *phronesis*.

From this sketch of the historical development it follows necessarily that in the *Protrepticus* Aristotle based himself on a different metaphysics. It was the abandonment of the Idea-theory that led to the break with Plato's doctrine of the primacy of *phronesis*, and with his onesidedly theoretical derivation of the ethical life. Therefore the *Protrepticus*, which is still completely dominated by the conception of *phronesis* in the old sense, must have been based on Plato's ethical metaphysics, that is, on the unity of being and value. All the essential parts of it are in fact Platonic, not merely in language but also in content. Nowhere else does Aristotle sanction the Academic division of philosophy into dialectic, physics, and ethics (except in the *Topics*, but there it is merely mentioned in passing, and the *Topics* is presumably one of his earliest efforts).[2] Moreover,

[1] This is true of all specifically human values, but not of absolute value or good. Aristotle believed as much as Plato that being and value in the absolute sense coincide in the conception of God. In that respect he remained a Platonist to the day of his death. The highest being is also the highest good. At the point that is farthest removed from human affairs metaphysics penetrates into ethics and ethics into metaphysics. The perspective, however, has shifted completely. It is only in the far distance that the motionless pole appears, an ultimate sign-post, on the horizon of existence. The connexion of this metaphysics with particular actions is too loose to justify its being called *phronesis*.

[2] In frg. 52 (p. 60, l. 17, in Rose), in the course of a proof that we can attain to real knowledge, Aristotle clearly distinguishes knowledge (1) 'of the just and the beneficial', (2) of 'nature', and (3) 'of the rest of truth'. He does not yet possess an expression for 'first philosophy' (cf. p. 59, ll. 1–4, in Rose, where the conception of it is again linked with the knowledge of the just and unjust and the knowledge of nature, and again expressed by a periphrasis). At any rate, Plato's word 'dialectic' seems to him not to be characteristic enough; it fails to distinguish ontology from ethics and politics, and it does not contain any reference to an object. For the latter reason Aristotle limits it to formal logic, which has no object. In harmony with the tripartite division of philosophy is the proof (1) about substance (p. 60, l. 21—p. 61, l. 1, in Rose),

there is as yet no trace of what we find in the *Ethics*, the supplementation of the doctrine of virtue by psychological analysis; instead of that we have Plato's architectonic doctrine of the four virtues.[1] The decisive thing, however, is what the *Protrepticus* says about the method of ethics and politics.

The opponents of philosophy are there made to describe ethics in accordance with Plato's notion of it, as if the correctness of that notion were self-evident. It is a science of the just and unjust, of the good and bad, like geometry and its related sciences.[2] Aristotle is here calling attention to a point that had obviously aroused severe criticism, the view that ethics is an exact science. In another place he describes politics (which he considers inseparable from ethics) as a science that seeks for absolute norms (ὅροι). To philosophical politics he opposes the 'arts', which use merely second-hand knowledge. He reckons ordinary empirical politics as one of them, because its decisions are based only on the analogies of experience and it is therefore incapable of ever giving rise to creative action. Philosophical politics has 'the exact in itself' for object. It is a purely theoretical science.[3]

This ideal of mathematical exactness is contrary to everything that Aristotle teaches in his *Ethics* and *Politics* about the method of those studies. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* he explicitly opposes the demand for an exact method, as being incompatible with the nature of the material. In this respect he equates ethics and politics with rhetoric rather than with mathematics.[4] Their propositions are merely typical, never universal; their inferences are valid at best as a general rule, and not without exception. To the ideal of method that he stood for in the *Protrepticus* Aristotle here replies that the more general ethical propositions are the more empty and ineffective they are.[5] Virtually every

(2) about the virtues of the soul (p. 61, ll. 2–8, in Rose), and (3) about nature (p. 61, ll. 8–17, in Rose). In *Top.* I. 14, 105^{b} 20 ff., Aristotle distinguishes between ethical, physical, and logical premisses; here again 'dialectical' is avoided, cf. Xenocrates frg. 1 (Heinze).

[1] For the four Platonic virtues see frg. 52 (p. 62, l. 1, in Rose) and frg. 58 (p. 68, ll. 6–9).

[2] Frg. 52 (p. 58, l. 23, in Rose).

[3] Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 55, ll. 1 and 6 ff., in Pistelli.

[4] *Eth. Nic.* I. 1, 1094^{b} 11–27; I. 13, 1102^{a} 23.

[5] *Eth. Nic.* II. 7, 1107^{a} 29.

word that the *Nicomachean Ethics* contains about this matter is written with a polemical implication, and we must learn to read it with this in mind. In the *Protrepticus* it was said that the philosophical statesman is distinguished from the common run of politicians by the exactness of his knowledge of the norms; he beholds things in themselves, and does not rest content with their variegated reproductions in empirical reality. There is an intentional reminiscence of this passage, almost to the very same words, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; but there the view is converted into its exact opposite. We read that one must distinguish between the way in which a geometer and the way in which a carpenter (i.e. an empiric) measures a right angle. The former beholds truth itself; the latter inquires into the nature of rectangularity only so far as it is necessary for his practical purposes. And it is with the latter, not with the geometer, that Aristotle compares the science of ethics or politics! Plato's ideal of an ethics proceeding *more geometrico* is here emphatically rejected, whereas in the *Protrepticus* it still holds undisputed sway;[1] and when Aristotle here insists that for the statesman, and even for the student listening to lectures on ethics, practical experience is far more important than theoretical equipment, that also is polemic against his own earlier Platonic view.[2] Of late origin again is the declaration that philosophy is not necessary for a king, but rather a hindrance; he should, however, give ear to truly philosophical councillors. This appears to come from a work addressed to Alexander, and to refer to a particular situation, which may be dated during the Asiatic expedition.[3] Between the time of the letter to Themison, which invited him to theoretical statesmanship based on the Forms, and the time when Aristotle wrote this piece of advice, a change had occurred in the fundamentals of his thought.

[1] *Eth. Nic.* I. 7, 1098ª 26: 'And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions.' Cf. Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 55, ll. 1–14, in Pistelli.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* X. 10, 1181ª 1 and 10; I. 13, 1102ª 19 ff.

[3] Frg. 647.

The ideal of geometrical ethics could have been conceived only on the basis of the later theory of Ideas. To Plato knowledge was measurement. By an exact science he understood one that measures things in accordance with an absolute and completely determinate measure. Hence the indeterminate (ἄπειρον), the manifold of the sensible world, is never an object of pure science. The *Philebus* shows how in his old age he tried to make ethics an exact science on the mathematical pattern by means of the principles of limit (πέρας) and measure (μέτρον). In that dialogue the notion of measurement is constantly recurring; it is the sign of the mathematical stage of the Idea-theory. Since all that is good is measurable and determinate, while all that is evil is immeasurable and indeterminate, both in the cosmos and in the soul, Plato's later politics and ethics are really nothing but a theoretical science of measure and the norm. In the second book of his lost *Statesman* Aristotle wrote: 'the good is the most exact measure'.[1] The Platonist Syrianus quotes these words against their author, and argues from them that Aristotle understood Plato's doctrine better at other times. Aristotle meant precisely the same thing in the *Protrepticus* when he demanded exactness and described politics as a science of pure norms. This is the philosophy of the *Philebus*, which gives the first place in the table of goods to measure (μέτρον), the second to the measurable (σύμμετρον), and the third to the reason that apprehends measure (*phronesis*).[2] In the *Republic* the Form of the Good had been the ground of the being and knowability of the whole real world. According to the *Philebus* and to Aristotle's *Statesman* the reason why it is so is that it is the highest and universal measure, the absolute unity that makes the world of Forms determinate, 'symmetrical', and thereby real, good, and knowable. All that is indeterminate is excluded from it. We need not here inquire what part Plato's later view that the Forms are numbers has to play in this doctrine Aristotle mentions it frequently in the *Protrepticus*. His later ethics is an intentional contradiction of the view represented there and in the *Statesman*; according to it there are no universal norms, there is

[1] Frg. 79. Syrian's remarks on this statement, which Rose does not reproduce, are important because they show that he was fully conscious of the contradiction between it and Aristotle's later view.

[2] *Phil.* 66 A.

no measure except the individual living measure of the autonomous ethical person, and *phronesis* is concerned not with the universal but with the particular.[1]

'The good is the most exact measure' means precisely the same as Plato's dictum in the *Laws*, 'God is the measure of all things'. This pointed attack on Protagoras' statement that man is the measure of all things was intended to set the absolute norm on the throne of the universe;[2] God is the good in itself, the pure monad, the measure of measures. Thus politics and ethics become theology and take their stand at the head of theoretical philosophy; what is and what ought to be are identical in the absolute sense; and human action is done with immediate reference to the highest value and meaning in the world. In accordance with its principles the *Nicomachean Ethics* denies that politics has this leading position; politics can no more be the highest wisdom than the aims of human life can aspire to the highest good, which is glimpsed only by the wise man in his intuition of the divinity.[3]

The view of the *Philebus*, that philosophy ought to be made an exact and mathematical science,[4] did not influence the *Protrepticus* merely with regard to the nature of ethics and politics. It is also the underlying reason for the account there given of the relation between empirical and pure science. Plato's later doctrine took from mathematics not merely the conception of measure and the ideal of exactness, but also the problem of drawing the line between pure and applied science. In the *Protrepticus* the opponents of pure philosophy and science are represented as coupling geometry and surveying, the theory of harmony and music, astronomy and the sailor's knowledge of sky and weather, in order to prove that theory is actually a handicap in any department of practical activity, because it prevents the student from getting practice and often even impairs the certainty of his natural instinct.[1] We should like to know how Aristotle replied to this criticism, but unfortunately his answer is lost. The idea of coupling together pairs of pure and empirical sciences was naturally not invented by his opponents; it was first used by Plato. The *Philebus* distinguishes an arithmetic of the philosophers from the arithmetic of the many;[2] it is science in a greater or less degree according as the units with which it operates are like or unlike. Similarly there are two 'arts' of computation and two of mensuration; in fact, there are many 'arts' where such a twin brotherhood exists, without their being distinguished by name.[3] Those with which the true philosophers are occupied are incomparably superior to the others because of their exactness and truth in matters of measure and number. Presumably Aristotle's answer to the empiricists was similar to Plato's in the *Philebus*: it does not matter which 'art' is most serviceable and which is of the greatest use, but which aims at the greatest accuracy, clarity, and truth. 'A little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed', and the lover of pure colours will therefore prefer it unconditionally.[4] This view, that knowledge ought to be made exact even if it thereby becomes useless, is also the conviction of the *Protrepticus*. It arises out of the artistic attitude to mathematics that is characteristic of Plato's

[1] 'The good man judges each class of things rightly, and in each the truth appears to him. . . . And perhaps *the good man* differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, *being as it were a norm and measure of them*', *Eth. Nic.* III. 6, 1113^a 29 ff. 'The refined and well-bred man, therefore, *being as it were a law to himself*', IV. 14, 1128^a 31. 'If virtue and the good man as such are the measure of each thing, those also will be pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant which he enjoys', X. 5, 1176^a 18. Incidentally, these remarkable sentences prove once more, if only we look at them in the light of the *Protrepticus*, that Aristotle's ethical inquiries were originally entirely dominated by Plato's problem of the measurability and measure of moral phenomena; his change consisted simply in rejecting the universal norms, and recognizing no measure but the autonomous conscience of the ethically educated person ('the good man'), a measure which can claim no 'exactness' in the epistemological sense. Thus he refers every man to himself, and recognizes the inexhaustible variety of the conditions of individual moral action without undermining the inviolability of the inner norm. The famous notion of virtue as a mean between excess and defect is also treated as a problem in the measurement of continuous quantities (II. 5, 1106^a 26); and it is this treatment that gives sense to the method employed, a fact which is usually completely misunderstood, because everybody ignores the actual historical connexions out of which Aristotle's problem arose.

[2] Plato, *Laws* IV. 716 C: 'God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man as men commonly say.'

[3] *Eth. Nic.* VI. 7, 1141^a 20 ff.

[4] For exactness (ἀκρίβεια) as the sign of a discipline's being scientific in character see *Phil.* 56 B–C, 57 C–E, 58 C, 59 A, 59 D, and so on.

[1] Frg. 52 (p. 59, ll. 18 ff., in Rose).

[2] *Phil.* 56 D.

[3] *Phil.* 57 D. Cf. *Epin.* 990 A, where the mathematical astronomer is contrasted with the empiric and the man who is weatherwise.

[4] *Phil.* 53 A.

feel ourselves directly transported into the midst of Plato's community of students. In the Academy men felt that they were swimming in the main current of progress, in comparison with which the other 'arts' were stagnant water. Aristotle speaks of the pace of the movement, and he believes that the completion of knowledge is at hand. He shares in the confidence which his generation derived from the conviction that it possessed creative power and had made unexampled progress. Men believed that genuine inquiry can make men happy, and this belief arose not from any artificial arguments but from actual good fortune and intensified experience; if it ever has been true it was true then. The outsider may think it thankless work, exclaims Aristotle, but he who has once tasted of it can never be satiated.[1] It is the only form of human activity that is not restricted to any time or place or instrument. It does not require any encouragement from external gain. He who lays hold of it is laid hold of by it; thenceforward he knows of nothing pleasanter than 'sitting down to it' (προσεδρεία). It was this circle of students that gave birth to Aristotle's ideal of 'the theoretic life'—not, that is to say, the animated gymnasium of the *Lysis* or the *Charmides*, but the cabin (καλύβη) in the secluded garden of the Academy. Its quietude is the real original of the isles of the blest in the *Protrepticus*, that dreamland of philosophical otherworldliness.[2] The new type of philosopher models himself not on Socrates but on Pythagoras or Anaxagoras or Parmenides. The *Protrepticus* names these three as founders.

This change is important enough to require our attention a little longer.

This seems to have been the moment at which the Academy first raised the problem of the historical and the Platonic Socrates, because the members were becoming more and more conscious of their distance from the Socratic type. In their earliest attempts to distinguish his share from Plato's they naturally denied to the historical Socrates almost every piece of philosophical knowledge that is ascribed to him in Plato's

[1] Frg. 52 (p. 62, l. 20, in Rose).

[2] Frg. 58 (p. 68, l. 3, and p. 69, l. 1, in Rose). The literary model for this was Plato, *Gorg.* 526 C, and *Rep.* VII. 540 B. The Platonists referred these two passages to life in the Academy. The *Epinomis* (992 B) takes over the same idea.

dialogues. Later on this radicalism was followed by a reaction, so that Aristotle obtained the following result: 'Two things must in fairness be ascribed to Socrates, inductive arguments and universal definition.'[1] In any case there is no connexion between Socrates and the theoretical philosophy of the *Protrepticus*. In that work metaphysics, which has not yet received the name 'first philosophy', is described as 'speculation of the type introduced by Anaxagoras and Parmenides', and the ancestor of Plato's philosophy is considered to be Pythagoras.[2] Even in the first book of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle still holds that Plato's doctrine was essentially Pythagorean in origin, though it added 'some peculiarities of its own'.[3] This view, which must often have astonished the reader, is not intended to belittle Plato. It was the official view of the Academy; and Aristotle still held it when he wrote these words about 348/7. The Platonic Socrates had been the result of the artist's desire to mould and create; the Academy's cult of Pythagoras, one of the most remarkable examples of religious auto-suggestion there have ever been, was a projection of the Academy itself and its number-metaphysics into the half-mythical personality of Pythagoras, whom the Platonists venerated as the founder of 'the theoretic life', and whom they soon freely credited with the views of their own time and school.

The tale about Pythagoras in the *Protrepticus*, unimportant as it is, enables us to see with our own eyes how story-telling developed and came to have its fateful influence on the history of Greek philosophy. Pythagoras is asked what is the purpose of human life. He replies, 'to contemplate the heavens'.[4] In

[1] *Metaph.* M 4, 1078^b 27. This cautious formula seems to me to be still the fairest account of the historical facts. Maier (*Sokrates*, Tübingen, 1913, pp. 77 ff.) was no doubt right in denying that Socrates had any logical *theory* of the universal and induction; it is high time that we ceased calling Socrates the first logician on the strength of Aristotle's statement. But his actual words give no sanction whatever to such a view; he merely describes the logical operations that Socrates *practised*. He considers Socrates, however, from his own *point of view*. His aim is not in the least to give 'a picture of the man', but to discover in him, as in Democritus and the Pythagoreans, the primitive origins of logical method (cf. 1078^b 20).

[2] Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 51, ll. 8 and 11; frg. 52 (p. 59, l. 4, in Rose).

[3] *Metaph.* A 6, 987^a 30.

[4] Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 51, l. 8. The dictum of Anaxagoras at l. 13 is a variant of this.

answer to a second question he describes himself as such a contemplator (θεωρός). With this story let us compare the classical account of the origin of the word 'philosopher' in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, which comes from Heraclides of Pontus, a fellow-student of Aristotle's.[1] Here again Pythagoras is being questioned. He calls himself a philosopher, and to explain this new name he tells the following story. He compares human life with the great festival at Olympia, where all the world comes together in a motley throng. Some are there to do business at the fair and to enjoy themselves; others wish to win the wreath in the contest; others are merely spectators. The last are the philosophers, of whom there are but few. After reading the *Protrepticus* one recognizes in the first two groups the representatives of pleasure and virtue, that is of the 'apolaustic' and the 'practical' lives. The philosopher lives entirely for 'theory', for pure *phronesis*. Attractive as this story sounds it is neither a unity nor original. Heraclides, the most assiduously Pythagorean of all the Platonists, has obviously been stimulated by the *Protrepticus*. He projects the distinction of the three lives into the dim past. The kernel of the tale lies in the word 'theory', which inevitably suggests a double meaning. The *Protrepticus* had already drawn the parallel between the philosopher's contemplation of reality and the sacred spectacle of Olympia, and had done so in a passage close to that describing the answers of Pythagoras.[2] Heraclides simply combined these two elements into a short story and gave it a little embellishment. What to Aristotle was merely a stylistic device now becomes a simile of the three lives (since not every one who goes to Olympia is a spectator), and is ascribed to Pythagoras himself (αὐτὸς ἔφα). In reality the tale presupposes the fundamental notions of Plato's later ethics and metaphysics.

Lastly, we must consider what the *Protrepticus* can tell us about Aristotle's early attitude towards life and relgion. In this respect it is supplementary to the *Eudemus*; it shows that the view that he had there established about the other world made a radical difference to his opinion of this one. In both works he is thoroughly pessimistic about earthly life and temporal goods and interests. He exhorts us to throw away life of our own

[1] Cic. *Tusc.* V. 3, 8. [2] Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 53, l. 19.

accord, in order to obtain a higher and purer good in exchange. But whereas the *Eudemus*, with its doctrine of the soul and immortality, is predominantly speculative, the *Protrepticus* introduces us to a more personal atmosphere.

Following Plato's example and doctrine, Aristotle is convinced that there are higher, imperishable values; and that there is a truer world, towards which genuine knowledge leads. For the sake of that good he abandons all the seeming goods of power, possessions, and beauty.[1] The worthlessness of all earthly things has never been more contemptuously denounced. As to the dream of the aesthetic eighteenth century—harmony, cloudless serenity, and the enjoyment of beauty—the *Protrepticus* feels nothing but the profoundest disgust for it. Probably it never really appealed to the Greek spirit. There were moments, as in the fourth century, when the aesthetic attitude seemed to be triumphant in life and in art; but they were soon overtaken by the reflection that 'strength, beauty and stature are but a laughing stock, and utterly valueless'. When these words were written the beauty of the body in its sublime austerity had long ceased to seem divine; and the art that should have interpreted it was living on a mere semblance, the empty cult of form. In the *Protrepticus* Aristotle lays hands on the beautiful Alcibiades, who was the idol of that age, and in whom it delighted to find its own image. He puts his finger on the weakness of the time when he says that if a man could see into the inside of that much-admired body 'with the eyes of Lynceus', he would find a picture of ugliness and nausea.[2] He himself is using the Lynceus-vision of another attitude towards life when he penetrates this visible material partition that surrounds us and discovers behind the scenes of appearance a new and hitherto invisible world, the world of Plato.

On this view the perfection of all the imperfections of human life must lie in the transcendental world. Thus life becomes the death of the soul, and death the escape into a higher life. Aristotle borrows the language of the *Phaedo* and declares that the life of the true philosopher must be a continual practice of death.[3] He will find nothing harsh in that, for to him the

[1] Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 53, l. 19. [2] Frg. 59 (p. 70, l. 11, in Rose; cf. ll. 7 ff.).
[3] See Diels, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. i, p. 479.

A clever and cultivated scholar of imperial times, Aristocles of Messana, had the moral force to tear down this veil of legend. He put an end to the persistent tradition of the compilers by going back to the primary sources and demonstrating the miserable insufficiency of the grounds on which the gossip rested. Chance has kindly preserved to us the part of his critical inquiry where, after triumphantly destroying the threadbare tissue of lies, he shows that the rumours of a break between Plato and Aristotle rest on a crying misinterpretation of a passage in the latter's pupil Aristoxenus of Tarentum.[1] In all probability it was Aristocles who, after demolishing these apocryphal tales, restored to light that precious personal document which gives us Aristotle's real attitude to his master better than all the hypotheses of alien malice, namely the altar-elegy dedicated to Eudemus.[2] The assertion, that the man to whom Aristotle is enthusiastically testifying in this fragment is not Plato but Socrates (whom Aristotle had never seen in his life), is self-contradictory and psychologically improbable.[3] It would never have been put forward if scholars had kept steadily in mind the fact that this rare jewel owes its rediscovery solely to a critical biographer's search for first-hand information, and therefore must have contained Aristotle's own explicit account of his relation to Plato and his reply to the malicious critics of that relation. The later Neo-Platonists took the poem from a learned work on this subject, where it was quoted only so far as it threw a direct light thereon. It is therefore clear that by the man 'whom bad men have not even the right to praise' is meant in this elegy none other than Plato; and that the 'bad men' whose praise Aristotle thinks

I. 6, 1096^a 11–16, and frg. 8. Our information about the gossip in the schools has been critically examined by Stahr (*Aristotelia*, Halle, 1830, vol. i, pp. 46 ff.). He takes his material from Franciscus Patritius (*Discussiones peripateticae*, Basle, 1581). The latter, a Platonist of the Renascence, was quite blinded by his hate of Aristotle; he put implicit faith in any accusation however absurd.

[1] Aristocles in Euseb. *praep. ev.* XV. 2, 3.

[2] This is the view of Immisch (*Philologus*, vol. lxv, p. 11). It is rendered probable by the fact that, as Stahr has shown (ibid. vol. i, p. 61), what the Ammonius-life of Aristotle tells us about his relation to Plato must be referred, on account of its verbal echoes, to the fragment of Aristocles preserved in Eusebius.

[3] Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, vol. i, pp. 143 ff. Rightly rejected by Wilamowitz (*Aristoteles und Athen*, vol. ii, p. 413), and more recently by Immisch (loc. cit.).

damaging to the master are not just any *misera plebs*, but those mistaken admirers who thought it their duty to defend Plato against Aristotle's criticism of his doctrine.[1] A literal translation may be added here:

> Coming to the famous plain of Cecropia
> He piously set up an altar of holy Friendship
> For the man whom it is not lawful for bad men even to praise,
> Who alone or first of mortals clearly revealed,
> By his own life and by the methods of his words,
> That a man becomes good and happy at the same time.
> Now no one can ever attain to these things again.

The dedicator of the altar, here spoken of in the third person, is unknown to us. The statement that the poem was addressed to Eudemus is no help, because we cannot determine whether the Cyprian or the Rhodian is meant. The latest Neo-Platonists, in their confused version of the life of Aristotle, professed to be able to describe the inscription on the altar; and according to them the dedicator was Aristotle. It is quite unsafe to make this the basis of an interpretation. Fortunately, the various remaining versions of the biographical tradition enable us to follow the growth of the legends so clearly that we can detect the stages in the gradual development of this supposed inscription.[2]

Though there is some obscurity in the outward situation as depicted by Aristotle, there is none whatever in the inner, and

[1] Only so can we give concrete meaning to this passionate repudiation of the profane. In Aristotle's style an empty rhetorical hyperbole is unthinkable; and to refer it to Diogenes the Cynic (as is done by Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, vol. ii, p. 539; and by Immisch, loc. cit., p. 21), because he also taught the self-sufficiency of virtue, seems altogether too strained. Diogenes could perhaps have appealed to Socrates in support of his own doctrines, but never to a thinker so theoretical and so far removed from himself as Plato.

[2] Immisch considers the inscription genuine (loc. cit., p. 12); but in the *Vita Marciana* the spurious hexameter, 'Aristotle set up this altar for Plato', is quoted by itself, as is right (p. 432 in Rose); and then we read, 'and *in another place he says* of him, "a man whom it is not lawful for bad men even to praise"'. This second line is a pentameter, and what happened is that the careless compiler of the so-called *Life According to Ammonius* put the pentameter and the hexameter together (p. 439 in Rose), supposing that 'man' was in apposition to 'Plato', and that the two lines formed a single distich, although they were given separately in his source. It is inconceivable that things can have gone the other way, namely that the author of the *Vita Marciana* can have had the distich before him as a whole, and then broken it up and said that the pentameter came from another poem. Originally the quotation probably included the whole of the fragment of the elegy, for it is obvious that it was obtained from Aristocles (see above, p. 106, n. 2).

present generation and the superhuman leader there is a tragic resignation, in virtue of which this memorial poem is not a mere piece of exalted praise but a human and moving confession. The fact is that Aristotle in his *Ethics* denies Plato's doctrine that man's happiness depends only on the moral power of his soul.[1] He would prevent the chatterers from copying this sublime dictum. But to Plato, its originator, it was absolute truth. Where is the man that can follow up his steep path?

> Earth's insufficiency
> Here grows to Event;
> The Indescribable,
> Here it is done.

Nevertheless, Aristotle's departure from Athens was the expression of a crisis in his inner life. The fact remains that he never came back to the school in which he had been educated. This was presumably connected with the question of Plato's successor, which would inevitably determine the spirit of the Academy for a long time to come, and the decision of which could not meet with Aristotle's approval in any event. The choice, whether Plato's own or that of the members, fell on Plato's nephew Speusippus. His age made it impossible to pass him over, however obvious Aristotle's superiority might be for all who had eyes to see. The decisive consideration was perhaps certain external circumstances, such as the difficulty of convey-

λαβεῖν). III. 1286^b 7, 'aristocracy would be more desirable than monarchy, . . . if it were possible to obtain many men of the same kind' (ἂν ᾖ λαβεῖν, i.e. to discover in reality, or to make real). Objection has been taken to the juxtaposition of 'ever again' and 'now'. This manner of speech is due to the compactness that compresses two possible expressions into one, namely 'never or at least not now' and 'none of those now living' (οὐδενὶ τῶν γε νῦν). Aristotle writes his own language, and it cannot be reduced to a set of rules. He is interested solely in the accuracy of the intellectual nuance that he wishes to convey, and not in the smoothness of the diction; e.g. the precise distinction of 'or first' in the fourth line is more suitable to a lecture than to an elegy. The master has shown us the goal—such is the meaning of the conclusion—but we men of the present cannot fly so high. It follows that the poem was written after Plato's death, and is addressed to Eudemus of Rhodes. The feeling is too direct, however, for it to have been written during Aristotle's latest period. It seems to be the offspring of strong emotion and inner conflict. If, as I believe, it was at Assos that both Theophrastus and Eudemus became students of Aristotle's, the elegy may have been written shortly after Plato's death. At the moment when Aristotle was abandoning the master in matters of doctrine, the impulse of his heart drove him to declare his inner relationship to him in the form of an intimate personal confession.

[1] Immisch rightly emphasizes this, loc. cit., p. 17.

ing the Academy to a metic, although this was afterwards overcome. The choice of Speusippus continued Plato's family in the possession of the property. Whether, in addition to such reasons of external expediency, personal antipathies also played a part, it is no longer possible to say; but on general grounds it is practically self-evident that they must have done so. One thing, however, is certain; it was not Aristotle's criticism of Plato's fundamental doctrines that prevented him from succeeding to the headship of Plato's Academy. Speusippus himself had declared the theory of Ideas untenable during Plato's own lifetime, and had also abandoned the Ideal numbers suggested by Plato in his last period; he differed from him in other fundamental particulars as well. And that Aristotle was not meanly but highly thought of in the school when he left Athens is proved by the person who accompanied him, namely Xenocrates, the most conservative of all Plato's students with regard to alterations of the doctrine, but at the same time a thoroughly upright man. The departure of Aristotle and Xenocrates was a secession.[1] They went to Asia Minor in the conviction that Speusippus had inherited merely the office and not the spirit. The spirit had become homeless, and they were setting out to build it a new place. For the next few years the scene of their activity was Assos on the coast of the Troad, where they worked in common with two other Platonists, Erastus and Coriscus from Scepsis on Ida.

The importance of this period has not been recognized. Plato's sixth letter, the genuineness of which has been convincingly demonstrated by Brinckmann,[2] is addressed to Erastus and Coriscus, two former students now in Asia Minor, and to their friend Hermias, lord of Atarneus. The two philosophers are to put themselves under the protection of Hermias, since, while persons of excellent character, they are devoid of worldly

[1] Strabo XIII. 57, p. 610.

[2] *Rheinisches Museum*, N.F., vol. lxvi, 1911, pp. 226 ff. In our views of the external events connected with Hermias we agree almost entirely (see my *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, 1912, pp. 34 ff.); and this is all the stronger evidence because Brinckmann started from a quite different point, and we reached the same conclusion independently of each other. Although my book was not published until 1912, it had already been submitted as a thesis to the philosophical faculty at Berlin when Brinckmann's miscellany appeared.

experience; Hermias on his part is to learn to appreciate their steadfast and trustworthy friendship. This remarkable relation between the two companions of Plato and the prince of Atarneus has been illuminated by an inscription first published by Boeckh,[1] in which 'Hermias and the companions' (the formal phrase Ἑρμίας καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι occurs five times in the original) make an alliance with the people of the city of Erythrae. The newly discovered commentary of Didymus on Demosthenes' *Philippics* leaves no doubt that the companions who here appear along with Hermias as legal parties to the contract are none other than the two philosophers from the neighbouring town of Scepsis, as was already probable from Plato's letter.

Hermias was a man of lowly origin. That he was a eunuch is not to be denied. Even the story that in earlier years a bank had employed him as money-changer at the counter presumably rests on fact, although it is related by Theopompus, who describes him as unpleasantly as possible.[2] He began by getting possession of some mountain villages in the neighbourhood of Ida.[3] Later he obtained public recognition from the Persian administration, and was allowed to adopt the title of prince, presumably after the payment of an adequate sum. His residence was at Atarneus. His steadily growing political influence extended the area under his control to an astonishing size. In the end he must have maintained a substantial contingent of mercenaries, for he reduced rebellious places to obedience by military raids, and he afterwards withstood a siege by the Persian satrap.

Erastus and Coriscus had lived for a long time in the Academy, and then returned to their native town of Scepsis. Hermias' original reason for entering into relations with them was certainly not theoretical enthusiasm for Plato's philosophy. They must

[1] Boeckh, 'Hermias von Atarneus' in *Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, 1853, Historisch-philosophische Klasse, pp. 133 ff. (*Kleinere Schriften*, vol. v, p. 189). The inscription appears in Dittenberger's *Sylloge*, vol. i³, p. 307.

[2] He was certainly a Greek, or Aristotle in his hymn could never have represented him as the upholder of the true tradition of Hellenic virtue, in contrast to the barbarians who treacherously killed him (cf. the epigram, Rose, frg. 674). In the letter to Philip Theopompus says (Didymus *in Demosthenem*, col. 5, 24, Diels-Schubart, Berlin, 1904): 'Though a barbarian he philosophizes with Platonists, though he has been a slave he competes with costly chariots at the meetings.' Here the first statement at any rate is either a lie for the sake of rhetorical antithesis or merely a reference to his being a eunuch.

[3] Didymus *in Demosthenem*, col. 5, 27, Diels-Schubart.

have been persons of importance in that little city. The community was proud of its two learned sons. It was not uncommon for small Greek cities to call for laws from citizens who had become famous. The mathematician Eudoxus, who returned to Cnidus as a great scholar, was highly respected there; he was voted an honorary decree and entrusted with the task of writing new laws for the city.[1] Erastus and Coriscus no doubt tried to introduce in Scepsis various political reforms that had been suggested in the Academy, as other Platonists did in other places, some as dictators or the advisers of princes, others as communists and tyrannicides. Presumably Plato wished to institute a friendship between the two companions and their 'neighbour' Hermias, because, while he recognized their noble disposition, he was afraid they might be somewhat doctrinaire. The letter that we possess is the solemn record of this peculiar pact between *Realpolitik* and theoretical schemes of reform. The spirit of Plato hovers over the institution, and, although he is not acquainted with Hermias,[2] whom he supposes to be an unphilosophical and purely practical man, he exhorts the three parties to read the letter in common whenever they come together; and, if there should be any disagreement, to have recourse to the arbitration of the Academy at Athens. The movement towards reform thus appears as the result of a philosophic political system, which is to be realized throughout Greece wherever the opportunity occurs, and in which the Academy intends to retain the lead.

When this oligarchy of wise men was established the philosophers naturally demanded that Hermias study geometry and dialectic,[3] just as Plato had once demanded it of Dionysius, his pupil Euphraeus of Perdiccas king of Macedon, and Aristotle of Themison of Cyprus; and, like those other knowledge-hungry men of a busy and enlightened but inwardly vacillating century, Hermias applied himself to study with increasing zeal; and, what

[1] Diog. L. VIII. 88.

[2] See Plato, *Letter* VI, 322 E. Strabo, on the contrary (XIII. 57, p. 610), wrongly makes Hermias a philosopher and one-time student of Plato's, in order to explain his connexion with the Academy. For some inexplicable reason this contradiction was formerly supposed to prove the letter spurious, although Strabo's account contains many other inaccuracies (Brinckmann, loc. cit., p. 228).

[3] Plato, *Letter* VI. 322 D.

is more, directed his life on moral principles, which Theopompus, perhaps not without some justification, declares that he had not done during the first years of his rise. From the contradictory judgements of the Chian, who considered him absolutely unscrupulous, and of the Platonists, whose honest admiration for him is reflected by Aristotle and Callisthenes,[1] we may conclude that he was an unusual person, a mixture of natural intelligence, enterprising energy, and great will-power, but at the same time full of unresolved contradictions. At any rate the benefit that he received from the men of Scepsis was not merely in regard to the health of his soul; we now know from Didymus that they gave him correct political advice, for which he presented them with the town of Assos. On their recommendation he voluntarily changed his tyranny 'into a milder form of constitution'. This step conciliated the Aeolian peoples of the coast, and the consequence was that the territories from the Ida-range down to the coast of Assos came over to him of their own free will. In the milder form of constitution we may recognize the idea of Plato and Dion, who had intended to consolidate the Syracusan tyranny by the adoption of a constitutional form, and then to unite the city-states of Sicily, for purposes of foreign politics, under its strictly monarchical leadership. What could not be realized in Sicily became a political reality in miniature in Asia Minor.[2]

[1] See the juxtaposition of favourable and unfavourable judgements in Didymus, col. 4, 60 ff. He quotes in turn Book XLVI of Theopompus' *Philippic Histories*, his letter to Philip, Callisthenes' encomium on Hermias, Aristotle's poem to him, Hermippus' life of Aristotle, and Book VI of Anaximenes' *Philippic Histories*.

[2] Didymus, col. 5, 52, Diels-Schubart. I have added some tentative restorations at the beginning:

καὶ ε]ἰς [τὴν π]έριξ· ἐ-
στρατήγ[ησε, φίλους δ' ἐποιήσατο Κορίσκον] καὶ Ἔ-
ραστον καὶ Ἀριστοτ[έλην καὶ Ξενοκράτην]· διὸ καὶ
πάντ[ες οὗ]τοι παρὰ [Ἑρμίᾳ διῆγον. . . . .] ὕστε-
ρον . . [. . . .] ἤκο[υσεν αὐτῶν. . . . .]. ἔδωκεν
αὐτ[οῖς δ]ωρεά[ς.] . . [. . . . . ἐπιτηδ]ὲς δὲ τὴν
τυραν[νίδ]α μ[ετέ]στη[σεν εἰς πραιο]τέραν δυ-
ναστείαν· διὸ καὶ πάσ[ης τῆς σύν]ε[γγ]υς ἐπῆρ-
ξεν ἕως Ἀσσοῦ, ὅτε [δὴ καὶ ὑπερησ]θεὶς τοῖς εἰ-
ρημένοις φιλοσόφοις ἀ[πένειμεν] τὴν Ἀσσίων
πόλιν, μάλιστα δ' αὐτ[ῶν ἀποδεξ]άμενος Ἀρι-
στοτέλην οἰκειότατα [διέκειτο πρ]ὸς τοῦτον.

The text, together with the restorations, may be translated as follows: 'And into the surrounding country; he made expeditions, and he made friends of Coriscus and Erastus and Aristotle and Xenocrates; hence all these men lived with Hermias . . . afterwards . . . he listened to them . . . he gave them gifts . . . he actually changed the tyranny into a milder rule; therefore he also came to rule over all the neighbouring country as far as Assos, and then, being exceedingly pleased with the said philosophers, he allotted them the city of Assos. He accepted Aristotle most of all of them, and was very intimate with him.'

The reforms of Erastus and Coriscus must have occurred before Plato's death, because, since in 347 Aristotle joined them not in Scepsis but in Assos, Hermias' gift must have been an accomplished fact at that time. Didymus expressly tells us, what we did not know before, that Hermias heard the philosophers and lived with them for a considerable period; and, in fact, Plato could not have referred in his sixth letter to such purely theoretical questions as the doctrine of Forms (322 D) unless he had known that each of the three recipients was interested therein. The language of Didymus compels us to imagine not merely casual philosophical discussions but actual lectures. In this group the lead naturally fell to Aristotle, and the fact that Hermias felt specially obliged to him seems to show that he took the outstanding part in the lectures. Nothing less than a colony of the Athenian Academy was taking shape in Assos at this time, and there was laid the foundation of the school of Aristotle.

It must have been here that Callisthenes enjoyed the instruction of his uncle, for he did not hear him in Athens; in any case we have to assume that he was personally acquainted with Hermias, because he wrote an encomium on him. In later days Neleus, the son of Coriscus, was one of the most active and important Aristotelians; and Theophrastus came from the neighbouring town of Eresus on Lesbos. When, at the end of three years, Aristotle left Assos and settled himself at Mytilene in Lesbos, it was probably the influence of Theophrastus that led to the decision.[1] He it was also, as is well known, who bequeathed

[1] That Theophrastus joined Aristotle at least as early as the Macedonian period is proved by his personal knowledge of Stagira and by the fact that he owned property there (Diog. L. V. 52; *Historia Plantarum*, III. 11. 1; IV. 16. 3). This can have been acquired only by means of a fairly long stay in that place, and such a stay can have occurred only during the period prior to the founding of the school at Athens (335), when Aristotle, together with the little group that had followed him to Macedon, was often away from the court for long intervals; and especially during the years immediately preceding Alexander's accession, when the latter was already taking part in affairs of state. If this is

Aristotle's papers and library to Neleus, who in turn left them to his relatives in Scepsis. The close connexion between Aristotle and the friends in Scepsis and Assos, for the sake of studying philosophy, finally removes all appearance of romance from the oft doubted story of the rediscovery of his papers at Scepsis in the cellar of Neleus' descendants;[1] and it is now clear that the frequent use of the name Coriscus as an example in Aristotle's lectures goes back to a time when its owner was actually sitting on the bench of the lecture-room in Assos. In this connexion it is important to observe a tradition found in the Jewish writer Josephus (*c. Apionem* 176), which has apparently never received any notice. He mentions a work of Clearchus, one of the better-known earlier Peripatetics, on sleep. Aristotle himself appeared as a figure in this dialogue, and told of a Greek-speaking Jew who came to him during his residence in Asia Minor in order to study philosophy 'with him and some other members of the school'. Whether this story was Clearchus' own invention or an actual piece of tradition which he used for his own purpose, in either case he must have been convinced that there had been a time when Aristotle was teaching in Asia Minor together with other Platonists, and that can only have been the time when he was teaching in Assos. In every respect the experiences of this stay in Asia Minor were decisive for Aristotle's later life. Hermias gave him Pythias, his niece and adopted daughter, to wife. We know nothing about this marriage except that of it was born a daughter who received the same name as her mother. In his will Aristotle directs that the bones of his wife, who had

so, it follows that Theophrastus' acquaintance with Aristotle dates from the master's stay in Asia Minor, and that Theophrastus followed him thence to Macedon. It is not indeed impossible that he had even heard Plato, gone through the same process of development as Aristotle (Diog. L. V. 36), and left Athens along with him; but it is very improbable. He died in the 123rd Olympiad. If he was twenty years old when he came to Aristotle at Assos in 348/7, he would be at least eighty when he died, even supposing that it was the first year of the Olympiad (288), and may have been anything up to eighty-four. Hence it is scarcely possible that he was Plato's pupil for long. It is much more natural to think that he was attracted from Lesbos to the neighbouring Assos by the teaching of Aristotle and the other Academicians there. His friendship with Callisthenes (to whom Theophrastus dedicated *Callisthenes, or On Grief* after his death, Diog. L. V. 44) must also belong to a time before the founding of the school at Athens, since this man followed Alexander to Asia in 334 and never returned.

[1] Strabo XIII. 54, p. 608.

died before him, shall be laid beside his own, as was her last wish. Strabo's account is as usual romantically exaggerated; he tells a sensational story of Aristotle's flight with the tyrant's daughter, which he supposes to have taken place after the capture of Hermias. Here as elsewhere the new Didymus discovery has corrected and enlarged our knowledge. After three years of activity at Assos Aristotle went to Mytilene in Lesbos, where he taught until 343/2. He then accepted King Philip's invitation to go to the court of Macedon as tutor of the prince.[1]

Soon after entering on this new work he received news of the terrible fate of Hermias. Mentor, the Persian general, after shutting him up in Atarneus and unsuccessfully beleaguering him there, treacherously enticed him into a parley and carried him off to Susa. There he was questioned under torture about his secret treaties with King Philip, and when he steadfastly preserved silence he was crucified. Under the torture the king caused him to be asked what last grace he requested. He answered: 'Tell my friends and companions (πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τε καὶ ἑταίρους) that I have done nothing weak or unworthy of philosophy.' Such was the farewell greeting delivered to Aristotle and to the philosophers at Assos.[2] Aristotle's attachment to his friend, and the deep emotion that he felt at his death, are still living to-day in the cenotaph at Delphi, for which he himself composed the dedicatory epigram, and in the beautiful hymn to Hermias. While the nationalist party at Athens, led by Demosthenes, was blackening the character of the deceased, while public opinion was dubious about him in Hellas and feeling ran very high throughout the land against Philip and his partisans, Aristotle sent out into the world this poem, in which he declared himself passionately on the side of the dead man.

[1] Cf. my *Ent. Met. Arist.*, p. 35. For an example of the wrong view see Gercke in *Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, vol. ii, col. 1014. He regards the fall of Hermias as the reason for Aristotle's 'flight', and hence assigns it to the year 345, since it is established that Aristotle spent only three years in Assos (348–5); but Didymus has shown that he left Assos while Hermias was still alive, and that the latter did not fall until 341. Some (including Gercke, loc. cit.) have conjectured that Aristotle was in Athens for a short intervening period, during which he taught in the Lyceum; but this rests on a rash misinterpretation of Isocrates XII. 18.

[2] Didymus, col. 6. 15.

Virtue toilsome to mortal race,
Fairest prize in life,
Even to die for thy shape,
Maiden, is an envied fate in Hellas,
And to endure vehement unceasing labours.
Such fruit dost thou bestow on the mind,
Like to the immortals, and better than gold
And ancestors and languid-eyed sleep.
For thy sake Heracles the son of Zeus and Leda's youths
Endured much in their deeds
Seeking for thy potency.
Through longing for thee Achilles and Ajax came to the house of Hades.
For sake of thy dear shape the nursling of Atarneus also
Has left the sun's beams desolate.
Therefore his deeds shall be famous in song,
And he shall be declared immortal by the Muses,
Daughters of Memory,
As they magnify the guerdon of steadfast friendship and the worship of
Zeus the hospitable.

The unique value of this poem for our knowledge of Aristotle's philosophical development has never been exploited. For the most part it has been regarded merely as a human document, but it shows that when Aristotle had completed his destructive criticism of Plato's Idea, exact thinking and religious feeling went separate paths in him. To the scientific part of himself there was no longer any such thing as an Idea when he wrote these lines, but in his heart it lived on as a religious symbol, as an ideal. He reads Plato's works as poetry. Just as in the *Metaphysics* he explains the Idea, and the participation of the sensible world in its being, as the free creation of the contemplative imagination, so here in his poem it appears to him again, transfigured into the shape of a virgin for whom in Hellas it is still exquisite to die. The words 'in Hellas' must not be overlooked. Callisthenes also, in the encomium which he wrote on him at this time, uses Hermias' brave death as a picture of Greek virtue (ἀρετή), in contrast with the character of the barbarians (ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων τρόπος);[1] and Aristotle's dedicatory epigram at Delphi reveals hate and contempt for the 'Medes', who did not overcome Hermias in open fight but craftily broke their word and cruelly murdered him. The juxtaposition of Hermias with Heracles and the Dioscuri, with Achilles and Ajax, is not a trick

[1] Didymus, col. 6. 10–13.

of the panegyric style; Aristotle does not intend to deck out his friend in the pathetic paraphernalia of Homer's heroes. On the contrary, all Hellenic heroism, from Homer's naïve kind down to the moral heroism of the philosopher, appeared to him as the expression of one single attitude towards life, an attitude which scales the heights of life only when it overcomes it. He found the soul of the Greeks' power in this Platonic virtue or heroism, be it military prowess or steadfast silence in pain; and this he instilled into Alexander, so that in the middle of a century of enlightenment that proud conqueror long fought and carried himself as if he were Achilles. On his sarcophagus the sculptor represented the deciding battle between Hellenes and Asiatics as an example of the same contrast—on the visage of the Orientals the marks of deep physical and spiritual suffering, in the forms of the Greeks the original, unbroken, mental and bodily might of heroes.

The unfriendly attitude of Aristotle and his companions towards Persia was at that time universal in the Macedonian court. Now that the testimony of Didymus has rehabilitated Demosthenes' fourth *Philippic*, we know for certain that as early as 342/1 Philip was already seriously thinking of a plan for a national war against the hereditary foe, a war such as the Pan-Hellenic propaganda of Isocrates and his circle had long been brewing. Only this could justify the brute force by which the king of Macedon was ruling over the free Greek cities. By means of his secret agents Demosthenes knew that Hermias had made agreements with Philip, and thereby put himself in a serious position as regards Persia. This military treaty opened the way for a Macedonian attack on Persia. Hermias, being a far-sighted politician, had been well aware that the time was ripe to invoke Philip's protection for his hard-won position in north-west Asia Minor. The clash between the Persian empire and the military power of Macedon seemed to him inevitable, and he hoped to preserve his independence by giving Philip the Asiatic bridgehead and assuring him of a strong base in Aeolia. We do not know who told the Persians of these plans. However that may be, when the Persian general had taken Hermias prisoner, Demosthenes rejoiced to think that the great king would soon extract from him, under torture, confessions such as to throw a

glaring light on Philip's plot, and to make Persia ready for the alliance with Athens on behalf of which Demosthenes had long striven in vain.[1]

It is scarcely conceivable that Aristotle knew nothing of the high affairs of state which Philip, at whose court he was living, was arranging with his own friend and father-in-law. He removed to Pella in 342; Hermias fell in 341. We do not know whether the secret treaty was made during this year, or was already in being when Aristotle went to Macedon; but it is probable that it did not remain secret for long, and therefore was concluded not very long before the catastrophe. At all events Aristotle went to Pella with the approval of Hermias and not without some kind of political mission. The conventional tradition has it that King Philip was searching the world for a man to educate his important son, and therefore lit upon the greatest philosopher of the age; but at the time when Aristotle was lecturing in Assos and Mytilene he was not yet the intellectual leader of Greece, and Alexander was not yet an historic figure. Nor can the choice have been decided by the fact that Aristotle's father Nicomachus had been the personal physician of Amyntas at the court of Macedon, for since then four decades had passed. Everything indicates that it was the connexion between Hermias and Philip that really suggested this remarkable symbolization of world-wide historical events, the association of the thinker and the great king. Merely to play private tutor would not have suited Aristotle's virile character, and there was never much outlook in Macedon for a part such as Plato had taken at the court of Dionysius and Aristotle himself towards his princely friend in Atarneus. Hence it is important that when we analyse the *Politics* we observe a gradual transition from Plato's ethical radicalism, and from his speculation about the ideal state, towards *Realpolitik*; and that we are led to the conclusion that this change was accomplished mainly under the influence of the experienced statesman Hermias. Aristotle did not recommend to Alexander the Platonic ideal of the little city-state, such as it is preserved in the oldest portions of his *Politics*; although this

[1] Demosthenes, *Orations*, X. 31. Cf. the scholia ad loc. They refer the mysterious hints of the fourth *Philippic* to Hermias, and this has been confirmed by Didymus' commentary.

ideal still had its importance for the Greek cities, which had remained formally autonomous, and although he afterwards recognized it again when he lectured at Athens. He was well aware —and that he undertook the work is more significant of his character than all his political theories—that he was forming the ideas of the heir of the leading state in Greece, the most powerful European kingdom of the age, and that he was at the same time a diplomatic link between Philip and Hermias. The death of the latter gave an unexpected turn to everything, but the anti-Persian sentiment of the coalition thus destroyed became a part of Aristotle's emotional life, and in that atmosphere Alexander grew up.

It was a matter of faith with Aristotle that Greece could rule the world if it were politically united. As a philosopher he recognized the cultural leadership of this people, which, wherever it found itself, penetrated and dominated the surrounding nations with astonishing power. No race could vie with the intellectual compactness of the urban Greek; both in war and in commerce he conquered by his mere technical superiority and personal self-reliance. On the other hand, the traditional narrowness of political life in the autonomous city-state put in the way of any organic union difficulties that Aristotle, born in Chalcidice, was unable to appreciate with the Attic democrat's longstanding passion for freedom. Being the son of a family that had lived at the Macedonian court, it was easy for him to accustom himself to the thought of Greece united under Macedonian leadership. But in such an unstable form of state there would inevitably be an antinomy between the patriarchal or agricultural kingship on the one hand, and the freedom of the city-democracies on the other. This would make for inner disunion and could be overcome only by the outstanding personality of a real king, in whom Greece could see its own embodiment. Aristotle knew that such a man is a gift of the Gods. He was not a supporter of monarchy at all costs; Greek thought in fact never possessed—or at least that of the fourth century did not—the juristic insight necessary to appreciate the value of legitimacy and a fixed succession. The less, however, that the Greeks regarded a monarch as ruling by legal right in our sense, the more ready they were, even in the century of the greatest enlightenment,

CHAPTER VI

THE MANIFESTO *ON PHILOSOPHY*

THE history of the most productive epoch in Aristotle's life has previously been a blank sheet. Of the period from his thirty-seventh to his forty-ninth years, that is, from the time when he left the Academy to the time when he returned to Athens from Macedonia and founded the Peripatetic school (347–335), nothing has been known. No essential connexion could be traced between his 'travels' and the secluded life in the Academy that had preceded them. In any case they seemed to have no special importance for the understanding of Aristotle as a thinker. Since his writings could not be accurately dated there appeared to be a complete vacuum between his Academic and his Peripatetic periods, it being supposed that the treatises were all written during the latter. Since nothing precise was known about his teaching and writing previous to the foundation of his school, it is not surprising that scholars imagined his thought as having reached a final shape, and regarded the treatises as its systematic and definitive expression. Within this system the highest place appeared to belong to metaphysics, the study of pure being, an overarching dome beneath which all departmental sciences were included, presupposed, and thereby cancelled.

We now know from the newly discovered work of Didymus that Aristotle resumed his teaching immediately after 347, and that his first independent appearance occurred while he was still at Assos. What we hear of his activity during these years shows that it had come to be his desire to exert a widespread public influence. At the same time, everything points to the conclusion that his close affinity with Plato and Plato's preoccupations continued undisturbed. He went on living and teaching among Plato's pupils. As we have seen, his departure from the school at Athens was in no sense a break with the Academic community as such; and it would be an intolerable contradiction to suppose that, after having remained a true disciple throughout his master's life, he broke away from him the instant he was dead.

On the contrary, his development took on more and more of the public character that had always determined Plato's personality and influence. He founded schools and sowed the seeds of philosophy in various places. He took part in political affairs, as Plato had done, and came to have influence at the courts of the most powerful rulers of the age. For the first time he began to number important men among his pupils.

It is *a priori* probable that this was also the time of his first appearance before the general public as a critic of Plato, since he now had to explain the Platonic philosophy on his own responsibility and according to his own conception of its nature. Starting from this reflection, we must try to penetrate farther into the mysterious darkness of these decisive years, during which he reached the first comprehensive formulation of his own point of view. We discover that between the early, dogmatically Platonic, stage of his development, and the final form of his thought in its maturity, there was a period of transition whose nature can be definitely ascertained in many particulars; a period when he was criticizing, rearranging, and detaching himself; a period, previously wholly overlooked, which was clearly distinct from the final form of his philosophy, although it reveals the entelechy of the latter in all essential points. The advantage of examining this situation is not merely to obtain a picture of the gradual growth of his principles. Only when we know what he emphasizes as time goes on, what he suppresses, and what he introduces, can we form a clear conception of the determining forces that were working to bring about a new *Weltanschauung* in him.

At the head of this development I place the dialogue *On Philosophy*. It is generally reckoned along with the earlier writings,[1] but its doctrine is obviously a product of the transition. The numerous fragments remaining, some of them quite substantial, make the attempt at reconstruction more hopeful than it is with any of the other lost works. Here again we shall have to go into the minutiae of interpretation in order to extract

[1] Bernays and Heitz see no difference between this and the other exoteric writings, because they assume that Aristotle attacked Plato in all of them. Dyroff, on the other hand (op. cit., p. 82), universalizes his correct view that the contents of the dialogues and the *Protrepticus* were mostly Platonic, and assumes that the same was true of that *On Philosophy* also.

Metaphysics. One of the few points that can be firmly established about the chronology of the treatises is this: shortly after Plato's death Aristotle produced a happy sketch of the main results of the mass of discussion that had been going on about the Forms within the Academy, in which he attempted to outline his new system of improved Platonism; the introduction to this early sketch is contained in the first book of the *Metaphysics*.[1] Now it is inconceivable that the criticism in the dialogue *On Philosophy*, which was addressed to the public and cast in literary form, came before this esoteric discussion; that criticism was not the first but the final step For the sake of the Academy Aristotle would avoid as long as possible a public examination of the internal controversies of his school on logical and metaphysical questions, which few persons were capable of judging; and the remaining fragments prove that he did so only when self-defence obliged him. It follows that the dialogue was written at the same time as the criticism of the Forms in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, or slightly later, and certainly after Plato's death. Aristotle enters the lists armed not merely with destructive criticisms but also with a view of his own. Until Andronicus published the *Metaphysics* this dialogue remained the chief source of information about Aristotle's general philosophical opinions in the ancient world, and from it the Stoics and Epicureans took their knowledge of him. It was, however, an undeveloped Aristotle with whom they had to content themselves.

He began with the historical development of philosophy. He did not confine himself to the Greek philosophers from Thales onward, who display a real continuity, and who were pure inquirers, proceeding without presuppositions along definite lines. Contrary to his procedure in the *Metaphysics*, he went back to the East, and mentioned its ancient and tremendous creations with interest and respect. In the first book of the *Metaphysics* he touches only on the Egyptian priests and their services to mathematics, for the sake of the example of philosophic leisure and contemplation that they gave to the Greeks. In his dialogue, however, he penetrated to the earliest times—if we follow his own chronology—and spoke of the Magi and their

[1] See *Ent. Met. Arist.*, pp. 28 ff., esp. p. 33.

teaching.[1] Then came the venerable representatives of the oldest Hellenic wisdom, the theologians, as he calls them; then the doctrines of the Orphics, and no doubt Hesiod, though he does not appear in the fragments; and finally the proverbial wisdom traditionally ascribed to the Seven Wise Men, the preservation of which was specially cared for by the God of Delphi. This gave occasion to mention the old Apolline worship. It is worth noticing that Aristotle was the first successor of Plato to rid himself of Plato's contemptuous opinion of the Sophists. He restored the name to its rightful meaning as a title of honour; and he had the historical insight to put the Seven Wise Men at the head of this succession of commanding intellects, whose influence on the development of Greek thought seemed to him so important that he included it in the history of philosophical wisdom.[2]

This mass of facts was critically sifted and reduced to order. Aristotle raised the question of the genuineness of the remaining Orphic poems. He denied that Orpheus wrote verse; and he distinguished between the religious ideas and the form in which they were handed down, correctly assigning the latter to a fairly late period, about the end of the sixth century. This is the origin of the view, which still holds the field, that the mystification of the Orphic poem was invented by Onomacritus, theologian to the Pisistratids, who were interested in Orphic mysticism.[3] Aristotle also inquired into the antiquity of the proverb 'Know thyself', which was inscribed over the entrance to the temple at Delphi. He sought to determine its date by means of the history of the building.[4] Similarly, instead of naïvely admiring the hoar antiquity of Egyptian wisdom and of Iranian religion, he attempted to assign to them the most definite possible dates.[5]

This strict chronology is the result not of a mere antiquarian

[1] Frg. 6.

[2] The evidence for these details in the dialogue *On Philosophy* is as follows. Apart from the dating of the religion of the Magi, only the calculation about the antiquity of the Delphic proverb 'Know thyself', which led on to the question of the date of the Seven Wise Men, is definitely ascribed to this dialogue (frg. 3). Aristotle assigned the proverb to a time prior to Chilon. It follows that fragments 4 and 5 come from the same context. That the theologians must have been mentioned is obvious from the fact that in the *Metaphysics* too he makes philosophical reflection begin with them.

[3] Frg. 7. [4] Frg. 3. [5] Frg. 6.

interest but of a philosophical principle. His doctrine was that the same truths reappear in human history, not merely once or twice, but indefinitely often.[1] He therefore laid the foundation of a collection of Greek proverbs, on the ground that these laconic and striking empirical precepts are the survivals of a pre-literary philosophy, and have preserved themselves by word of mouth, through all the changes in the nation's spirit, in virtue of their brevity and pregnancy. His keen eye perceived the value of proverbs and proverbial poetry in the study of the origins of ethical reflection. To the educated Greek the detailed labour of making such a collection seemed banausic, and Aristotle's attempt evoked open scorn from Isocratean circles.[2] In examining the antiquity of the Delphic maxim 'Know thyself' he tried to determine the question from which of the Seven Wise Men it came. By means of his deductions from the building he settled this rather empty controversy with a judgement of Solomon; since the maxim is older than Chilon it comes from none of the Wise Men, but was revealed by the Pythia herself. The point of the argument becomes clear when we consider Plutarch's statement, according to which Aristotle 'in the Platonic works' held that 'Know thyself' is the most divine of the precepts at Delphi, and that it was this same precept that gave Socrates his problem. The peculiar phrase 'in the Platonic works' (ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς) is parallel to 'in the Socratic works', which means Plato's Socratic dialogues; it must refer to the form, not the content, and it must mean Aristotle's Platonic dialogues. The relation here established between the old Delphic maxim and the new Socratic search for ethical knowledge fits better into the dialogue *On Philosophy* than into any other. It is an example of the doctrine that philosophical truths are rediscovered throughout the course of history. Thus Socrates became the restorer of the ethical principle of Apolline religion; in fact, as Aristotle tried to show by the tale of the visit to Delphi, it was from this ancient centre of revelation that he received the

[1] *De Caelo* I. 3, 270^{b} 19; *Meteor.* I. 3, 339^{b} 27; *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1074^{b} 10; *Pol.* VII. 10, 1329^{b} 25.

[2] For Aristotle's interest in proverbs see παροιμία in Bonitz's *Index Aristotelicus*. For the view that proverbs are 'remnants of ancient philosophy' see frg. 13. For collections of the proverbs see Diog. L. V. 26 and Athenaeus II. 60 D.

external impulse leading to those questions that agitated all the ethical problems of his age.[1]

The connexion thus discovered between religion and philosophy extends throughout the dialogue. Socrates' Apolline mission had already been touched on by Plato in the *Apology*; here the doctrine of cycles is used to broaden it into a renascence of Delphic wisdom. Apollinism and Socraticism are the two foci in the development of Greek ethics. The inquiry into the date of the origin of Orphism must have been part of the same idea. Aristotle never doubted the historicity of Orpheus; he emphasized the lateness of the literary formulation solely in order to replace the Pisistratid versifier and oracle-monger with a genuine prophet of Greek antiquity. He was certain that the Orphic poems were late; there was nothing, however, to prevent the religious teaching itself from being of great antiquity. What led him to inquire into the date of its origin was doubtless its recent return in a more spiritualized form in Plato's doctrine of the after-life and the soul's progress.

Another example of this method is to be found in the following fragment. In his *Natural History* Pliny says (30. 3): 'Eudoxus, who wished it to be thought that the most famous and most beneficial of the philosophical sects was that of the Magi, tells us that this Zoroaster lived 6,000 years before the death of Plato. Aristotle says the same.' We know that Eudoxus, the astronomer and friend of Plato, interested himself in Oriental and Egyptian learning during his stay in those parts. He brought with him to Greece the lore that he had gathered from the representatives of a world still more or less closed to the Hellenes.

At that time the Academy was the centre of a very strong interest in the Orient. As an omen of Alexander's expedition and the consequent *rapprochement* between Greek and Asiatic this interest is of great and by no means sufficiently recognized significance. The channels through which the Eastern influence

[1] That fragments 1 and 2 belong with 3 cannot be doubted, as soon as it is perceived that the key to the whole is the theory of the periodic return of all knowledge. We are not concerned here with the question whether the Delphic precepts really belong to the ethics of Apollo, or are pieces of foreign wisdom availing themselves of the god's protection. The parallel between Socrates and the Delphic maxim also appears in Ps.-Plato, *Alcib.* I. 124 B: 'taking the advice of myself and of the Delphic maxim "Know thyself".'

forced its way can be traced only to a small extent. From a fragment of the Academy's list of students, preserved on a papyrus from Herculaneum, we happen to know that a Chaldaean was a regular member of the school.[1] This appears to have been during Plato's last decade. Other signs of Oriental influence point to the same period. Such are the parallel in *Alcibiades* I between Plato's four virtues and the ethics of Zarathustra, and the astral theology put forward as the highest wisdom by Plato's pupil and secretary, Philip of Opus, in his postscript to the *Laws*. To recommend the new religious views which he is earnestly proclaiming 'to the Greeks' Philip openly appeals to Oriental sources.[2] These tendencies undoubtedly originated during the time when Eudoxus was present in the Academy, although our material unfortunately does not permit us to evaluate to its full extent the tremendous influence exercised upon the Platonists by this man. They are connected in part with the Academy's admiration for Chaldaean and 'Syrian' astronomy, from whose ancient empirical acquaintance with the heavens it had obtained its reckoning of the times of revolution and its knowledge of the seven planets, a knowledge that appears in Philip of Opus for the first time in Europe. In part, again, these tendencies are connected with the appeal of the religious dualism of the Parsees, which seemed to lend support to the dualistic metaphysics of Plato's old age. The bad world-soul that opposes the good one in the *Laws* is a tribute to Zarathustra, to whom Plato was attracted because of the mathematical phase that his Idea-theory finally assumed, and because of the intensified dualism involved therein.[3] From that time onwards the Academy was keenly interested in Zarathustra and the teaching of the Magi. Plato's pupil Hermodorus discussed astralism in his *Mathematics*; he derived the name Zarathustra from it, declaring that it means 'star-worshipper' (ἀστροθύτης).[4]

[1] *Index Acad. Herculan.* col. iii, p. 13 (Mekler).

[2] *Epin.* 986 E, 987 B, and 987 D–988 A. Ps.-Plato, *Alcib.* I. 121 E–122 A.

[3] *Laws* X. 896 E. '*Ath.* And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens? *Cle.* Of course. *Ath.* One soul or more? More than one—I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two—one the author of good, and the other of the opposite.'

[4] For Hermodorus *On Mathematics*, used by Sotion in the *Diadoche*, see Diog. L. I. 2 and 8; cf. Schol. on Ps.-Plato, *Alcib.* I. 122 A.

These influences gave rise to Aristotle's interest in the Magi in the dialogue *On Philosophy*. Even the attempt to determine Zarathustra's date had already been made by other Academics. Hermodorus, for instance, had put him 5,000 years before the fall of Troy. The researches of this Platonist were still the main authority on the matter when the learned Alexandrian Sotion wrote his history of the philosophical schools. Besides Hermodorus he mentioned the suggestion of Xanthus, according to which Zarathustra lived 6,000 years before the invasion of Xerxes.[1] The date given by Aristotle and Eudoxus, as reported by Pliny, differs from the other traditional dates in its peculiar point of reference. When we compare '6,000 years before Plato's death' with figures reckoned from the fall of Troy or from the expedition of Xerxes (which later gave way to that of Alexander), it becomes obvious that this manner of statement is due not to chronological convenience but to the desire to connect Zarathustra and Plato as two essentially similar historical phenomena. The point of the comparison, and of Aristotle's interest in the round thousands of the interval, is clearly the view put forward in *On Philosophy* that all human truths have their natural and necessary cycles. Now in a fragment that is known to belong to the first book of this dialogue Aristotle speaks of the teaching of the Magi, namely the Iranian dualism, according to which there are two principles, a good and a bad spirit, Ormuzd and Ahriman; and these he identifies with the Greek divinities Zeus and Hades, the god of heavenly light and the god of chthonic darkness. Plutarch, also, compares Plato's doctrine of the good and the bad world-souls with the dualism of the Chaldees and Magi. It is natural to suppose that the same consideration was actuating Aristotle in the fragment where he draws a parallel between Zarathustra and Plato.[2] This supposition is rendered certain by the only other passage where he mentions the Magi, namely one of the oldest parts of the *Metaphysics*, which must be assigned on other grounds to the time when *On Philosophy* was being written. Here again the subject is Platonic dualism. As the earliest forerunners of this view Aristotle mentions in Greece Pherecydes, in Asia the Magi.[3] The Academy's

[1] Diog. L. I. 2.

[2] Frg. 6. Plutarch, *Is. et Osir.* 370 E.

[3] *Metaph.* N 4, 1091^{b}8.

wrote copiously about all that art, and commented on two million lines written by Zoroaster, affixing an index to every book, says . . . that his teacher was Agonaces, and that he himself lived five thousand years before the Trojan war.[1]

Theopompus in the eighth book of his *Philippica*.

It is evident that Hermippus used the same sources for both these accounts of the Magi, namely the dialogue *On Philosophy* and the *Voyage* of Eudoxus. He must have quoted them exactly each time. Diogenes preserves his quotation in full; but Pliny, as often, names only the authors without the books. Pliny's fragment fits excellently with the theory of cycles, and with the chronological discussions in the first book *On Philosophy*, which contained other statements about the Magi; in future, therefore, it is to be included among the fragments of this dialogue. The parallel position of Plato and Zarathustra in the cycle does not give the impression of having been invented during Plato's life. It was certainly not to be found in the *Voyage* of Eudoxus, who died long before him. The originality of Eudoxus lay solely in putting Zarathustra '6,000 years ago'. It was Aristotle who, led by his doctrine of the periodical return of all human knowledge, first specifically connected this figure with the return of dualism, and thereby put Plato in a setting that corresponded to his profound reverence for him. There can be no doubt that the dialogue in which he thus directed the light of the centuries upon his master was written after the latter's death.[2]

[1] On the correct form of the name 'Agonaces' see Fr. C. Andreas in Reitzenstein, 'Die Göttin Psyche', *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, vol. viii (1917), Abh. 10, p. 44. On the significance of the above discussion of Aristotle's statements about Zarathustra's teaching for the oriental tradition and its chronology see Reitzenstein-Schaeder, *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus aus Iran und Griechenland* (Leipzig, 1926), p. 3.

[2] If Pliny's words 'sex milibus annorum ante *Platonis mortem*' do not come from the intermediate source Hermippus—it is true, as Eduard Fraenkel has pointed out to me, that in technical chronology 'ante mortem . . .' sometimes means no more than 'ante aliquem'—but from Hermippus' authority, they can only be from Aristotle, since Eudoxus died before Plato. (It is impossible to follow Gisinger, op. cit. p. 5, n. 1, in supposing on the basis of the passage in Pliny that Eudoxus died later than Plato.) Merely on internal grounds, however, it seems to me certain that such a comparison could never have arisen while Plato was still alive, and the same is true of the attitude of the dialogue as a whole to Plato and his philosophy.

The doctrine that truth returns at certain intervals assumes that men are incapable of permanently retaining it once it has been discovered. It was not supposed, however, that humanity cannot maintain itself for long upon a high spiritual level, and for that reason continually loses again even truths that have been known for a long time. The theory was that the tradition, and in fact civilization as a whole, is periodically destroyed by violent convulsions of nature. In other words, Plato's doctrine of catastrophes was applied to the history of philosophy. Bywater has given convincing reasons for believing that this doctrine occurred in Aristotle's dialogues.[1] In the *Timaeus* it is suggested that all the more ancient traditions of the Greeks have been annihilated by overwhelming natural events. Such myths as those of Phaëthon and of the flood are there interpreted as traces of these events in human memory. The same method of interpretation is applied to the oldest records of culture in the *Laws*, just as Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* explains the stories of the Gods as remnants, distorted by tradition, of an early stage of his own theory of the movers of the spheres.[2] This rationalizing procedure certainly cannot have originated in Plato's imaginative brain. It bears the stamp of Ionian science, and presumably it comes from Eudoxus himself, together with the theory of catastrophes. Aristotle made free use of it. In the *Meteorologica*, for example, he argues from the mythical tradition to the prehistorical existence of the hypothesis of ether, which as a matter of fact was invented by himself.[3] On the other hand, Eudoxus is certainly not the author of the view that all intellectual things recur. This, however, only brings out more clearly

[1] Bywater (*Journ. of Philology*, vol. vii, p. 65) assigns to the *On Philosophy* portions of Philoponus *In Nicom. arithm.* The theory of cataclysms is there connected with the growth of knowledge, and this is an idea that Aristotle took over from Plato and developed. The form of the theory that Bywater analyses is, however, Stoic, especially the notion of the development of the arts, and of the continual change that this causes in the meaning of 'wisdom'. See my *Nemesios von Emesa, Quellenforschungen zur Geschichte des älteren Neuplatonismus und zu Poseidonios* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 124 ff. See also Gerhäusser, *Der Protreptikos des Poseidonios* (Heidelberg thesis, 1912), pp. 16 ff.

[2] Plato, *Timaeus* 22 A–C, *Critias* 109 D ff., *Laws* III. 677 A; Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1074^b 1–13.

[3] *Meteor.* I. 3, 339^b 20 ff., *De Caelo* I. 3, 270^b 16 ff., *De Animal. Mot.* 3, 699^a 27, *Pol.* VII. 10, 1329^b 25.

the effect of contemporary natural science on men's thought about the history of culture, on their use of the myths, and on their conception of the human spirit, which, like nature with her forces, is ever bringing forth anew that which lies hidden within itself.

By representing Plato in the first book as a man of the ages, out of the reach of every petty contradiction, and as the culmination of all previous philosophy, Aristotle gave the proper perspective to the criticism that followed. The second book was a destructive criticism of the Ideas. The third gave his own view of the world; it was a cosmology and a theology; like the second, it took the form throughout of a criticism of Plato, for the simple reason that it was dependent on him at every step. Its general contents are described by the Epicurean in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*. In essentials Aristotle adopted the stellar theology of Plato's later days. This, it seemed to him, must be the point of departure for metaphysics now that the theory of Forms had collapsed. Plato conceived that behind the sidereal story of his later years there lay the supersensible world of Ideas, of which the visible heavens were a copy. Aristotle, however, was concerned exclusively with the cosmological side of this dual world. (So, though in a different manner, was that other pupil of Plato's, Philip of Opus, in the *Epinomis*.) In this way he became the real founder of the cosmic religion of the Hellenistic philosophers, which, emancipated from popular beliefs, sought its objects of worship solely in the heavenly bodies. The threads connecting on the one hand Aristotle's stellar religion with the Academy, on the other Stoic theology with Aristotle's early views, have not yet been laid bare. In particular, the importance of Aristotle in this connexion has not been clearly recognized, because scholars have taken their start too exclusively from the treatises, which were totally unknown to the Hellenistic age.

According to the unfavourable account in Cicero, which comes from some Epicurean source also used by Philodemus, Aristotle in his third book *On Philosophy* declared now that God was mind, now that he was the world, now that he was the ether, and now that he was some other being, to whom the world was subordinated, and who guided its movement by a kind of backwards turning (*replicatione quadam*).[1] By applying the dogma of

[1] Frg. 26 (Cic. *De Natura Deorum* I. 13, 33).

the Epicurean school the critic discovers gross contradictions in these statements; but, however superficial his judgement of them may be, the correctness of the account as such cannot be doubted. The God to whom the world is subordinated is the transcendental unmoved mover, who guides the world as its final cause, by reason of the perfection of his pure thought. This is the original nucleus of Aristotelian metaphysics. Besides this, Aristotle described the ether as a divine body, or as a more divine body, as he does in the treatises; he certainly did not call it God.[1] The divinity of the ether does not seem to fit very well with a strict transcendental monotheism, but below the unmoved mover were the stargods, whose matter was ethereal. There is no real contradiction in the fact that Aristotle called now the world and now the ether God, i.e. first the whole and then the part. 'World' here does not mean what the Epicurean takes it to mean. It is not the Hellenistic conception of the cosmos filled with living creatures and containing all things, but the heavens, the mere periphery. This was the way in which the old Academy used the word, as the *Epinomis* also shows. In this work it is said to be indifferent whether we call the highest God, who is the heaven, Uranus or Olympus or Cosmos. In another passage we read that the truest description of him is Cosmos.[2]

The influence of the later Plato on the dialogue *On Philosophy* was not confined to terminology. In the main features of theology, also, it corresponds almost perfectly with the *Epinomis*. It is noteworthy that the Epicurean, who is looking for points of attack, says nothing whatever about the fifty-five sphere-gods of the later metaphysics. In this dialogue Aristotle obviously had not yet adopted that view.

This is confirmed by a statement of Pseudo-Philo's in the work *On the Eternity of the World*. Aristotle is there said to have imputed terrible atheism (δεινὴν ἀθεότητα) to the philosophers who declared that the world had a beginning or an end, because

[1] Cicero translates 'ether' by *caeli ardor*. This is usual, and the description of it as divine is further evidence that what is meant is Aristotle's hypothesis of ether as the fifth element (cf. Cic. *De Natura Deorum* I. 14, 37; *ardorem, qui aether nominetur*, to which Plasberg refers in commenting on our passage). Aristotle must therefore have put forward the hypothesis while he was still in the Academy. It became fairly general there, though it suffered some excisions and modifications. Its first presentation to the public was no doubt that in the *On Philosophy*.

[2] *Epin.* 977 A, B and 987 B.

unity of the world is anchored in that Form. The stars and the heavens, however, have souls within them and follow their own inner laws spontaneously and consciously. This theory of immanent star-souls excludes the other method of explanation. The causes of the heavenly motions had long been discussed in the Academy. In the *Laws* Plato mentions three hypotheses as reasonable, without definitely deciding in favour of any one. They are to be valid for all heavenly bodies without distinction. Either we must think of the stars as bodies with souls inside them (to Plato the soul is the principle of spontaneous movement), or the soul, not being inside the star, makes itself an external body of fire or air and therewith propels the star, or finally the soul has no body at all, but guides the motion of the star 'by some extraordinary and wonderful power'.[1] Plato's own theory is probably that of the immanent souls, for this fits best both with his view that the soul is the principle of all movement and with the plastic simplicity and vitalizing power of his thought. He describes the second as 'the view of certain persons' (λόγος τινῶν), presumably astronomers; one thinks of the spheres of Eudoxus, although he is almost certainly too early to have believed that the spheres had souls. The bodiless soul of the third hypothesis is obviously a transcendental Form, moving the star as final cause, as the beloved moves the lover. It is the principle of the unmoved mover. The wonderful power of which Plato speaks may be imagined as similar to the longing of sensible things for the Idea, or to Aristotle's *orexis*.

It will presumably always remain impossible for us to determine whether it was Aristotle himself or some other Academic who first conceived the theory of the unmoved mover and applied it to the problem of stellar motion. The communal nature of their studies prevents us from distinguishing the precise share of each person. The spirit of the idea is Platonic; that is to say, it is one that could not have arisen by itself, but only within the Platonic universe of thought, whoever its acute inventor may have been. Aristotle used it only for the highest principle, which is distinct from the world and has absolutely no motion; the stars and the heavens, on the other hand, were moved by immanent souls. We know this not merely from the

[1] *Laws* X. 898 E.

passage in Philo, but above all from the Aristotelian arguments preserved by Cicero, which must now be examined. According to Plato one of the three hypotheses had to be true of all heavenly motions without distinction. The fact that Aristotle combines the first and the third perhaps indicates that he was not the originator of either.

In the second book of his work on the Gods Cicero gives us proofs of their existence from Cleanthes, from Chrysippus, from Xenophon, and several from Aristotle, which he obviously obtained not from his own reading but from a ready-made collection.[1] Many of the arguments simply repeat what has already been said. Even the collection itself did not derive everything from the originals, any more than Sextus, who also made a collection of arguments for the existence of Gods, largely similar to this one in content.[2] Hence Cicero's account must be used critically. Nevertheless, it is authentic in essence. Both points can be demonstrated from the very first argument. All elements give rise to living things, earth to some, water to others, air to others. Hence it seems absurd to Aristotle to suppose that there are no living things in the element that by its purity and power of movement is most suited for their production, namely the ether. Now in the region of the ether we find the stars. Presumably, therefore, the stars are living beings of keen intelligence and extremely rapid motion.

This argument has been correctly assigned to the dialogue *On Philosophy*, but it cannot have appeared there in its present form. We have seen that in that work Aristotle was already maintaining the doctrine of ether as a fifth element. The argument preserved by Cicero presupposes only four. It cannot belong to a period prior to the introduction of the fifth, and therefore cannot be assigned to any earlier work of Aristotle's; it is an adaptation of his argument to the Stoic theory of the elements, the latter being a compromise between the traditional and the Aristotelian view, by which fire and ether were regarded as a single element. The only thing that Cicero's Stoic authority correctly reproduces is the formal analogical nature of the reasoning. Aristotle began with the universal validity of the

[1] Cic. *De Natura Deorum* II. 15, 42–44 (partly reproduced in Rose as frgs. 23 and 24).
[2] Sext. Emp. *Adv. Phys.* I. 49.

the vision of true being by which the philosopher is separated from his brothers and rendered lonely. Aristotle's simile also breathes a new attitude towards the world. His men, however, have not lived in caves. They are modern, cultivated, satiated, miseducated persons, who bury themselves like moles in the sunless and comfortless splendour in which they are seeking their dubious happiness. He makes them ascend one day into the light, there to perceive the drama that he himself sees, the immeasurable marvel of reality, the divine structure and motion of the cosmos. He teaches them to contemplate, not a supernatural world, but that which is visible to all and yet seen of none. He is conscious of being the first Greek to see the real world with Plato's eyes, and his intentional alteration of Plato's simile is a sign of this view of his historical mission. What he gives us instead of the Ideas is the contemplation of the wonderful shapes and arrangements of the cosmos, a contemplation which, intensified until it becomes religion, leads up to the intuition of the divine director of it all.

By means of the *Epinomis*, which is equally emphatic in assigning to theology the central position in philosophy, we know that these lofty speculations met with energetic opposition from the Greeks. According to the popular Greek view the knowledge of the divine, the Gnosis of the Orientals, is a thing that must be for ever unattainable to mortals; and unhappy is the man who plagues his head with the search for the forbidden fruit. Aristotle himself, at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, deprecates the deeply-rooted Hellenic dislike of extravagant (περιεργία) and high-flown audacities of thinking. He often opposes the ancient wisdom according to which a mortal should think mortal things; and he earnestly invites us to live in eternity.[1] Theology became possible to the Greeks only when the discovery of laws in the heavenly motions had led to the assumption of star-souls, and when assured knowledge of the

[1] *Epin.* 988 A: 'Let none of the Greeks fear that it is not right for mortal men ever to busy themselves with matters divine; they must hold entirely the opposite view'; 988 B, the divine power is free from jealousy. The same ideas reappear with verbal echoes in Aristotle's *Metaph.* A 2, 982b 28 ff. Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* X. 7, 1177b 31; 'we must not follow those [e.g. Epicharmus (frg. 20 in Diels), and Euripides (*Bacchae* 395 and 427 ff.)] who advise us, being men, to think of human things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal.'

'visible Gods' had brought within measurable distance the possibility of an exact and astronomical theology based on experience. To this we must add the influence of the East, as the *Epinomis* tells us and other evidence confirms. The Socratic 'know thyself', the quintessence of Apolline wisdom, was now converted into its opposite. In his *Life of Socrates* Aristoxenus the Peripatetic related that an Indian, meeting Socrates in Athens, asked him about his philosophy. When Socrates answered that he was attempting to understand human life, the Indian represented to him the hopelessness of such an undertaking, since man cannot know himself until he knows God.[1] This sounds apocryphal, but it is simply the legendary formulation of the view, universal in the later Academy and summed up in the *Epinomis* as a programme for religious reform, that in future Oriental astralism and theology would have to be combined with the Delphic religion of Hellas, if the Greeks were to make religious progress.[2] In the opinion of the author, who gives us the ruling tendency in the Academy (he could hardly represent merely personal preferences as the conclusion of Plato's *Laws*), the way to this combination is through mysticism. Aristotle shares with him, and with all Academics whatever, the view that *cognitio dei* is conceivable only if it is God Himself

[1] Aristoxenus, frg. 31 in Mueller. The visit of the Indian to Athens is also mentioned in the fragment of Aristotle (frg. 32) preserved in Diogenes Laertius II. 45. If this were genuine it would presumably have to be assigned to the first book of the dialogue *On Philosophy*; but Rose was probably right in including it under the remains of the spurious *Magicus*, since its contents do not accord with Aristotle. The nearest parallels to the theology of the supposed Indian (it is really that of the later Plato) are Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (whose demand that human action be based on the knowledge of God reappears in *Eth. Eud.* VIII. 3, 1249b 13–21) and the *Alcibiades Major*, which Friedländer has recently attempted to rehabilitate, and has assigned to Plato's early period (*Der grosse Alcibiades ein Weg zu Plato*, Bonn, 1921). This dialogue culminates in the thesis, elaborately and somewhat pedantically developed, that the Delphic maxim 'know thyself' can be realized only through the self-contemplation of *Nus* in the mirror of the knowledge of God (132 E–133 C). The attainment of this thereby becomes the real focus of all the ethical, political, and educational problems that Plato's school inherited from Socrates. The *Epinomis* also stands for this reduction of all ethical questions, both of happiness and of virtue, to the question of the knowledge of God. The *Alcibiades* is obviously an attempt, undertaken by some disciple at the same time as the above-mentioned works, to apply theology to the problems of Plato's early days, and to anchor them in a firm dogmatic principle, to wit, the mysticism of Plato's later doctrine of *Nus*.

[2] *Epin.* 987 D–988 A.

knowing Himself. He pictures this activity as something transcendental and beyond the merely human standard. The self is the *Nus*, which is said to 'come in from without' and to be 'the divine in us'; and it is through *Nus* that the knowledge of God enters into us. The author of the *Epinomis* goes so far as to speak of the participation of the one contemplator in the one *phronesis*, whereas Aristotle never emphasizes God's unity with human *Nus* more than His transcendence.[1] In any event it is impossible to understand Aristotle's influence on posterity unless we realize that he breathed this atmosphere for many years, and that his metaphysics is rooted in it, however far it may have developed beyond it on the logical side. The establishment of the worship of the stars, which are confined to no land or nation but shine on all the peoples of the earth,[2] and of the transcendental God who is enthroned above them, inaugurates the era of religious and philosophic universalism. On the crest of this last wave Attic culture streams out into the Hellenistic sea of peoples.

[1] In *Metaph.* Λ 2, 983ª 5–11, the knowledge of God is identified with God's knowledge. For the union of the human spirit with the divine see *Epin.* 986 D.
[2] *Epin.* 984 A.

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGINAL *METAPHYSICS*

I. THE PROBLEM

THE importance of the dialogue *On Philosophy* is not exhausted by the light it throws on the period between the Academy and the Lyceum. It gives us for the first time a fixed point in the development of Aristotle's opinions, and a historically accurate starting-place from which to analyse his metaphysical treatise. The earlier works obviously rest on an entirely different basis; but what is the relation between the doctrines of this classical dialogue, in which he made it public that henceforth he dissented from Plato's views, and the traditional Aristotelian metaphysics? Naturally, we must not take what we have learnt from the fragments and read it into the text of the treatise—itself, indeed, fragmentary, but still incomparably fuller. Our recovered picture of the lost work would, however, become important, if analysis of the *Metaphysics* were of itself to lead us along the same lines.

The fundamental conceptions of the *Metaphysics* were undoubtedly already determined when Aristotle wrote the dialogue. Even if we knew nothing else but that it contained the doctrine of the unmoved mover, we should thereby be assured that he had already established the conceptions of matter and form, of potency and act, and his own conception of substance. Moreover, the three separate inquiries of which the dialogue was composed, the historical, the critical, and the theological, have their counterparts in the *Metaphysics*, the first in the first book, the second in the concluding books and throughout, the third in Book Λ. A more difficult question is how far the dialogue contained any parallel to the so-called central books of the *Metaphysics*, those which develop the theory of substance and of potency and act. We may say either that Aristotle considered these investigations too hard and too esoteric for publication, or that it is simply an accident that no fragment of this portion remains. In any event it cannot have occupied so large a space as in the *Metaphysics*, where it outweighs everything else,

especially if we omit the introduction (A–E). Theology, on the contrary, was developed much more thoroughly than it is in Book Λ, for our accounts tell us much of which the *Metaphysics* by itself would have given no inkling. With the doctrine of star-souls we are transported into a distinctly earlier stage of Aristotle's development, and there is much to indicate that, if we had more of the dialogue, its divergence would probably appear still greater. That would seem to be a proof of the late origin of the *Metaphysics*, which would thus have to be assigned to Aristotle's last period; and this would agree thoroughly with the view that has obtained up to now, for ever since the Roman empire it has been a widespread opinion that the *Metaphysics* was written late and left unfinished.

This picture alters entirely, however, as soon as we analyse the *Metaphysics*. The origin of the *book* bearing this name now becomes important for the origin of Aristotle's metaphysical *speculation* itself.[1] It is totally inadmissible to treat the elements combined in the *corpus metaphysicum* as if they were a unity, and to set up, for purposes of comparison, the average result of these entirely heterogeneous materials. As I have shown in another place, internal analysis leads to the view that various periods are represented; and this is confirmed by the tradition that the collection known as the *Metaphysics* was not put together until after its author's death. Previous investigations, however, have concerned only the history of the text *subsequent* to Aristotle's death, i.e. the history of his literary remains. The clarification of these matters was undoubtedly the first step; but it was directly important only for the history of Aristotle's influence, and the labour expended was out of all proportion to the advance made in knowledge of his own thought and personality. Criticism did not regain its meaning and importance until it sought to understand the actual state of the text as the organic result of the inner form of its author's thought.[2] This at once led away from the question of the external literary unity of the surviving metaphysical papers to that of their inner philosophical unity, and thus to chronology and the analysis of development. I took the first steps along this road in my *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik*, but at that time I was too much under the influence of the old philological attitude (whose problem is, 'In the *Metaphysics* as we have it, can we justify the division into books and the order of the parts?') to pursue my own findings to their logical conclusions. The question of chronology, on one point of which I had already reached an assured result at that time, must now be taken up again in the light of Aristotle's philosophical development. This will necessitate some repetitions in detail, which the course of the inquiry itself must justify.

[1] See my *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Berlin, 1912.

[2] Cf. *Ent. Met. Arist.*, pp. 150, 161.

Before beginning to discuss the chronology we may once more briefly remind ourselves what, in the present condition of the *Metaphysics*, is to be ascribed to the editors of Aristotle's literary remains. Here it will be best to omit all arguments and rely on the results of the previous investigation.

The aim of the modern philologist, to make the external order reflect the order of composition, even at the cost of the general impression, was quite foreign to ancient editors. Aristotle's literary executors were philosophers. They would have given much to be able to construct, out of the precious papers that they found, as true a picture as possible of the whole intellectual system of 'first philosophy' as Aristotle had intended it to be; but their desire was thwarted by the incomplete and disparate character of the material. For one thing is certain; the editors themselves did not believe that with the order which they established they were giving posterity the complete course of lectures on metaphysics. They realized that they were offering an unsatisfactory makeshift, which was all that the condition of their materials allowed. The postscript to the introductory book, the so-called little α, comes after big A simply because they did not know where else to put it. It is a remnant of notes taken at a lecture by Pasicles, a nephew of Aristotle's disciple Eudemus of Rhodes.[1] ABΓ belong together; Δ, on the other hand, was still known as an independent work in Alexandrian

[1] Asclepius, in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* (p. 4, l. 20, in Hayduck), refers this information, which reached him as a tradition handed down in the Peripatetic school, to A; but this is a confusion. His account must come from notes taken at a lecture by Ammonius, and obviously he misheard. The true account is given by the scholiast on little α in the codex Parisinus (cf. *Ent. Met. Arist.*, p. 114).

times, as a sound bibliographical tradition informs us. E is a short transitional passage leading to ZHΘ. These three form a whole, but their connexion with the previous books seems to be problematical. I, a discussion of being and unity, stands entirely alone; and from this point onwards all inward and outward connexion disappears. K simply contains another form of BΓE, to which are appended some excerpts from the *Physics*, in themselves just as Aristotelian as any other part of this collection of manuscripts, but out of all relation to their surroundings. Similarly, a passage from the *Physics* has been inserted into Δ. Λ is an isolated lecture, giving a general view of the whole metaphysical system, entirely complete in itself, and presenting no trace of connexion with the rest. The concluding books MN have no relation to the preceding; this was remarked even in antiquity, and has led to their insertion before KΛ in many manuscripts, which, however, does not produce a more plausible train of thought. Their closest relationship is to the first two books.

Nothing but exact inquiry can determine in detail at what time and in what connexion this material arose, and how it is to be used in reconstructing Aristotle's philosophy. On no account must we, by assuming that it is philosophically homogeneous, cover up the problems which its content as well as its form presents at every step. We must reject all attempts to make a literary whole out of the remaining materials by rearranging or removing some of the books, and we must condemn the assumption which overhastily postulates their philosophical unity at the expense of their individual peculiarities. Each of these papers is the result of decades of untiring reflection on the same questions; each is a fruitful instant, a stage in Aristotle's development, an approach to the solution, a step towards new formulation. It is true that all the details are supported by that potential unity of the whole system which is active in every particular utterance of the philosopher; but no one who is content with that has the right to call himself familiar with the Aristotelian temper in its actuality. Aristotle has a dour, austere form; no wide-ranging survey, no genial, comfortable intuition, can really understand him. Rarely does he offer us a whole on which the eye can rest with pleasure. Only in the concrete

details, only by intensive concentration, can his essence be grasped. 'For the actuality of *Nus* is life.'

II. THE INTRODUCTION AND THE EARLIEST DRAFT OF THE CRITICISM OF IDEAS

The piety of the editors has preserved the famous criticism of Plato's doctrine of Ideas in two versions, one in the ninth chapter of Book A, and the other in chapters 4–5 of M. These two versions, which correspond almost letter for letter, cannot both have been intended for the same draft of the *Metaphysics*. If the version in M, which fits perfectly into the whole argument of that book, was meant to remain where it is, this can only have been because Aristotle intended either to write a new introduction, or at the least to omit the partly duplicated chapters at the end of the introduction as we have it (A 8–10). Now M frequently refers to the first two books[1] and this shows that somehow and somewhere it was meant to follow them. Hence Aristotle must have intended to delete the critical matter at the end of the first book. This proves that he used parts of Book A as raw material for a subsequent reconstruction.

This conclusion, that the two versions differ in date, is confirmed by the few respects in which their language disagrees. If we exclude a new argument which the later passage introduces against the Ideas,[2] their only difference lies in the systematic removal of the *first* person plural, which the earlier version consistently uses to represent the supporters of the theory of Ideas. This characteristic 'we' shows that the first book was written at a time when Aristotle could still call himself a Platonist and a recent supporter of the theory.[3] Hence the interval between the two books must have been considerable, for in M his separation from the Platonic community is an accomplished fact. More-

[1] M 2, 1077ª 1 (= B 2, 997ᵇ 12–34); M 9, 1086ª 34 (= B 6, 1003ª 6); M 9, 1086ᵇ 2 (= A 6, 987ᵇ 1); M 10, 1086ᵇ 15 (= B 4, 999ᵇ 24, and B 6, 1003ª 6).

[2] M 4, 1079ᵇ 3–11; cf. *Ent. Met. Arist.*, pp. 29–30.

[3] The result of our inquiry into the doctrines of the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus* is thus placed beyond all doubt; up to the moment when he first made such a criticism of the Ideas Aristotle himself supported the theory. The passages are collected in *Ent. Metaph. Arist.*, p. 33. 'We' also occurs in the first book outside the duplicated section, wherever the doctrine of Ideas is mentioned. Thus A 9, 992ª 11, 'we state', 25 'we have given this up' and 'we say', 27 'we assert', 28 'our account', 31 'we assert'.

over, in contrast to the considerate treatment of the first book, the tone of the later polemic is often sharp or positively contemptuous.

As the date of the earlier version only one single fleeting instant in Aristotle's life can be suggested. Plato himself was dead; this is the unmistakable meaning of the imperfect tense in which he is spoken of, and which appears several times.[1] In general, this criticism does not give the impression of having been Aristotle's first utterance on the subject in the Academy. The means by which Plato's arguments for the existence of 'separate' Ideas are here referred to—mostly abbreviated terminological descriptions—presuppose that the hearers were constantly occupied with them. Aristotle even assumes that they are acquainted with the objections to them. We should scarcely be able to understand his account, or to infer from his words exactly what argument he is criticizing, if the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias had not preserved their meaning for us from Aristotle's lost work *On Ideas*.[2] He is using mere formulae when he refers to 'the arguments from the sciences', 'the "one over many" argument', 'the third man' (a counter-argument that does not come from himself at all, but from Polyxenus the sophist,[3] and that Plato himself had already puzzled over in the *Parmenides*); also to 'the more accurate arguments', some of which assumed Ideas of relatives, and to 'the argument that there is an object for thought even when the thing has perished'.[4] Thus the original form of the criticism presupposes a group of *Platonic* philosophers, for whom Aristotle once more sums up, in a rapid survey, all those objections to the doctrine of the now dead master that had occupied the Academy in the course of the years, in order to infer the necessity for a complete reorganization of Platonism on the basis of these criticisms. The bereaved school is now standing at a decisive turning-point of its career. Outside of Athens, which he very soon left, Aristotle was surrounded by such a group of Platonists, after Plato's death, only in Assos, and then never again. In Athens he can

[1] A 9, 992a 20 'he used to object', 21 'he used to call', 22 'he often posited'.
[2] Frgs. 187–189.
[3] According to Phanias 'in the speech in reply to Diodorus' (frg. 24 in Mueller), quoted by Alex. Aphr. *In Arist. Metaph.*, p. 84, l. 16, in Hayduck.
[4] A 9, 990b 12 ff.

scarcely have been sufficiently composed in mind to work out, before his departure, a new lecture embracing all the criticisms of Plato's doctrine and all his own reflections on the problems of metaphysics. In Assos, on the other hand, he had not merely the necessary leisure, but also an audience of sound philosophical judgement, including Plato's best-known disciples, men who were either objective enough to listen to an opponent's reasons, like Xenocrates, or themselves full of doubt about Plato's doctrine, as Erastus, Coriscus, and their convert Hermias, seem to have been. At any rate Plato himself, in his letter to them, had thought it necessary to explain that 'even in his old age' he could not give up the theory of Ideas. He assumes that the men of Assos also have their controversies about 'this noble lore'; perhaps they had consulted him on some point. He exhorts them to have recourse to the Academy in every difficulty; if dissensions threaten he will exorcize them.[1] After his death the men of Assos invited the two representatives of the conservative and the critical tendencies respectively to visit them, and this is the group to whom the earliest version of the *Metaphysics* was read. It was contemporary with the dialogue *On Philosophy*.

We can still detect that the first book is a boldly sketched improvization. The famous opening chapter is borrowed in all essentials from the *Protrepticus*, as our examination of the latter showed;[2] in other words, Aristotle's fundamental attitude to knowledge had not changed. The aetiology which follows it, the doctrine of the four causes, is taken, along with the other main conceptions—form, matter, potency, act—from the *Physics*; Aristotle expressly refers to that work as the foundation of what he says here. It is new, however, when he develops his doctrine of causes genetically out of the history of earlier philosophy, as the completion and fresh beginning of which he represents Plato. The criticism of the Ideas, itself also hastily thrown together,

[1] Plato, *Letter VI*, 322 D: 'In addition to the love of Ideas (a noble lore, as I maintain, even in my old age) Erastus and Coriscus have need also of the lore of self-defence against the base and wicked, and of a sort of faculty of self-preservation.' (The words τῇ καλῇ ταύτῃ φήμ' ἐγώ καίπερ γέρων ὢν go together. The usual view, that φημί goes with προσδεῖν, makes nonsense of the intervening concessive participle. Hence we must emend προσδεῖν to προσδεῖ.) Thus this statement, when we restore its original meaning, becomes highly significant for the controversies about the Ideas within the Academy during Plato's last years, and for his own point of view.
[2] Above, p. 69.

then paves the way for his own formulation of the problems in the second book, which is equally conditioned by the situation that we have described, and cannot be fully understood apart from this historical background. This result completes the picture of Aristotle's relation to Plato and his school that we obtained from the dialogue *On Philosophy*. It confirms the view that the publication of his criticism was the very last step in a long process, the beginnings of which are lost in the darkness of the esoteric communal studies of the Academy. It is no longer possible to distinguish Aristotle's own special objections from those of other critics, for what he gives us in the *Metaphysics* is obviously a collection of *all* the essential arguments, irrespective of origin. At the same time as he publicly attacked the official Academic doctrine, he attempted, by means of an esoteric lecture on metaphysics in Assos, to convert such of his fellow-students as were more favourable to his critical attitude to a certain conviction, namely that the essence of Plato's legacy could be preserved only by the absolute abandonment of dualism and of the 'separateness' of the Ideas. What he proposed seemed to himself to be pure Platonism, and was meant to be nothing else; it was to be the philosophical consummation of what Plato had aimed at but failed to attain. The most remarkable thing about this estimate of his own position, which enabled him to preserve his reverence in spite of violent alterations of Plato's doctrine, is his feeling that he is responsible for the organic development of the doctrine, and his determination to acquit himself well. His contemporaries, however, judged him otherwise. Beneath the conservative covering they recognized a new and revolutionary attitude towards the world, and hence they no longer considered him a Platonist. He himself, however, was not yet sufficiently detached from his own development to perceive the truth of this opinion. Only in his latest period did he become wholly free and independent. Whether his earlier or his later estimate of himself seems truer to us, will depend on whether we look more to the historical presuppositions of his philosophy, or to his individual way of regarding reality and reflecting upon it. We must call to mind how difficult Plato found it to distinguish his own identity from that of Socrates, if we are to understand, from the *irrationale* of his discipleship

with Plato, Aristotle's modest repudiation of all and every claim to originality.

The next question is how far this earliest version of the *Metaphysics* extends and what its members are. In the first place, it includes, besides the criticism of the Ideas (where the 'we' very clearly denotes the transitional period), the complete first book; for, since the unity of this book is above suspicion, the chronological inferences that can be made about a part of it must apply also to the whole. It appears that Aristotle's frequent reference to himself as a Platonist was already a stumbling-block in the days of antiquity. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Syrian tell us that some ancient scholars rejected the book. According to a remark of Albert the Great the Middle Ages sometimes ascribed it to Theophrastus, and apparently it was lacking in the Arabic translations.[1] Both facts are to be explained as the result of a tradition among learned persons in antiquity; obviously some late editor actually omitted the book because of the assertion that it was spurious. A comment of Alexander's on the second book shows that this assertion was suggested precisely by the objectionable 'we' of the first, which seemed to mark it off from all the others. Aristotle says (B 2, 997^b 3): 'It has been explained in the introduction that we hold (λέγομεν) the Ideas to be both causes and self-dependent substances; while the theory presents difficulties in many ways, the most paradoxical thing of all is our statement that there are certain things besides those in the material universe, and that these are the same as sensible things except that they are eternal while the latter are perishable.' From this passage Alexander infers that it is wrong to reject the first book, since it is here expressly referred to, and since its 'ethos' agrees precisely with that of this passage; in both places Aristotle treats the theory of Ideas as his own. This argument presupposes that it was that 'ethos' which had rendered the first book suspicious. At that time no one understood how Aristotle could call the Ideas his own doctrine, and even Alexander can only suppose that it is a device to give vividness.[2]

[1] Albertus Magn. I. 525^b: 'et hanc probationem ponit Theophrastus qui etiam primum librum qui incipit "omnes homines scire desiderant" metaphysicae Aristotelis traditur addidisse; et ideo in Arabicis translationibus primus liber non habetur.'

[2] Alex. Aphrod. *In Ar. Metaph.* B 2, 997^b 3 (p. 196, l. 19, in Hayduck):

The rejection must therefore be due to the orthodox Peripatetic scholars of the empire, who erased all signs of connexion between Aristotle and Plato because the theory of Ideas was a heresy in which the master could have had no part. To us this kind of criticism simply shows, once more, how little we can trust the Peripatetic tradition when it comes to the question of Aristotle's development. The fact is that this, our chief witness, is through and through a biassed source of information. We have already seen (p. 32 above) how the dialogues, which protest loudly against this distortion of the truth, were reduced to silence. As a matter of fact, the passage in the second book, which Alexander brings into play against the rejection of the first, shows how close is the genetic relation between the two. To this quotation from the beginning of the second book he might have added a similar one from the end, which also has not yet been used in the inquiry into chronology, incomprehensible as that may seem (B 6, 1002^b 12): 'In general one might raise the question why after all, besides perceptible things and the intermediates, one should have to look for another class of thing, i.e. the Forms which we posit.' These two passages allow us to assign the whole second book with certainty to the earlier version of the *Metaphysics*. It was written in the same breath as the first. Later on we shall find that its content also leads to this conclusion.

III. THE EARLIER AND THE LATER CRITICISM OF THE ACADEMIC THEORY OF NUMBERS

Books M and N are usually considered a unity, mainly because of the uniformity of their content, the criticism of the Academic theory of Ideas and numbers. In the opening chapter (M 1) Aristotle explains the purpose of the inquiry. He raises the question whether, besides the things of the phenomenal world, there is another kind of being, unmoved and eternal. He proposes to begin by examining the thinkers who have main-

'Being about to speak of [the Ideas] he begins by referring to what he said in the first book to remind us what the doctrine was. Hence it is plain for many reasons that this book is also Aristotelian and belongs to the same treatise. Moreover, the "ethos" with which he spoke of them there is the same as that with which he reminds us of them here. In both places he writes as if he himself held the theory of Ideas.' Cp. Syrianus, *Comm. in Metaph.* ad loc. (p. 23, l. 9, in Kroll); he, however, is probably merely following Alexander.

tained such a kind of being, namely Plato and his school. He lays down a fixed plan of procedure, the mere arrangement and method of which would invite the closest attention. First we are to consider the constructions of mathematics, simply as such, i.e. without reference to the metaphysical doctrines that have been attached to them, such as the view that they are Ideas, or that they are the principles and essence of all things. In the second place we must examine the Ideas; here again we must consider them not with reference to Plato's later interpretation of them as numbers, but in their original and genuine form. Thirdly there must be a critical study of the mathematical philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates.

In this scheme the first two parts, the discussion of the being (οὐσία) of mathematical objects and the criticism of the original theory of Ideas—with both of which we are familiar from Plato's dialogues—have really no independent significance. They are simply stages in Aristotle's methodical exposition of that which was their historical consequence, namely the doctrines of Speusippus and Xenocrates. The latter are the main objects of interest in the inquiry, as would be clear merely from the length of their treatment. They obviously constituted the actual problem at the time when M was in the writing, whereas the Platonic Ideas are mentioned only for the sake of completeness. Aristotle definitely tells us this in the passage where he is giving the Idea-theory its place in the book. Not because it still has supporters in the Academy is he going to include it in this discussion, but merely 'for form's sake as it were'.[1] Speusippus abandoned the Ideas entirely, replacing them with numbers as a higher kind of reality. Xenocrates, conservatively attempting to save Plato's later theory, identified the mathematical 'essences' with the Ideas which Plato had regarded as numbers; that is to say, he compromised between Plato and Speusippus. Aristotle calls this the 'third mode' of the theory, and naturally it must have been the last to appear.

This shows that M was written much later than the first books. It is true that Aristotle mentions speculation about

[1] Ὅσον νόμου χάριν, *Metaph.* M 1, 1076^a 27. [W. D. Ross translates: 'only as far as the accepted mode of treatment demands.' Tr.] For the expression see Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, p. 150.

sidered later. But as regards those who believe in the Ideas we can survey at the same time their mode of thinking and the difficulty into which they fall.'[1] The preface in M 1 is far more careful in the arrangement of the same matter. Aristotle there enumerates not merely Ideas and numbers, but also their subdivisions, and before both of them he places mathematical magnitudes as such; thus the introduction displays the same gradual and cautious method as we have seen to permeate the book as a whole. In the preface in M 9, on the other hand, the inquiry is in a somewhat more inchoate stage, and what is lacking is precisely this distinctive detail in the differentiation of the problem.

We have here, therefore, not a merely verbal variant, but the introduction to an earlier criticism of Academic number-metaphysics, in which the subject was treated according to a distinctly less developed method.[2] As already suggested, there are presumably other portions of this older writing also embedded as raw material in the new construction, the present Book M, but we are no longer able to separate them.

In order to determine the date of the earlier version we must make a detour, which will involve the interpretation of an obscure passage that has not yet been rightly understood. Here again the opportunity which the passage offers for exact dating has been overlooked as completely as in the decisive portions of Books A and B.

In M 10, 1086ᵇ 14, Aristotle begins his refutation of the Idea-theory with a difficulty which he had formulated in B 6, 1003ᵃ 6.

'Let us now mention a point which presents a certain difficulty both to those who believe in the Ideas and to those who do not, *and which was stated before, at the beginning, among the problems.* (1) If we do not suppose substances to be separate, and in the way in which particular things are said to be separate, we shall destroy substance, as may be admitted for the sake of argument; (2) but if we conceive substances to be separable, how are we to conceive their elements and their principles?

[1] M 9, 1086ᵃ 29.

[2] In my *Ent. Metaph. Arist.*, pp. 42 ff., I recognize that the passage from M 9, 1086ᵃ 21, to the end of the book is a subsequent addition, which the editors attached to the complete discussion M 1–9, 1086ᵃ 20. Strangely enough, however, I failed to see that M 1 and M 9, 1086ᵃ 21 ff., undoubtedly form a doublet, the two parts of which must have arisen at widely separated times. This discovery alters my whole treatment of Books M and N, as the following pages will show.

'(A) If they are individual and not universal, real things will be just of the same number as the elements, and the elements will not be knowable. . . . (B) But if the principles are universal, [either the substances composed of them are also universal, or] non-substance will be prior to substance; for the universal is not a substance, but the element or principle is universal, and the element or principle is prior to the things of which it is the principle or element.'

Immediately before this passage Aristotle has explained the difficulties involved in the Idea-theory by means of its origin (1086ᵃ 35–ᵇ 14). The main difficulty arises from the fact that the Ideas are regarded both as universal (καθόλου), and at the same time as existing independently and hence to a certain extent as a new kind of particular (τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον). The cause of this peculiar duality in their nature was the fact that Plato had asserted the unreality of phenomenal things, because he had been led by Heraclitus to the view that all perceptible things, all sensible particulars, are in continual flux and have no permanent existence. On the other hand, the ethical inquiries of Socrates had indirectly given rise to the new and important discovery that science is of the universal only, though he himself had not abstracted conceptions from real objects nor declared them separate. Plato then went further—according to Aristotle's retrospective account—and hypostasized universal conceptions as true being (οὐσία).

Then follows the important passage. Aristotle here develops the question whether the principles are universal or in some sense particular. This is difficult both for the supporters of the Ideas and for their opponents. He tries to show that either answer seems necessarily to lead to absurdities. If the principles are particular they are unknowable, since only the universal is knowable. If, on the other hand, they are universal, not-substance would be prior to substance, and we should have to derive substance, whose principles they are, from the universal; which is impossible, since the universal is never a substance. These are the logical consequences, Aristotle continues, of deriving the Ideas from elements, and of assuming alongside things of one kind a transcendental unity like the Ideas. This summary would by itself suffice to show that what he has in mind is really the theory of Ideas, and not specially its opponents, in spite of his introductory words; only, he needs them both in order to

CHAPTER VIII

THE GROWTH OF THE *METAPHYSICS*

THE prevailing view that the *Metaphysics* is a late work has been rendered untenable by our discovery that it contains large portions of an earlier version belonging to the first half of the forties. The doctrine that we must now hold—and it is really obvious in itself—is that even during the years immediately before and after Plato's death metaphysics was the true centre of Aristotle's critical activity. On the other hand—and this is a no less important result—he returned to the matter again during his last period and undertook a reorganization that introduced fresh ideas into the old material, excising parts of it and reshaping others to fit their new surroundings. The traces of this last alteration enable us to guess the direction in which he wished to develop his philosophy. The individual peculiarities of the earlier and later portions cannot be clearly grasped, naturally, except through the knowledge of their 'alternating harmony' within the final structure that includes them both.

Our analysis must start from that purified torso of the *Metaphysics* which we have obtained by examining the history of its origin, and the inner relationships of which, as Aristotle meant them to be, we have rendered more visible through removing the loose pages appended by the editors. This is the compact body of books down to Ι, excluding α and Δ; Bonitz himself disentangled it correctly in the main.[1] He also established the fact that the series is unfinished—in particular, the theology as we have it (Λ) is not the intended conclusion—and this statement needs to be emphatically asserted in view of recent attempts to throw doubt on the convincing arguments in its favour. Only in the account of the last two books does Bonitz require supplementing; he obviously took less interest in them, because his attention was directed mainly to the doctrine of substance. We have shown that Book Μ was meant to replace Ν in the later version; it therefore belongs to the torso established by Bonitz.

[1] See the introduction to his *Kommentar zur Metaphysik d. Ar.*, vol. ii. He, in turn, was following Brandis (cf. *Ent. Metaph. Arist.*, pp. 3 ff.).

The metaphysics that Aristotle here offers us in sweeping strokes is the famous doctrine of substance in general, the philosophy of substantial forms, which served so many later centuries as the framework of their views of nature and being. To discover how this incomplete but mighty structure grew up we must start from its centre, that is from the doctrine of substance.

In Book Β, which develops the problems of 'the science that we are seeking', Aristotle is aware of the problem of substance only in the specialized form of the question whether the supersensible world is real. After four introductory problems concerning the nature of the new science he places this question, like a 'far-beaming countenance', at the head of the eleven problems that carry us into the real arena of the discipline. Thus he emphasizes its fundamental importance by the position he assigns to it.[1] Ever since Plato created the Ideas it had been absolutely *the* problem of philosophy. In formulating the task of metaphysics as he does, therefore, Aristotle starts directly from Plato's fundamental question. He expresses it, in fact, precisely as a Platonist would: the transcendental realities that we believe to exist in separation from sensible phenomena, such as the Ideas and the objects of mathematics—do they truly exist? And if not, can we posit, over and above sensible things, any other kind of supersensible reality? About the sensible world (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) he says nothing whatever. The very first sentence goes straight to the central question, that of transcendence; the succeeding problems rise out of this root like trunk, boughs, and branches. A mere glance will show that they too originated without exception on Platonic territory. What are the first principles? Are they the genera, as Plato maintains, or, as natural science teaches, the elements of visible things? If the former, are they the highest or the lowest genera? What is the relation between the universal, which Plato regards as substance (οὐσία), and Being or Reality? Is the 'truly real' the most abstract of abstractions, or do we approach the real more nearly the more we descend from the heights of abstraction to

[1] The four introductory problems are treated in *Metaph.* Β 2, 996ᵃ 18–997ᵃ 33. The problem of the supersensible follows in 997ᵃ 34. For the distinction between essential problems, and those which merely introduce and define the science of metaphysics, see *Ent. Metaph. Arist.*, p. 100.

reader's eyes. In the second version of the *Metaphysics* he applied this method to the conception of 'being' in its widest sense; and 'substance' now became just one of a whole series of meanings of 'being' in this broad sense. To the theory of pure, immaterial form he prefixed that of form in general, as the true reality and substance; in front of this again he put the doctrine of the various senses of 'being', from which he selects 'substance' as the only one that affects metaphysics. The selection consists in starting with the senses that signify nothing existential or independent, but only the accidental modifications *of* being or the attitudes of consciousness *to* being. In view of its merely preparatory nature this part is given very summarily (E 2–4). In the present version of the *Metaphysics* it forms the connexion between the earlier introduction (A–E 1) and the new body (ZHΘIM). Leading up to the main discussion, and sketching the structure of what is to follow, it was naturally the last part to be inserted. Its introduction converted the list of the senses of 'being' into the outline of the whole composition. We must realize, however, that this composition is the final stage in a long process of development—incomplete and provisional, indeed, even in this last version, but nevertheless bearing all the marks of the determination to make a great synthesis. The additions, insertions, and excisions, which originated mostly in this final stage, evince a unitary aim that was perfectly foreign to the original version—the construction of a theory of the manifold senses of 'being', a sort of ontological phenomenology, within which the old Platonic doctrine of transcendent and immaterial Form still remains as conclusion, but no longer holds the centre of interest.

I may here introduce a paragraph on the last chapter of Book Θ, which I have discussed in detail in a previous work.[1] This passage deals with the two meanings of truth; first, truth and falsity in the ordinary sense, when we call a judgement true or false according as it joins the predicate to the right subject or not; and secondly the truth of metaphysical statements of being, which do not arise from discursive thinking and hence are never true or false as discursive judgements are. The truth of metaphysical statements expressing a being that is not an object of

[1] *Ent. Metaph. Arist.*, p. 49.

experience rests, according to Aristotle, on a special intuitive form of apprehension, which resembles sense-perception more than discursive thinking in that it is a sort of intellectual vision, a pure 'contact and assertion'. This is the only remnant of Plato's contemplation of the Ideas that has survived in Aristotle's metaphysics. Why he discusses it here is explained by himself in E 4, where he shows that being in the common sense of the truth or falsity of a proposition is not part of the metaphysician's problem about being. Into this passage he inserted a later reference, which can be very simply recognized as such by the disturbance of the sentence-construction to which it has given rise; there is also, he says, a second kind of truth, intuitive apprehension, on which all general views of the universe depend, and this he is going to discuss later. The discussion is the final chapter of Book Θ. I have shown in my earlier book, following Schwegler, that this chapter is a subsequent addition to Book Θ, and that the reference to it in E 4 must have been inserted at the time when the chapter itself was attached. Aristotle introduces his account of intellectual intuition, and of the metaphysical sort of truth, at a fitting place, namely between the end of the doctrine of potentiality and the beginning of that of the reality of the supersensible, which was intended to follow immediately. This insertion, which must also have been made on the occasion of the introduction of ZHΘ, shows once again the attempt to arrange a gradual ascent up the scale of being to immaterial essence, and to make the whole work single in its aim, though constructed of such disparate materials. That was the spirit of Aristotle's final recension.

By good fortune our discovery of two separate versions of the preface to the theory of the supersensible, the earlier in M 9, and the later in M 1, enables us to test our hypothesis that the *Metaphysics* originally did not contain the doctrine of material sensible form.[1] If this supposition be correct, the later version must presuppose the books on substance, with their detailed analysis of sensible being and of immanent form (ἔνυλον εἶδος); whereas the earlier must proceed directly to the problem of transcendental being, as we should expect according to the early plan in Book B, and regard the world of sense (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) as in no respect an

[1] See pp. 182 ff. above.

1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATION OF THE *EUDEMIAN ETHICS* TO THE *PROTREPTICUS*

The *Nicomachean Ethics* begins its inquiry into the aim of human life with a bold sketch of the system of ends. Thus from the start the problem is put into relation with Aristotelian teleology as a whole, and the nature of what follows is indicated. The beginning of the first book of the *Eudemian Ethics* introduces the same inquiry in a much less systematic, but more vivid and personal, form. On the propylaeum of the temple of Leto on Delos, the lecturer begins, these lines appear:

> Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
> But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

To this apodictic expression of popular Greek sentiment he opposes, not without feeling, his own thesis. 'But for ourselves, let us not agree with this author; for happiness is the noblest and best and at the same time the pleasantest.' This places the question of happiness at the summit of ethics, and the whole of the first book is concerned with it. The connexion between ethics and happiness had been traditional since Socrates and Plato, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* also retains it as starting and closing point. But the latter work is much more modern in prefixing to the discussion of happiness a chapter which derives from the general system of ends the formal conception of a necessary supreme end of all human effort. Not until the beginning of the next chapter is this equated with happiness.

The second point that Aristotle deals with in the *Nicomachean Ethics* before entering on the discussion of happiness is the question of method. Our study of the *Protrepticus* has shown that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he had arrived at a view about method diametrically opposite to that of his early days. As early as the proem he gives it clear formulation.[1] Here again the *Eudemian*

[1] For the contrast between the *Protrepticus* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* in point of method see above, pp. 85 ff. The application of the name 'proem' to the part which in the *Nicomachean Ethics* precedes the place where the *Eudemian* begins (i.e. *Eth. Nic.* I. 2) comes from Aristotle himself: 'These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our proem.' He then returns to the idea of the supreme end, using almost the same words as in the first chapter, and declares it, as in the *Eudemian Ethics*, to be happiness. The emphasis on the contrast with Plato's and with his own earlier method, and its insertion

Ethics is less definite. It contains no reflections on the peculiarity of ethical method. Instead the author discusses the difference between the philosophical and the unphilosophical treatment of ethical and political questions, a point that had already received detailed examination in the *Protrepticus*.[1] In that work empiricism was sharply opposed to the rational knowledge of the pure norms, and to dialectic as the only philosophical method. The *Eudemian Ethics* does not, like the *Nicomachean*, meet this view with an absolute repudiation of the demand for exact geometrical treatment; on the contrary, it smoothes over the contrast on which the *Nicomachean* version purposely throws a bright light. 'One must try to obtain conviction from reasoning (λόγοι), but to use the phenomena as evidence and as examples.' Further, it is necessary to bring the philosophical norm into harmony with the prevailing ethical views by revealing their underlying kernel of truth through conceptual manipulation. Thus the conceptual analysis of experience replaces the soul's spontaneous knowledge of the Ideas as we find it in the *Protrepticus*, although emphasis is still laid on the fact that experience by itself is 'confused', that only the Logos can lead to a clear insight into the causes of things. The contrast between the philosophical and the unphilosophical treatment is no longer the same as that between the normative or logical and the empirical. It now corresponds to two species of concern with experience: a lower one that merely ascertains facts, and a higher that seeks for the reasons of the facts. The way in which the standpoint of the *Eudemian Ethics* has been influenced by the *Protrepticus* can also be seen in its attitude towards the assertion that the politician needs theoretical knowledge of the ethical norm. It sounds almost like the defence of a half-abandoned doctrine when we hear that such a knowledge is 'not superfluous' even to the politician, because he must understand the reasons of ethical and political facts. On the other hand, however, the *Eudemian*

before the beginning of the inquiry proper, is therefore wholly intentional in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

[1] Von der Mühll (op. cit., p. 21) suggests that *Eth. Eud.* I. 6 is directed against Plato and the Academy; Kapp doubts this. The truth is that Aristotle is here referring to the remarks on method in his own *Protrepticus* (Iambl. *Protr.*, c. x), which were Platonic in essence, and is partly emending and partly rejecting them. Cf. above, pp. 85 ff.

topic, whereas the other work lays great weight precisely on the systematic derivation of them from the three conceptions of *phronesis*, virtue, and pleasure. This derivation reveals the origin of the theory of the three lives; it arose out of Plato's later ethics. The *Philebus* begins by asking what is the highest good for man, and makes the two lives of *phronesis* and pleasure compete for the position.[1] The *Protrepticus* adds virtue, and declares the best life to consist in the correct admixture of the three. The *Eudemian Ethics* takes its start from this stage of the development.

The fundamental reason why the *Nicomachean Ethics*, while retaining the lives, abandons the derivation of them from the trichotomy *phronesis*-virtue-pleasure, lies in the change in Aristotle's attitude towards *phronesis* in this work.[2] We need mention this point only briefly, since we have already discussed the contrast between the notion of *phronesis* in the *Protrepticus* and in Plato, and that in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The two formulations of this notion express the two answers that Plato and Aristotle gave to the question of the ultimate standard and sanction of morality. In the *Protrepticus*, *phronesis* retains the full Platonic sense of the *Nus* that in contemplating eternal being is at the same time contemplating the highest good. There only the philosopher lives the life of *phronesis*. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, on the other hand, does not make moral insight dependent on knowledge of the transcendental; it looks for a 'natural' foundation of it in practical human consciousness and in moral character. *Phronesis* and the whole trichotomy of the *Protrepticus* are accordingly deleted from the first book. The *Eudemian Ethics*, on the other hand, not only retains it in the

[1] Plato, *Phil.* 20 E.

[2] In *Eth. Nic.* I. 2, 1095^b 14, the three lives are no longer derived from the three goods. On the contrary, we are supposed to learn from the lives what men think good. In the life of enjoyment this is pleasure; in that of politics it is honour (not virtue). When he comes to the contemplative life Aristotle is in a difficulty (1096^a 4), since he cannot mention *phronesis*. He therefore refers to the account to be given later: 'Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.' To this he adds the life of money-making, the aim of which is wealth. He thereby purposely removes all trace of the old trichotomy. The new lives are simply the result of the psychological observation of life, whereas the old ones were ideal points of reference. We have already noticed this procedure of obliteration in the treatment of the four Platonic virtues of the *Protrepticus* in *Eth. Nic.* X. 4, 1178^a 24 (above, pp. 73–74).

earlier sense, as we have shown, but develops the outline and plan of the whole ethical system from it.[1]

It announces the plan in the following way: 'Let us first consider virtue and *phronesis* [notice the order; it corresponds to the actual order of treatment in the *Ethics*], inquiring into the nature of each of them, and whether they are, either themselves or the actions that proceed from them, parts of the good life.' Pleasure is to be dealt with later.[2] Since the central books of the *Eudemian Ethics* are lost, we must use the *Nicomachean* to see whether this proposal is actually carried out. The later version has preserved the original construction, although the role played by *phronesis* in it is essentially different from that assigned to it in the former. The first part, 'on virtue', is contained in Books II—V. Book VI follows with the theory of reason and knowledge, which the *Eudemian Ethics* would describe as 'on *phronesis*'. The nomenclature used in the *Nicomachean* is 'moral' and 'intellectual virtue' (which also occurs in the earlier work), 'moral virtue' being equated with the part 'on virtue', and 'intellectual virtue' with that 'on *phronesis*'; but in spite of the change of name in the latter version *phronesis* still remains the chief subject of the part. Book VII discusses pleasure, which is also treated of in X. In the last part of X Aristotle performs the synthesis of the three lives. The intervening books on friendship (VIII and IX), though found in the *Eudemian Ethics* too, cannot have been originally intended for this place, since they go beyond the original conceptual structure of the *Ethics*.[3] Without the *Eudemian* version it would now be impossible to see that the system of Aristotle's *Ethics* is an organic development, in three

[1] In *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics Book VI* (Cambridge, 1909) Greenwood points out that with regard to the meaning of *phronesis* there is the same contrast between the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics* as we have shown (pp. 81 ff. above) to exist between it and the *Protrepticus*. Kapp makes use of this observation (op. cit., p. 48).

[2] *Eth. Eud.* I. 5, 1216^a 37.

[3] I have shown in my *Ent. Metaph. Arist.* (pp. 150 ff.) that Aristotle's treatises arose by the combination of isolated and self-contained monographs (λόγοι, μέθοδοι, &c.) This does not mean that there is never an idea uniting a large group of such monographs, or that their relationship is one of loose juxtaposition in thought as well as in expression. It is simply an aid to the understanding of the way in which Aristotle's 'works' were composed, and it enables us to explain their incoherences and apparent irrelevancies by recalling the philosopher's manner of working and teaching.

Eudemian Ethics there is a long discussion of the norm by reference to which the good man recognizes and pursues the morally good. This passage enables us to see how Aristotle originally conceived the relation between theoretical and practical reason, and what he understands by 'right reason'. The physician also makes use of a norm, we read, in order to determine what is healthy for the body and what is not. It is possible to say, therefore, that the healthy is that which medicine and the reason employed in medicine prescribe; but this is as indefinite as it is true. The conception of the reason employed in medicine must take its content from the objective principle to which it is relative, namely health and its unalterable law. Thus medicine is on the one hand the knowledge of health and on the other the application of this knowledge to the particular case. In the same way moral reason is partly the knowledge of an objective value (θεωρητικόν), and partly the application of this knowledge to human behaviour, the moral imperative (ἐπιτακτικόν). Now the absolute value or highest good, which reason thus grasps, is God.[1] God is to be thought of not as issuing laws and commands, not as duty or will, but as the highest Being, sufficient to Himself. Will and command arise only when reason or *phronesis* devotes itself to the contemplation of this Being. Hence our

rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.' Here, for once, the idea of the norm reappears. This is the most pregnant expression that could possibly be found of the change in Aristotle's attitude towards this problem. The fact is that there is no universal norm for him any more. 'State of character in accordance with right reason' was included in the definition of virtue by all Platonists (see VI. 13, 1144^{b} 21). In VI. 1, 1138^{b} 25, Aristotle declares that this, though true, is anything but clear; in this book, therefore, he gives a more accurate account of the share that *phronesis* has in choice. Its function is no longer to apprehend the universal norm, as it was in the *Protrepticus*, but to discover the right means of attaining the end (τέλος, σκοπός) determined by the moral will (VI. 13, 1144^{a} 8 and 20, 1145^{a} 5).

1 *Eth. Eud.* VIII. 3, 1249^{a} 21 to the end. Here too he is objecting to the obscurity of the Academic definition of the norm as 'determined by a rational principle' (1249^{b} 3), as in *Eth. Nic.* VI. 1, 1138^{b} 25. The problem remained with him throughout his life, but the solution here is different from that in the later *Ethics*. The comparison between *phronesis* and medicine had been used in the Academy. Aristotle modifies it in his earlier *Ethics* by distinguishing between theoretical and practical medicine. *Phronesis* apprehends the norm (health or God) and then applies it. In *Eth. Nic.* VI. 13, 1144^{a} 4, he calls the first process wisdom and only the second *phronesis*. As early as the *Protrepticus* we find: 'Moreover what canon of goods have we, or what more accurate norm, than the man who has *phronesis*?' (frg. 52, p. 61, l. 25, in Rose). But here *phronesis* is still a general kind of knowledge without any differentiation at all.

most pressing duty is to choose all the occupations and activities and goods that further the knowledge of God. Theoretical philosophy is the means to man's moral education. Everything, whether possession or action, is morally bad and reprehensible if it hinders a man from serving and knowing God (τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν).[1] We know that *deum colere et cognoscere* is still a common definition of religion. The conclusion of the *Eudemian Ethics* is the *locus classicus* for theonomic ethics as taught by Plato in his later days. God is the measure of all things. In preserving this much from the wreck of the Idea-theory Aristotle believes he is retaining the abiding essence of Platonic morality, the notion of the absolute norm and of the metaphysical transcendence of the Good, which had given to the Platonist a new experience of God. No wonder that Eudemus, the supposed author of this *Ethics*, has always been looked on as a pious man! All this was incompatible with men's idea of Aristotle. This first lecture on ethics exhales the religious fervour of his youthful Platonic faith. Against such an ethics of pure devotion to God the famous picture of the contemplative life in book ten of the *Nicomachean Ethics* fades, and becomes little more than an objective if idealized description of the life of the scholar devoted to research, rising at the end to the intuition of the ultimate force that guides the spheres. Some of the old notes sound again in this picture, but not quite with their old power. The strength of the later *Ethics* lies rather in its parts, with their analysis of concrete moral types, and in its rich and humane urbanity.

The contemplation of God was originally closely connected with the theory of friendship, which in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is expanded into a general sociology of the manifold forms of human relationship. In this complex phenomenology of society we should be hard put to it to detect the close connexion between Aristotle's philosophy of friendship and Plato's theory of Ideas, had we not the older *Ethics* to give us a clear picture of the method that Aristotle originally had in mind. He here replaces the transcendental and universal Idea of the Good with ideal types, as he does throughout his earlier ethics and politics. These ideal types are immanent in experience, and yet they are normative and not

1 *Eth. Eud.* VIII. 3, 1249^{b} 20.

mere descriptive averages simply read off from experience. The most important of them is 'first friendship' (πρώτη φιλία), from which in the *Eudemian Ethics* all forms of friendship are 'derived'. This arises directly out of the conception of the 'first principle of friendship' (πρῶτον φίλον) as developed in Plato's *Lysis*.[1] But whereas the latter was the highest metaphysical value (αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν), in contrast with which all that seems dear on earth is nothing but a shadow, in 'first friendship' Aristotle is constructing the picture of the ideal friendship. He retains the kernel of Plato's notion—the basing of friendship on the ethical principle of the Good—but he makes the Good a concrete moral value developing within the character of the man himself. The supra-personal ground of the value of the human relationship no longer diverts attention from the personality of the friend; on the contrary, it is concentrated and incarnated therein. Aristotle's idea is therefore not just another way of referring all social values to the general problem of value; its aim is rather to establish the independent worth of the moral personality, and in the last resort of human morality in general, as opposed to the cosmic Good that is based on the idea of God.

The derivation of the various forms of friendship from 'first friendship' is accomplished in the earlier *Ethics* by means of purely Platonic conceptions. The distinction between will (βούλεσθαι) and desire (ἐπιθυμεῖν) corresponds to Plato's distinction between the absolute Good, which is the natural goal of the will, and the apparent good, which is the goal of the desires. Plato is also the origin of the separation of the good from the pleasant, and of the doctrine that the good without qualification is identical with the pleasant without qualification, so that the friendship of the really good man is at the same time pleasant. The main part of the discussion in the *Eudemian Ethics* is devoted to showing that 'first friendship' combines in itself all the marks that have ever been declared characteristic of the essence of friendship, even those that seem to be mutually exclusive—a classical example of early Aristotelian dialectic. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, on the other hand, writes 'perfect friendship' instead of 'first friendship', because the latter expres-

[1] Plato, *Lysis*, 219 C. For the development of the ideal of 'first friendship' see *Eth. Eud.* VII. 2, and for 'the first friend' VII. 2, 1236^b 28.

sion clearly recalls the theory of Ideas, and leads one to expect a purely deductive method.[1] It retains, indeed, the Platonic doctrine that the other kinds of friendship are not co-ordinate and can be called 'friendship' only *per accidens*, and the derivation of them from the ideal conception of perfect friendship; but the important thing for Aristotle now is the psychological and sociological analysis, which far outweighs the other even in bulk. We shall see later that a similar development occurs in the *Politics* also. A mass of facts gathered from experience, governed essentially by their own laws, and becoming more and more an independent object of interest, has been introduced into the framework of what was previously an ideal Platonic construction.

If the basis of true friendship is personal goodness, the ethical relation of the ego to the non-ego must be determined by that of the ego to itself. By distinguishing the rational part of the soul from the inferior parts, which nevertheless can be moved by reason, Aristotle is able to represent the ethical relation of the ego to itself by means of the conception of self-love (φιλαυτία), by which he understands not selfishness, which popular morality rightly condemns, but the kindred affection of the lower part, which is spoken of as if it were actually a second ego, for man's higher self (αὐτό).[2] By the self the *Protrepticus* meant *Nus*, the 'divine in us', in accordance with Plato's later doctrine; and Plato's view of the right relation of the soul that is ruled by *Nus* towards itself can be learnt from the *Timaeus* (34 B), where the highest visible God is said to be 'able to converse with itself, and needing no other friendship or acquaintance'. Thus the selfishness of the natural man is cancelled and made to serve his will to be his true self. The psychological problems connected with this view are not formulated sharply enough for our requirements, but this objection applies to the whole of Aristotle's theory of *Nus*, which is in fact a legacy from Plato's later speculations. In the religious atmosphere of the *Eudemian Ethics* the mysticism of the doctrine of self-love, from which

[1] *Eth. Nic.* VIII. 4.

[2] *Eth. Eud.* VII. 6, and *Eth. Nic.* IX. 4 and 8. We here have speculation developing a piece of popular Greek wisdom that often found expression, as in Soph. *O.C.* 309, 'What good man is not friendly to himself?', Eur. *Med.* 86, frg. 460, and Men. monost. 407. For *Nus* as man's self see Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 42, ll. 3 and 14, and *Eth. Nic.* IX. 8, 1168^b 35, and X. 7, 1178^a 2.

from the exoteric discussions—and not merely the division as such, but also its application to the inquiry concerning the best life, for the passage expressly refers to 'exoteric discussions concerning the best life', the fundamental notions of which are to be adopted in the present discussion.[1]

Zeller, who supposed Eudemus to be the author of the *Eudemian Ethics*, tried to explain this reference to the exoteric discussions by saying that Eudemus is really only reproducing the passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which it is said that we must consider happiness in the light of 'what is commonly said about it', and that in changing this vague phrase to 'this distinction we make even in our esoteric discussions' he was copying the passage in the *Politics*.[2] This interpretation leaves it obscure how Eudemus could come to speak of one of Aristotle's writings in the first person ('we make').

We can now see, as earlier scholars could not, that so long as they assumed Eudemus to have been the author of the *Eudemian Ethics* it was simply impossible to solve the problem of the exoteric discussions. For either they followed a sound philological instinct for style and understood by these discussions actual works of Aristotle, as did Bernays (and then they came into irreconcilable conflict with the reference to exoteric discussions in the *Eudemian Ethics*[3]); or else they started from this passage and constructed with reckless logic as empty a sense as possible for 'exoteric', which was not so much an explanation as a way of escaping the dilemma, and which violated all the laws of philological interpretation.[4] Now that we have restored the

[1] The Oxford translators sometimes render ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι by such phrases as 'discussions outside our school', thus implying a view different from that maintained in this book. While preserving their versions as much as possible, for the sake of easy reference, I have been obliged to bring them into line with the theory of this chapter. Tr.

[2] *Hermes*, vol. xv, p. 554.

[3] Oddly enough Bernays took no notice of this passage (*Eth. Eud.* II. 1), so far as I can see, although he systematically examined all the places where Aristotle mentions exoteric discussions. On the presuppositions of those days it would have toppled his whole edifice.

[4] H. Diels, 'Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles', *Ber. Berl. Akad.*, 1883, pp. 477 ff. (the passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* is discussed on p. 481). His arguments appear to have found general approval, which is comprehensible in view of the situation. To-day there is nothing for it but to admit that his trail was the wrong one. The sincerity of his work, however, has prevented it from being useless.

Eudemian Ethics to Aristotle there is no longer anything against Bernays' conjecture that the exoteric discussions were definite writings, and in fact the literary works of Aristotle. It is confirmed by the new material, without which it would have remained a mere hypothesis. The only alteration required is that in the present case we are concerned not with a dialogue, as Bernays supposed, but with the *Protrepticus*.

Protr., p. 52, l. 12.	*Eth. Eud.* II. 1, 1218b 32.
So other things [that is, external things] should be done for the sake of the goods that have their seat in the man himself; and of the latter those that are in the body should be done for the sake of those that are in the soul, and virtue for the sake of *phronesis*. *Phronesis* is the supreme good. [Then comes a definition of goods.]	All goods are either outside or ⟨in the body or⟩ in the soul, and of these those in the soul are more desirable; *this distinction we make even in our popular discussions*.
Protr., p. 59, l. 26.	
We assume that happiness is either *phronesis* and some kind of wisdom, or virtue, or the greatest possible amount of pleasure, or all three. [Then follows a more detailed account.]	For *phronesis*, virtue and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to all to be the end.
Protr., p. 41, l. 20.	*Eth. Eud.* 1219b 28.
One part of the soul is reason. This is the natural ruler and judge of things concerning us. The nature of the other part is to follow it and submit to its rule.	Let it be assumed that the parts of the soul partaking of reason are two, but that they partake not in the same way, but the one by its natural tendency to command, the other by its natural tendency to obey and listen.

Elements that have been taken over ready-made into the *Eudemian Ethics*, and somewhat hastily put together, are to be found in the *Protrepticus* not merely in a form that for the most part verbally echoes them, but also, which is more important, in the context to which they were originally organic.

Protr., p. 41, l. 22.	*Eth. Eud.* II. 1, 1218b 37.
The good state of everything is that which is in accordance with its proper *virtue*. To attain to one's	Let this then be assumed, and also that *virtue is the best state* or condition or faculty of all things

proper virtue is good. A thing is in a good state when its most essential, commanding, and valuable parts have their virtue. From this it follows that the natural virtue of a thing *is better when the thing itself is better* by nature. The better by nature is that which has more of the commanding and leading element in itself, as man has compared with the other animals. *Now the soul* is better than the body (because it is more commanding), and within the soul itself the rational and intellectual part is better than the rest. . . . *It necessarily follows, therefore, that the virtue of this part, whatever it is, is the most desirable of all things,* not merely for us but also absolutely or for everyone; and everyone would hold, I presume, that we are constituted, either wholly or chiefly, by this part. Furthermore, when a thing accomplishes *its work* as well as possible, then, provided that it is its work essentially and not just accidentally, *we must declare that such a state of affairs is also good, and that this accomplishment is the most perfect virtue, in accordance with which it is the nature of each thing to perform its work.*

A complex and divisible thing has several *different activities*; but if a thing is naturally *simple,* and is not relative in essence, it must have only one true and proper virtue. If therefore *man* is a simple animal, *and if the essence of his substance is reason and intellect, his work can be nothing whatever* but perfect truth—the discovery of the truth about things; but if his nature is compounded of several faculties, it is clear that when a thing naturally fulfils more than one function its work is always the best of these functions; for example, health is the work of the doctor and safety that of the navigator. *Now it is impossible to mention any better work of the intellect,* or of the thinking part of our soul, *than truth. Truth* is therefore the essential *work of this part of the soul.*

that have a use and work.|| This is clear by induction; for in all cases we lay this down: e.g. a garment has an excellence, for it has a work and use, and the best state of the garment is its excellence. Similarly a vessel, house, or anything else has an excellence.|| *Therefore so also has the soul, for it has a work. And let us assume that the better state has the better work*; and as the states are to one another, so let us assume the corresponding works to be to one another. And the work of anything is its end; it is clear, therefore, from this that the *work* is better than the state; for the end is best, as being end; for we assume *the best, the final stage, to be the end for the sake of which all else exists.* That the work, then, is better than the state or condition is plain.

Eth. Eud. II. I, 1219^b 32.

It makes no difference whether the soul is *divisible or indivisible,* so long as it has *different faculties,* namely those mentioned above, just as in the curve we have unseparated the concave and the convex, or, again, the straight and the white, yet the straight is not white except incidentally and is not the essence of the white.[1] We also neglect any other part of the soul that there may be, e.g. the vegetative, *for the above-mentioned parts* [*i.e. the rational ones*] *are peculiar to the human soul*; therefore the virtues of the nutritive part, that concerned with growth, are not those of man. For, if we speak of him *qua* man, he must have *reason and moral action* as governing principles. . . . And just as general good condition of the body is compounded of the partial excellences, so also the excellence of the soul, *qua* end. But of virtue or excellence there are two species, *the moral and the intellectual.*

[1] Omitting τοῦ.

The *Ethics* considerably alters the order of the ideas. The logical structure is more luminous and more systematic in the *Protrepticus*. For good measure the *Ethics* adds examples explaining 'by induction' the connexion between virtue and work. The application of all this to the soul is performed in the *Protrepticus* with exemplary lucidity, beginning with the words 'now the soul'; but the *Ethics* merely indicates it with 'therefore so also has the soul', and leaves all details for oral elaboration. Possibly, indeed, Iamblichus found the examples in his source but left them out; yet since they are extremely trite and pedagogical it is more probable that Aristotle did not cite them at all in his literary work, but introduced them only when he came to write his lecture. We must say the same of the examples of convex and concave by which the inseparability of the parts of the soul is explained in the second paragraph. There, incidentally, the difference in man's aim as envisaged by the two works comes out clearly. In the *Protrepticus* the sole aim of human life was the theoretical knowledge of reason (*phronesis*). The theoretic life hung high above all other aims and was sharply sundered from them. The soul, which was described as man's essence, was there conceived as the indivisible unity of the pure rational soul (after the manner of Plato's later theory of *Nus*), which has rid itself of animal and vegetable existence as well as of will and desire. In the lectures, on the other hand, we read that it makes no difference whether the soul is a unity or has parts, and practice (πρᾶξις) now takes its place beside thought (λογισμός) as equally worthy. Aristotle now holds that happiness depends upon the interaction and equilibrium of the rational and irrational

powers in the soul. In saying this he is not merely paying attention to the claims of ordinary life; he is establishing a new ideal, and seeking to overcome the harshness of his previous purely intellectual attitude (see especially 1219[b] 39–1220[a] 5). He was therefore obliged to suppress the passage in which the *Protrepticus* had represented pure contemplation as the only valuable and essential occupation of the human soul (p. 42, l. 22—p. 43, l. 25). All the alterations that he introduces in the *Ethics* are logical consequences of this fundamental change in his ideas.

The *Protrepticus* is also the root of what we read in the first book of the *Eudemian Ethics*. We have already shown this of the first four chapters by analysing the train of thought in them. The sixth discusses the new method in ethics, and we have seen that it is throughout directed against the *Protrepticus* (above, p. 233). That the greater part of the fifth also comes directly from this work is clear from the following juxtaposition. Aristotle is here giving the proof that life by itself is not the greatest good, but receives its value from *phronesis*.

Protr., p. 45, l. 6.	*Eth. Eud.* I. 5, 1215[b] 15.
It is obvious to everybody that *no one would choose to live*, even if he had the greatest wealth and power that man has ever had, *if he were deprived of his reason and mad*, not even if he were going to be constantly enjoying the most vehement pleasures, as *some insane persons do*. It seems therefore that everyone shuns folly as much as possible. Now the opposite of folly is *phronesis*, and of opposites one is to be shunned and the other to be desired. As disease is to be shunned health is to be desired. According to this argument too, therefore, it appears that *phronesis* is *the most desirable of all things*. . . . For if a man had everything, but the thinking part of him was *corrupted and diseased*, life would not be desirable for him. The other goods would be no benefit to him. This is why all men belittle all	About many other things it is difficult to judge well, but most difficult about that on which judgement seems to all easiest and the knowledge of it in the power of any man—viz. *what of all that is found in living is desirable*. . . . *For there are many consequences of life that make men fling away life, as disease*, excessive pain, storms, so that it is clear that, if one were given the power of choice, not to be born at all would, as far at least as these reasons go, have been desirable. Further, *the life we lead as children is not desirable, for no one in his senses would consent to return again to this*. Further, many incidents involving neither pleasure nor pain or involving *pleasure but not a noble kind* are such that, as far as they are concerned, non-existence is preferable to life. And generally, if one were to bring together all

other goods so far as they know what reason is and are capable of tasting it. This is also why *none of us could endure to be drunk or to be a child throughout life*. This again is why *sleep, though extremely pleasant*, is not desirable, even if we suppose that the sleeper experiences all the pleasures. Cp. *Protr.* p. 40, l. 6: 'It is thoroughly slavish to long for mere life instead of for the good life', a favourite position of Aristotle's.	that all men do and experience but not willingly because not for its own sake, and were to add to this an existence of infinite duration, *one would none the more on account of these experiences choose existence rather than non-existence*. But further, neither for the pleasure of eating alone or that of sex, if all the other pleasures were removed that knowing or seeing or any other sense provides men with, *would a single man value existence, unless he were utterly servile*, for it is clear that to the man making this choice there would be no difference between being born a brute and a man. . . . We may say the same of *the pleasure of sleeping*. For what is the difference between sleeping an unbroken sleep from one's first day to one's last, say for a thousand or any number of years, and living the life of a plant?

It is not chance that these parallel trains of thought are so like each other. It is inconceivable that Aristotle unconsciously formulated a view that was familiar to him in the same way in two different places. All doubts are removed by the quotation from the *Protrepticus* that follows a few lines lower.

Protr., p. 51, l. 11.	*Eth. Eud.* I. 5, 1216[a] 11.
They say that when Anaxagoras was asked why one should choose to be born and live he answered the question thus, 'for the sake of viewing the heavens and the things in it, stars and moon and sun', implying that everything else is worthless.	And so they tell us that Anaxagoras answered a man who was raising problems of this sort and asking why one should choose rather to be born than not—'for the sake of viewing the heavens and the whole order of the universe'.

Since the *Eudemian Ethics* connects this representative of the theoretic life very closely with those of the two others, and since this passage is dependent on the *Protrepticus* almost to the very words, we are justified in also ascribing what follows to the same source, down to 1216[a] 27. We here find Sardanapallus set against Anaxagoras as the representative of the life of pleasure, along with

Aristotle used to refer to his exoteric dialogues for the matters now treated there, namely slavery and the doctrine of the three forms of rule obtaining within the household (master, husband, and father). They were fully treated in those works, and so we read in III. 6, 1278^b 30: 'There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority; they have often been defined already in the exoteric works.'[1] He then gives the classification exactly as we find it in the first book: the kinds of authority are master and slave, husband and wife, father and child. That he nevertheless refers to a dialogue for this classification can fail to be surprising only if Book III belongs to a version in which I did not occur. In the final version he conceived the plan of filling up this gap by giving a full discussion of the matter in an introductory book. It then became necessary to insert in the passage quoted a reference to the fact that the subject had already been treated in the first book. But the older reference to the dialogues was not removed, and the juxtaposition of the two is a strange contradiction.[2] Aristotle introduced another reference to I at a passage in VII where he touches on the subject of master and slave;[3] and the remarkable relation obtaining between the references in II, III, VII, and VIII, and those in IV–VI, already discussed, can also be satisfactorily explained if we bear the development of the work in mind.[4] The reason why II, III, VII, and VIII, the books con-

exclude the possibility that the reference here is to III. 4. Newman (*The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. iv, p. 155) suggests III. 12, 1283^a 14 ff. See the next note but one.

[1] The Oxford translation, 'in discussions outside the school', presupposes another view of the meaning of 'exoteric', but see p. 249 above. Tr.

[2] *Pol.* III. 6, 1278^b 17. If this reference to Book I had been present from the beginning, and I itself therefore were as old as III, it would be impossible to see why Aristotle here finds it necessary to repeat all over again what he had already said there about the forms of authority, and to appeal to the exoteric works for support. It is clear from the other references to exoteric works that we have here an extract from a dialogue, and that Aristotle introduces it *for the want of anything better*; but this presupposes that at the time of writing III was not preceded by I.

[3] *Pol.* VII. 3, 1325^a 30: 'about which I have said enough at the commencement of this treatise.' Here, as in III. 6, 1278^b 18, 'the commencement of this treatise' does not mean Book III, which is its usual sense in the *Politics*, but Book I. That is to say, it presupposes the latest revision. Both references were introduced on that occasion. That the *Politics* contains any references not inserted by Aristotle himself I cannot admit.

[4] See p. 267 above.

taining the account of the ideal state, are tied together with a network of mutual references, while they do not mention the intervening Books IV–VI, is that they were written as one and at an earlier time. The same fact also explains why the latest and empirical part, and especially IV, frequently takes account of the old.

Let us now attempt to determine more exactly the date of the sketch of the ideal state, as against that of the later books and of the collection of constitutions. As with the *Ethics* and the *Metaphysics*, we must start from its connexions with Aristotle's early writings—and it is significant that only the older part of the *Politics* shows any such connexions; the later books, IV–VI, evince not the slightest trace of a relation to the dialogues. Unfortunately the material at our disposal for comparison is extremely poor. The *Protrepticus*, the only work that we can use, helps us solely in matters where the *Politics* is directly based on the *Ethics*. The surviving remains contain little that is wholly political. This misfortune is to some degree counterbalanced, of course, by the fact that the connexion between the *Politics* and the *Ethics* was much closer in the early period than afterwards. Later on, while Aristotle still formally preserved the unity of the two disciplines, and even systematized them externally into one great whole, the ethics of the individual had nevertheless been practically completely separated, beneath the surface, from its traditional Platonic yokefellow, and a way was already open to the independence that it obtained in Hellenistic times.

We start with the beginning of Book VII, which lays the foundation of the ideal state. It is thoroughly Platonic in identifying the end of the state with the ethical end of the individual; for this is the meaning of the proposition from which the inquiry proceeds, that the best state is that which assures its citizens of the best life (αἱρετώτατος, ἄριστος βίος). In saying this Aristotle is by no means subordinating the state to the welfare of the individual, as a liberal would do, but is deriving, as Plato does, the categories for judging the value of the state from the ethical standards that apply to the soul of the individual. To say that the 'best life' of the state and of the individual are one and the same does not mean for him that things are well with the state if everybody has good food and feels comfortable,

sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of half-a-farthing, and is as feeble and false in mind as a child or a madman.' The age of this passage is clear from its mention of the four Platonic virtues, including *phronesis*, which is substituted for *sophia* in accordance with Plato's late view. We have seen the same fourfold scheme in the *Protrepticus*.[1] The importance assigned to it is shown by the four examples. That given for the value of *phronesis* can still be found in our fragments of the *Protrepticus*. 'No one would choose to live, even if he had the greatest wealth and power that man has ever had, if he were deprived of his reason and mad, not even if he were going to be constantly enjoying the most vehement pleasures.' And later on we read: 'If a man had everything, but the thinking part of him was corrupted and diseased, life would not be desirable for him. The other goods would be no benefit to him. This is why all men belittle all other goods so far as they know what reason is and are capable of tasting it. This also is why none of us could endure to be drunk or to be a child throughout life.'[2]

This, however, is universally acknowledged, the *Politics* continues. Men differ only about the degree, that is, about the question which sort of good we need most of. 'Some think that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like.' Yet 'happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue or both [this was the problem of the *Philebus* and the *Protrepticus*],[3] is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities.' These words reproduce ideas and phrases characteristic of the *Protrepticus*. The man 'most highly cultivated in mind' is the counterpart of the man in the *Protrepticus* who is 'decked in shining raiment' but whose soul is 'in evil state'.[4]

[1] Frg. 52 (p. 62, ll. 2–4 in Rose) and frg. 58 (p. 68, ll. 6–9 in Rose). Compare *Pol.* VII. 1, 1323^{b} 33–6, and 15, 1334^{a} 22.

[2] Frg. 55 (p. 65, ll. 4–7 and 15–21 in Rose).

[3] Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 41, l. 12, and p. 59, l. 27, in Pistelli.

[4] *Pol.* VII. 1, 1323^{a} 36 ff.; cp. frg. 57. The method of determining the parts played in happiness by external possessions and by the state of the soul is the same in both passages.

Aristotle mentions this inner 'state' a few lines lower down in the *Politics*. 'The best state of one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between the natures of which we say that these very states are states.'[1] The *Protrepticus* expresses the same thing more simply. 'If the state of a man's soul is bad neither wealth nor strength nor beauty is a good for him. On the contrary, the more the excess in which these states are present the more and the greater the harm they do to the man who possesses them without *phronesis*' (frg. 57 end).

External goods must have a limit (πέρας); for they are means, and every means is useful for something. Treated as an end in itself, a means becomes harmful to the man who makes himself its slave, or at the least it becomes useless. The more we increase inner goods, however, the more useful they are, if the epithet 'useful' as well as 'noble' is appropriate to such subjects.[2] Here again the *Protrepticus* is the source. In that work we read: 'To look for some result from every piece of knowledge, and to demand that it be useful, is to be absolutely ignorant of the fundamental difference between goods and necessities, and this difference is very great. Such things as we desire for the sake of something else, and without which we could not live, should be called necessary conditions (ἀναγκαῖα καὶ συναίτια); while what we desire for its own sake, even if nothing else comes from it, is good in the strict sense. For it is not the truth that one thing is desirable for the sake of another, and that for the sake of another again, and so on to infinity; there is a stop somewhere' (cp. *Pol.* 1323^{b} 7, 'external goods have a limit'). In general one must not be always asking 'What use is it?' or 'How does that help us?'; there is an ideal ('the noble and good') that stands above base usefulness.[3] 'Each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and *phronesis*'—the formula of the *Eudemian Ethics*. 'God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in

[1] For Aristotle's tendency in the *Protrepticus* to express conclusions in the manner of formal logic see Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 43, l. 28, and p. 44, l. 21. Both of these examples also refer to the eligible and the more eligible.

[2] *Pol.* VII. 1, 1323^{b} 7–12.

[3] Frg. 58 (p. 68, l. 19, in Rose). At l. 1 of p. 69 in Rose three lines have fallen out after λέγομεν through a printer's error, cp. Iambl. *Protr.* p. 52, ll. 28 ff.

constitutions are not lifeless products of chance, which most of them are, they are without exception of this character according to him.[1] Now his new ideal is constructed as a mean between these two radical extremes. The boundless individualism of the thoroughgoing Platonist, who prefers absolute freedom to taking part in a despotic state, and wishes neither to rule nor to be ruled, is indeed ethically better than the modern state's ideal of power, he says, but rule is not necessarily despotism, and a large number of men are simply born to be dependent. It is also unjustifiable to condemn action and praise inactivity. He is incomparably Greek when he declares that there must be truth in the view that 'he who does nothing cannot do well'. To the Hellenic mind this was a certainty that required no discussion. Clearly Aristotle can combine the philosopher's ideal life with this view of the purpose of state and society only by representing philosophic contemplation as itself a sort of creative 'action'. Here again he is opening up new roads, and making a new tie to replace Plato's shattered mythical synthesis of knowledge and life. The activity of the creative mind is—building. Aristotle has abandoned the lonely heights of the *Protrepticus*. He now places himself in the midst of active life, and comes forward as an architect of thoughts (ὁ ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτων), to build a state in which this intellectual form of action may obtain recognition and become effective as the crown of all the human activities that further the common good.[2] Thus he wrestles with the reality, whose nature he now sees more clearly, and preserves his youthful ideal. His criticism of the fundamental ethical and political principles of the *Protrepticus*, and of its theory of the best life, is as much to the fore in his early account of the ideal state as we have found it to be at every step in the original *Ethics*; and this fact not only proves the early date of that account, but also allows us, for the first time, to give it its right place in the history of his development. The original *Politics* comes, in fact, at the same stage as the original *Ethics* and the original *Metaphysics*.[3]

[1] The two types are described in *Pol.* VII. 2, 1324^{a} 35 ff.

[2] *Pol.* VII. 3, esp. 1325^{b} 15 ff.

[3] The dependence of Book VII on the *Protrepticus* is by no means confined to the first three chapters, which are analysed above. For example, it can be clearly detected in chapter 15 also. The mention of the four Platonic virtues there (1334^{a} 22 ff.) is sufficient to show that this whole sketch of the state belongs to a very early date, and the topic on the necessity of philosophy and of the moral virtues upon the islands of the blest is directly borrowed from the *Protrepticus* (frg. 58). Thence comes also the invective against persons who are unable to use the goods of life (frg. 55), which follows this topic. So do the statements at the end of the chapter about the relation between body and soul, and about the parts of the soul (Iambl. *Protr.* p. 51, l. 18—p. 52, l. 2). 'The deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill up' (VII. 17, 1337^{a} 2) is verbally copied from Iambl. *Protr.*, p. 50, ll. 1–2. 'Nature has given older men wisdom' (VII. 9, 1329^{a} 15) comes from p. 51, ll. 24 ff.

This gives a fresh meaning to the numerous passages where the old sketch of the ideal state refers to the *Ethics*. They have usually been supposed to apply to the *Nicomachean* version, even when the *Eudemian* was perfectly possible. There remained, indeed, the peculiar fact that some of the chief ones would fit the *Eudemian* only, which was supposed to be by Eudemus;[1] but since in these passages the *Ethics* is not expressly quoted but tacitly made use of (which is the ordinary thing), it was possible to maintain that it was Eudemus who had the *Politics* before him while writing, and not the other way about. Now that we have disproved his authorship and determined the age of the *Ethics* called after him, the real relation becomes clear. If the sketch of the ideal state must, in view of its close relation to the *Protrepticus*, have been written during the forties of the fourth century, it is self-evident that it cannot have used any *Ethics* but the original one. In VII. 13, for example, it quotes a long account of the right relation between means and end.[2] The source of this admittedly cannot be the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Nor is it possible to suppose that these ethical reflections first appeared in the *Politics*, where they are only mentioned in passing, whereas the *Eudemian Ethics* gives them in their original

[1] Bendixen was the first to point out (*Philologus*, vol. xi (1856), pp. 575 ff.), against Spengel's view that the *Eudemian Ethics* was written by Eudemus, that there are several passages where the *Politics* shows a remarkable connexion with the *Eudemian Ethics*. He did not, however, venture to infer definitely that Spengel's declaration of spuriousness was untenable. In the Göttingen dissertation (1909) that I have already mentioned Von der Mühll reopened the discussion of Bendixen's observations (p. 19), but did not examine them in detail. Now, however, that we have adequately established the Aristotelian origin of the *Eudemian Ethics* by another path, and determined that it was written while he was moving away from Plato, it is necessary to take a new view of Bendixen's material.

[2] *Pol.* VII. 13, 1331^{b} 26. Cp. *Eth. Eud.* II. 11, 1227^{b} 19. That the passage is borrowed from the *Ethics* is rendered certain by the fact that this chapter expressly refers to 'the *Ethics*' in two other places (1332^{a} 8 and 21).

followed by his friends throughout Greece. Alexander's prompt suppression of the 'rebellion' seemed to have restored peace and obedience, until the report that he had been killed while campaigning on the Danube caused the nationalist party to rise once more (335) and proclaim freedom and autonomy.[1] Once again they were very quickly sobered. Alexander stormed Thebes and razed it to the ground, a warning to the other Greeks. Only with the utmost difficulty did Athens escape the degrading order to deliver up Demosthenes and all the nationalist leaders. These persons now disappeared from the public scene. The feeling against Macedon grew considerably less tense. Alexander withdrew in October, 335. In May, 334, he crossed into Asia Minor and defeated the Persian satraps on the Granicus.

About this time Aristotle came to Athens as the flower of Greek intellect, the outstanding philosopher, writer, and teacher, the friend of the most powerful ruler of the time, whose rapidly rising fame raised him with it even in the eyes of persons who stood too far from him to understand his own importance. His intention to return to the place of his growth may have been developed during his last years in Macedonia, when he was living in the retirement of research. It was his recollection of Plato that made him see in this return something more than a mere outward condition of any really wide influence. He thereby announced himself publicly to all the world as the successor of Plato. It is true that the Academy was estranged from him. After the death of Speusippus (339/8) the members had chosen Xenocrates as their head.[2] For Aristotle it was out of the question to re-enter a society now led by a former companion of such different intellectual interests, anxious though he was to preserve a good external understanding with that venerable man. We do not in fact hear of any quarrel (probably many persons attended lectures in both places), but from this moment the Academy surrendered the lead to the new school, which Aristotle opened first in the corridors of the palaestra in the Lyceum, and afterwards presumably outside it in a nearby space, with suitable rooms, in front of the gate of Diochares in the east of the town, a spot that had been a meeting-place of sophists

[1] Arrian I. 7, 2: 'promising freedom <and autonomy>, ancient and noble names.'
[2] *Ind. Acad. Hercul.*, col. vi, p. 38 (Mekler).

for decades. So long as Aristotle remained within the walls of Athens that dethroned queen of cities was once more, and for the last time, the intellectual centre of the Hellenic world, the metropolis of Greek learning. When he and Theophrastus died it was all over. Thereafter the centre of gravity lay in Alexandria. Aristotle the non-Athenian in Athens, at once the intellectual leader of the nation and the stronghold of Macedonian influence in what had formerly been the leading city of the Attic empire—that is the symbol of the new age.

Aristotle founded his new home of learning under the protection of his powerful Macedonian friend Antipater, whom Alexander had left behind as regent and commander-in-chief in Macedon and Greece. It is much to be regretted that we have lost his correspondence with this important man, who seems to have been more intimate with him than any one else after the death of Hermias. Since Antipater came from a totally different environment, and was no scholar, their friendship must have been based on some profound kinship of character. This explains how a relationship that began in the court of Philip, at a time when Aristotle was in high favour with the king and with Alexander, could outlast Alexander's fickle kindness and forge a lifelong bond that did not let Antipater go even when his philosophical friend was dead. Aristotle appointed him the executor of his last wishes in his will. The few remaining fragments of their letters speak the language of unhesitating mutual trust. We may infer that Aristotle and his circle were at one with the political intentions of Macedon, since during the years 334/23 Antipater was governing the domestic affairs of Greece with authority virtually absolute.

The Macedonian party at Athens, which was particularly strong among the rich, could now come forth into the open without danger. Mutual distrust had assumed frightful proportions among the citizenry, and it was still easy for the nationalists to stage and win oratorical contests like that between Demosthenes and Aeschines about the crown, and thereby to get the masses temporarily on their side. They were powerless, however, against the Macedonian lances, and they no longer had the support of the educated, to whose indifference, in fact, the shipwreck of Demosthenes' efforts was mainly due. To the intellectual

during the following months until his own death. An affection of the stomach from which he suffered put an end to his life shortly afterwards, in his sixty-third year. It seems that he was aware of the approach of death, for the will that we possess was drawn up in Chalcis.[1] He was not spared the news that the Delphians, who had accorded him honours for his list of Pythian victors, were revoking them now that his royal patron was dead; but even the confusions of this time could not permanently disturb the peace of his soul, specially sensitive though he was to man's misfortunes.[2]

A word about his private life during these last years. His guardian Proxenus and his fostermother had long been dead. He had adopted their son Nicanor and made himself a father to him. Nicanor was an officer on Alexander's staff. In the year 324 the king sent him to Greece as the bearer of an important message. He it was who had to announce to the Hellenes assembled at Olympia for the national festival that Alexander claimed divine honours. By his will Aristotle bequeathed to Nicanor the hand of his daughter Pythias, who was still a minor, a child of the long dead Pythias. After the death of his wife he had taken a certain Herpyllis into his house, by whom he had a son called Nicomachus. In his will he is careful to provide faithfully for them all, and also for his students. There is something affecting in the spectacle of the exile putting his affairs in order. He is constantly calling to mind his home in Stagira and the lonely house of his parents far away, the figures of his foster parents, his only brother Arimnestus, whom he lost early, and his mother, whom he could picture only as he had seen her when a child. His desire is that his mortal remains be not divided from the bones of his wife Pythias, as was also her last wish. Between the lines of the sober practical dispositions in this last document we read a strange language, such as is not to be found in the wills of the other heads of the Peripatetic school,

[1] It speaks of Chalcis and Stagira as being the only possible places for Herpyllis to live, and does not mention Athens (Diog. L. V. 14). It also regards as uncertain where Aristotle is to be buried (V. 16), which would undoubtedly have been different if the arrangements had been made at Athens during quiet times.

[2] Frg. 666 in Rose (letter to Antipater): 'About the voting at Delphi and their depriving me of my honours my feeling is that I am sorry but not extremely sorry.' The tone of this fragment is very genuine.

which are also preserved. It is the warm tone of true humanity, and at the same time the sign of an almost terrifying gulf between him and the persons by whom he was surrounded. These words were written by a lonely man. A trace of this remains in an extremely moving confession that he makes in a letter of this last period, words that have an inimitably personal fragrance. 'The more solitary and isolated I am, the more I have come to love myths.' Within the noisy house there sits an old man living entirely to himself, a hermit, to use his own expression, a self withdrawn into itself, a person who in his happy moments loses himself in the profound wonderland of myth.[1] His austere and reserved personality, carefully hidden from the outside world behind the immovable ramparts of learning, here reveals itself and raises the veil of its secret. As with most ancient personalities, we know just enough of Aristotle's to realize that we cannot really know anything about it. So much, however, we do see, that this full life was not exhausted, as a superficial eye might suppose, by all its science and research. His 'theoretic life' was rooted in a second life, hidden and profoundly personal, from which that ideal derived its force. The picture of Aristotle as nothing but a scientist is the reverse of the truth. This was precisely the age in which the self began to be emancipated from the chains of the objective side of life, when it felt more consciously than ever before that it could not be satisfied with external creation alone. At this time the private side of life withdrew from the turmoil of action into its quiet corner and made itself at home there. The private side of individuals also awoke and locked the door against uninvited guests. The absolutely objective form in which Aristotle always presented himself to the outside world was already based on a conscious separation of personal from externalized activities. Only a little later the rapidly swelling torrent of subjectivity burst its dam

[1] Frg. 668 in Rose. According to Aristotle myth and philosophy are closely connected. This was a problem that he took over from Plato. *Metaph.* A 2, 982b 17: 'A man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant. Hence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders.' It is of course one thing to see elements of philosophy in the love of myth, and another when the philosopher, as Aristotle does in this fragment, indulges himself by returning at the end of his long struggle with the problems to the half-hidden, illogical, obscure, but suggestive, language of myth.

which is thereafter pursued through all its characteristic manifestations. All sorts of traces indicate that the series only gradually attained to its present completeness.[1] The conjunction of these more general physiological preliminaries with the zoological works to form a comprehensive picture of the organic world, as we now have it, gives us an artistic pedagogical structure which did not appear in this form until the last period. The question is how far the psychology itself shares in the general development that we have already sketched, and whether we can discover any data for the construction of a chronology of this work and of the so-called *Parva Naturalia*.

In this connexion the third book *On the Soul*, which contains the doctrine of *Nus*, stands out as peculiarly Platonic and not very scientific. This doctrine is an old and permanent element of Aristotle's philosophy, one of the main roots of his metaphysics. The treatment of it in this work goes deeply into metaphysics. On and around it the psycho-physical theory of the soul was subsequently constructed, as it appears, without, however, bridging the gulf between the two parts whose intellectual heritages were so different. It might be objected that this twofold character pervades Aristotle's whole philosophy and must have been inherent in it from the beginning. Against this view it must be said that the doctrine of *Nus* was a traditional element inherited from Plato, who, however, had no psycho-physics or only slight beginnings of one, and that, while we find a developed theory of *Nus* even in the earliest works of Aristotle of which we can have exact knowledge, as is consistent with the general speculative tendency of his first Platonizing philosophy, we do not find any trace of empirical psychology in those works. The latter pursuit is entirely his own invention. Hence it is certainly not an accident that his ethics, for example, is built on a very primitive theory of the soul, namely the division of it into a rational and an irrational part. This venerable doctrine, appearing in Aristotle as early as the *Protrepticus*, is simply Plato's. For practical reasons he left it undisturbed in later days, although his psychology had advanced a long way in the meantime and he no longer recognized parts of the soul

[1] See Brandis, *Griechisch-römische Philosophie*, vol. ii b 2, pp. 1192 ff., and my article 'Das Pneuma im Lykeion', *Hermes*, vol. xlviii, p. 42.

at all. In ethics it remained convenient to work with the old ideas, and no errors followed serious enough to vitiate the ethical result; Plato's old system was ingrained in the foundations of his ethics for good and all. Nevertheless he thinks it necessary to apologize for thus simplifying his problem.[1] The structure of his ethics would probably have been different if, when its foundations were being laid, his psychology had already reached the level at which we know it. This contrast of levels can still be pointed out in definite details. The way in which the *Eudemus* develops Plato's theory of Recollection, and the belief in personal immortality as we find it there and even in the dialogue *On Philosophy* (that is, even at the beginning of the middle period), are incompatible with the psycho-physics of the work *On the Soul* as it has come down to us. They presuppose the persistence after death of precisely that part of human consciousness which according to the philosopher's later view is bound up with the body.[2] Moreover, we have to recognize that the ethics of the middle period, with its theological notion of clairvoyance and of prophecy, is still on the same level as the dialogue *On Philosophy*, whereas the work *On the Interpretation of Dreams*, which belongs to the series of physiological inquiries attached to the books *On the Soul*, represents a complete break with this Platonizing view. The state of mind here is completely non-ethical and purely scientific; and more important than the fact that Aristotle rejects his previous view is the method on the basis of which he rejects it. He even introduces considerations drawn from the psychology of animals, a clear sign of the changed spirit of this new and completely unmystical attitude.[3] Now the

[1] In the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle is still confidently basing his doctrine of virtue on the old schematic division of the soul into 'two parts that share in reason' (II. 1, 1219^{b} 28), just as he does in the *Protrepticus*, which he is here following word for word (see above, p. 249). On the other hand, the corresponding passage of the later version (*Eth. Nic.* I. 13, 1102^{a} 23 ff.) apologetically insists that the statesman and the practical man, in order to judge questions of virtue correctly, need a minimum (only that!) of psychological knowledge. 'To refine further is perhaps more laborious than the matters in hand demand. Moreover, some points concerning virtue are sufficiently explained in the exoteric works, and they should be consulted.' Then comes the doctrine, traditional at this point, of the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, but with a short reference to the problematic nature of the conception of 'parts of the soul'. Accordingly this phrase is purposely avoided in what follows.

[2] See above, pp. 50 ff.

[3] In this extremely interesting essay Aristotle tries to give a natural explanation

that could be exerted on civic reality by this exclusive ideal of intellectual aristocracy. The attempt to impose it on the whole life of the nation could only lead to a complete renunciation of reality, since reality showed itself unable to adopt it. The tendency to renounce the world, together with a pitchblack pessimism about its goods and a pitiless criticism of its unintellectual society, is strikingly obvious in Aristotle's early work. Against this foil his metaphysico-religious optimism stands out all the more clearly, shining over all the worthlessness and all the misery of this world, striving with the pure intellect beyond this realm of appearances towards the beckoning goal of immortal life. The lasting impression that Aristotle received from this Platonic view of things cannot be doubted by any one who has followed its influence through his later development, but we must also bear in mind the background that is hidden from us by this typical Academic view. In this school began the movement that culminated in Aristotle's ethics, and even his dialogues betray something of the penetrating conceptual analysis that brought it into being. Men sought to understand the high ideal of the philosophic life by means of the nature of the human spirit itself, and in so doing, although they might at first, owing to the lack of analytical psychology, seem to find confirmation of their belief in the primacy of the knowing mind over the other parts of the soul, they at any rate stumbled on the problem of the different 'parts' of the soul, and on the task of doing justice to the irrational parts also, that is to say, of including them in the process of assimilating the spirit to God. In the *Philebus* as in the *Protrepticus* other 'lives' appear besides the philosophical, and an attempt is made to relate them. A question like that of the part played by pleasure in the pure philosophic life leads to the investigation of the motives of moral action; and the pedagogical idea of Plato's old age, which was to train up the young to the good by accustoming them early to feel pleasure in the good and displeasure at the bad, is already close to Aristotle's ethics, according to which an act is good only when accompanied by joy in the good. The problem of character must also have been worked out in the Academy, since Xenocrates divided philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics or the study of character. Plato's later dialogues show signs of a theory of the will and of moral

responsibility, which proves that Aristotle was not the first person to attain a philosophical mastery of this question so much discussed in Greek criminal law. When Aristotle examines and rejects definitions of such words as choice, happiness, and pleasure, he probably takes them all from discussions in the Academy. The intellectualization of Plato's early metaphors and the inauguration of ethics as a separate study were already in full swing in that school. Aristotle is merely the Platonist who carried out these tendencies with the greatest definiteness.

Aristotle was not a moral lawgiver in Plato's manner. This was neither within the compass of his nature nor allowed by the advance of the problems. Though his ethics was at first saturated with the idea of the divine norm, and regarded all life as the service and knowledge of God, even in his earliest work the new element reveals another direction, namely the analysis of the forms of the moral life as they actually are. He abandons Plato's theory of virtue for a theory of living types, adequate to the rich variety of the moral life in all conceivable manifestations, including economics, society, class-relationships, law, and business. Between this realistic study of civic life, and the lofty ideas handed down from Plato's religious philosophy, which form the framework of the whole, there is great tension. Although Aristotle explains the types of the just man, the brave, the proud, the liberal, and the magnificent, by means of a single formal conception of virtue, the principle of the proper mean, and although he develops his types not by pure description but by a dialectical construction in which every feature is logically connected with the others, the content is taken from experience and the types themselves arise from factual relationships as they are actually given. The introductory discussion of the fundamental nature of virtue is orientated with regard to the question of moral intention and its cultivation. This was a decided step forward; the essence of moral value is now developed out of the subjective self, and the sphere of the will is marked off as its peculiar realm. This really gives the virtue of character pre-eminence over that of the intellect, and hence the larger part of the discussion is devoted to it, although Aristotle is still far from making a fundamental division between the two. The theory of ethical virtue now becomes to a certain extent an

APPENDIX II

ON THE ORIGIN AND CYCLE OF THE PHILOSOPHIC IDEAL OF LIFE

THE memory of the earliest Greek thinkers lived on in the literature of the succeeding centuries through the permanent association of their names with particular opinions and questions, while their writings, in so far as they left any, went early to destruction. But besides this doxographical tradition, as it is called, which was committed to writing and sifted in the works which Aristotle's school devoted to the history of philosophy, and above all in Theophrastus' great *Opinions of the Physicists*, there survived also another sort of remembrance of them, sprung from an entirely different source. From this point of view the earliest figures in the history of philosophy were not persons who held more or less primitive and long superseded views on all sorts of strange questions, but the venerable archetypes and representatives of the form of intellectual life that is characteristic of the philosophic man in all ages, and that seemed to be incorporated with special purity and impressiveness in its earliest pioneers. This tradition had only general and typical traits to tell of those old thinkers, and therefore found expression characteristically in the form of anecdotes and apophthegms. But, as these typical traits became connected with the names of individuals who were thus known and identified, there arose alongside the impersonal tradition of their opinions a picture of the earliest philosophers that compensated the later centuries for their lack of all information about their human personalities, and was often taken for genuine historical tradition. These stories are related to us by later philosophers, from Plato on, with reverence and wonder.

Originally, however, they certainly arose in part from a wholly different motive, namely the people's amazement at a new type of man, the unworldly and withdrawn student and scholar who expresses himself in these anecdotes with paradoxes and freakish peculiarities. Such is Plato's story of Thales falling into a well while observing the sky, and being mocked by a witty Thracian servant-girl—that is to say, by the most uneducated sort of person a Greek could imagine—because 'he wants to discover what there is in the sky, but he doesn't even see what is lying at his own feet'.[1] Herds of cattle devoured the crops of Democritus, says Horace in his *Letters*,[2] while his quick mind roved far away from his body. In the division of his rich paternal

[1] Plato, *Theaet.* 174 A (Diels, *Vors.*[5] 11, A 9).

[2] Horat. *Ep.* I. 12, 12 (and the parallel passages in Diels, *Vors.*[5] 68, A 15).

inheritance his brothers led him by the nose, because he wished to be paid in cash in order to make long journeys. He was not given the full worth of his share, and what he did receive he spent on his travels to Egypt and to the Chaldees. While his father was alive he used to shut himself up in a little garden-house that was sometimes also used as a stable. He entirely failed to notice one day that his father had tied up an ox for sacrifice there, and remained peacefully under the same roof with it until the beast was fetched to the slaughter and Democritus' attention was drawn to his remarkable society.[1]

That stories of this sort were by no means merely the expression of a deep and sympathetic admiration of unusual intellectual concentration, but also give the folk's mocking view of absentminded scholars, is sharply brought out in the case of Thales by the complement that Aristotle gives us to the anecdote of the astronomer who pitched into the well. This is the tale of a smart business manœuvre that Thales carried through with brilliant success in order to show those who despised science that one can make a lot of money with meteorology if one sets one's mind to it. Expecting an unusually good olive harvest, he hired all the presses in the country round; when the great harvest arrived and no one had a press, he leased them to their owners at a high price.[2] Aristotle, with his usual keen critical sense, remarks that this is obviously a typical story, attributed to Thales merely because he was known to be wise. He also correctly describes the purpose of the attribution: to make it palpably evident that the truth is not that science is useless but that scientists are not interested in using it to enrich themselves. The typical character of many of these stories comes out above all in the fact that they are told of several persons. Thus Anaxagoras is also supposed to have neglected his inheritance, like Democritus; when his relatives called him to account, he replied: 'Look after it yourselves', and with these words he freely handed over to them all his goods and chattels, in order to be able to live for study alone.[3] Here the anecdote has taken on a more affecting character, instead of the good-humoured mockery that colours the Democritean version. The distracted philosopher, absentmindedly letting his cattle devour his grain, has become a great and independent spirit who consciously despises external goods and heroically rejects them. The same spirit informs an apophthegm in which Anaxagoras, asked what he lives for, gives the proud answer: 'To observe and study the sun and the moon and the sky.'[4] Equally

[1] Demetrius, in *Men of the Same Name*, according to Diog. IX. 35–6 (*Vors.*[5] 68, A 1).

[2] Arist. *Pol.* I. 11, 1259a 6 (*Vors.*[5] 11, A 10).

[3] Diog. II. 7 (*Vors.*[5] 59, A 1).

[4] Diog. II. 10 (*Vors.*[5] 59, A 1). The utterance occurs in another form in

heroic are the utterances that tradition ascribes to him when he was condemned by the Athenian court and when his son died. They are meant to show that the heart of the true student is not in perishable things, not even in the highest human goods, in civilized life and wife and child.[1] The anecdote that Anaxagoras, when accused of not caring for his country, pointed to heaven and cried: 'I care greatly for my country', is intended to bear witness to the complete withdrawal of the philosopher from that political life in which the Greek of the classical period was wholly absorbed.[2]

The time and place at which these stories arose are obscure. For those which, like the anecdote of the absentminded astronomer, express the feeling of the masses rather than the opinion of an individual, we have absolutely nothing to go on. With the last mentioned tales, however, the situation is somewhat different. These owe their coinage entirely to men of a definite class, men who were themselves full of the *ethos* of what was later called the 'theoretic life', and made themselves a sort of symbol for it in the striking utterances of the wise men of old. And this implies that, at the time when these anecdotes arose, the 'theoretic life' was not merely being lived by isolated exceptional men following their natural instinct, but had already become a conscious philosophical ideal. But this can certainly not be said of the earlier Pre-Socratic philosophers of nature. The ideal of the 'life' dedicated to knowledge was created by Plato, whose ethics describes several opposed types of 'life' and culminates in the 'choice of the best life'.[3] In itself, indeed, it is perfectly possible that a student like Anaxagoras, living in such an exclusively political society as the Athens of Pericles, should come to realize the

Arist. *Eth. Eud.* I. 5, 1216[a] 11. We are to understand in the same way the purposely obscure answer of Anaxagoras to the question: Who is the happiest man?: 'None of those whom you suppose, but someone who would seem absurd to you.' Cf. Arist. *Eth. Eud.* I. 4, 1215[b] 6 (*Vors.*[5] 59, A 30).

[1] Diog. II. 13 (*Vors.*[5] 59, A 1).

[2] Diog. II. 7 (*Vors.*[5] 59, A 1).

[3] In an Academy address that is charming and full of feeling (*Vita Contemplativa*, Ber. Heidelb. Akad. 1920, 8), Franz Boll has set down a series of representatives of this 'life', beginning with Thales, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras. Plato and Aristotle are merely touched on. Their influence on later men receives more of its due. Boll was far removed from the question that forms the starting-point of our examination: How far are our reports of the earlier thinkers and their 'life' a real historical tradition? When they ascribe the conscious ideal of the 'theoretic life' to Pre-Socratic philosophers, is that historically credible or is it a mere reflection of a later 'life' ethics? The whole tradition needs to be re-examined from this point of view, now that the development of philosophical ethics and 'life' doctrine from Plato to Aristotle and his pupils has been put in the right light. This gives us a fixed point that is also a focus for the history of the origin of the tradition concerning the history of philosophy. This, then, must be our starting-point.

separateness of his detached existence. Euripides already commended the quiet life of the student of nature, removed from the political machinery,[1] and depicted in his *Antiope* the tragic conflict between the 'musical' and the practical man.[2] But Plato was the first to introduce the theoretical man as an ethical problem into philosophy and to justify and glorify his life. Seen from Plato's position, the existence of this type in earlier times either had to appear as a mere paradox, a curiosity of human nature lacking all moral basis, or else the early representatives of this type, like Thales and Anaxagoras, had to be posthumously provided with Plato's legitimation and Plato's moral and emotional views of the 'theoretic life'. The latter can be shown to have been what occurred. All stories that make the older philosophers conscious followers of the ideal of the 'theoretic life' either come directly from Plato's school or arose soon afterwards under the influence of the Platonic ideal. The effect of the Platonic philosophy in forming tradition, and of its direct heir the Peripatetic school, would repay a connected examination. But the result is a foregone conclusion: the whole picture that has come down to us of the history of early philosophy was fashioned during the two or three generations from Plato to the immediate pupils of Aristotle. Along with the philosophy of these two schools it has remained a foundation-stone in the historical structure of our culture. And one of the most instructive examples of this rule is the reflection of the ideal of life as conceived during this flowering of Greek philosophy in the picture of the old Pre-Socratic thinkers and their 'life'. We are even still in a position to see that the great and apparently irreconcilable contradictions in the traditional account of the early thinkers are a necessary consequence of the fluctuations to which men's views of the 'best life' were subjected in the time from Plato to Aristotle and his pupils. To understand the development of the ethical problem, and of the 'life' problem in particular, during this period, is to clear up the creation of our tradition concerning the lives of the earliest philosophers. The present inquiry must therefore begin with the significance of the 'life' problem for the Platonic philosophy, and follow its development in some detail. First I must recall certain fundamental points from my *Aristotle* and carry them farther.

[1] Eur. frg. 910 Nauck.

[2] Plato in *Gorgias*, 484 E and 485 E ff., makes Callicles quote lines from *Antiope* as part of his campaign against a onesidedly philosophical life. It is true that Euripides depicts Amphion as a musical rather than as a scientific man. But the similarity lies in their being both unpolitical, and so Plato could make Callicles use against Socrates the lines of Zethus against Amphion. (Plato, although he believed in the political mission of Socrates, never denied that his teacher was an unpolitical man in the sense of ordinary party politics.)

The pure θεωρίη or 'theory' of the early physicists arose in Ionia. It was one of the most remarkable flowers of that late Ionian culture which was rendered increasingly unpolitical by the predominance of the mercantile atmosphere and later by foreign rule, and which by its great individual freedom facilitated the appearance of the type within the civic community of the *polis*. The down-to-earth Attic mentality with its tight political organization of life left no room for such special activities of individuals. Down to Plato's day and beyond it remained as unfriendly and reserved towards pure science as did later the Roman senatorial class. This hard earth was bound to give rise to the social tragedy of the 'unpolitical person', which Euripides first brought to light. The tension between the duties of a citizen and the leisure of a student, between action and knowledge, was here logically bound to increase into an enmity towards science on the part of the pure political man and a flight from politics on the part of the philosopher. Here alone, too, on Attic soil could Plato venture his profound attempt to reconcile the theoretic life and the political life without compromise, by giving science and philosophy a new subject, namely the state, and by making the highest norms and laws of social action their chief problem, on whose solution hung the welfare of the 'state itself'. In his earliest writings, where he presented Socrates to his contemporaries as the one true statesman whom they needed, because he had turned their eyes to the decisive question of the knowledge of the highest norm,[1] we find admittedly as yet no trace of the ideal of the theoretic life as Plato later proclaimed it. In those days his ideal both of *logos* and of 'life' was still embodied exclusively in Socrates; and there is the most obvious contrast between Socrates and the type of the unworldly pure scientist, the 'mind astronomizing and geometrizing', as set up for model in the famous digression in Plato's *Theaetetus*.[2] But Socrates' moral problem was for Plato a problem of knowledge from the beginning. Within the question of the right moral insight, of *phronesis* as Socrates had said in accordance with the prevailing Greek usage, was hidden the still deeper question of the essence of knowledge in general and of the true nature of being; and the detour through these fundamental questions, which Plato believed he must take in order

[1] See my *Platos Stellung im Aufbau der griechischen Bildung* (Berlin, 1928), p. 40 of the separate edition.

[2] Socrates is by no means lacking in 'theoretical' traits, although he likes most to be where people are thronging, in the wrestling-school or the market-place. But though Boll, op. cit., p. 9, refers to his neglect of his domestic affairs and his withdrawal from common politics, or to his 'I shall not cease from philosophizing' in the *Apology* (29 D), there is a great gulf between Socrates' sort of reflective concentration and the type of scholar depicted in *Theaetetus* (173 E). See above, p. 15.

to answer the Socratic question, led him more and more into a general doctrine of knowledge and being, and compelled him to add to his structure of theoretical science even the branches of mathematics and astronomy that he found existing. So *phronesis* was filled with the contents of this *sophia*, and out of the Socratic *aporia* and *elenchus* there grew a 'theoretic life' devoted to the purest research. In *Theaetetus*, where the alliance between philosophy and mathematics is specially prominent, Socrates sings a veritable hymn to the life of the student, and paints an ideal picture of this life in colours borrowed from the type of the astronomer and mathematician. That is the context in which Thales is cited as the perfect example of a philosopher unconcerned about practical and political life, and the story is told how he fell in the well while observing the stars. It is strange that this praise of geometry and astronomy is here sung by Socrates, whom Plato had once in the *Apology* made to say that of such high matters he understood neither much nor little but just precisely nothing.[1] It is clear that Plato himself was aware that with this latest picture of Socrates in *Theaetetus* he had reached the limit of what artistic freedom could justify in the way of transforming the historical Socrates. The new ideal of the theoretic life, and the type of pure speculative science on which it was based, demanded some other symbol, some other *archegete* than Socrates, who had hitherto been the leading figure in Plato's dialogues. And so in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, the two works written after *Theaetetus* and linked therewith, the leaders of the discussion are the two venerable representatives of Eleatic dialectic, Parmenides and Zeno; and Socrates has to be content with a subordinate role. Similarly in *Timaeus* the figure of the Pythagorean of that name is made the spokesman of Plato's cosmology. The ideal of the theoretic life, as realized in Plato's Academy at that time, was proclaimed in a work by the young Aristotle, the *Protrepticus*, which I have assessed in detail in a previous chapter.[2] It shows the changed attitude of the Academy to Socrates and his problems, that 'metaphysics', which was then for Plato's school the central question, and which had not yet obtained a precise name of its own, is indicated in the *Protrepticus* by the following circumlocution: 'the science of truth, as introduced by Anaxagoras and Parmenides'. Evidently the names of the old thinkers are here used simply as a substitute for pure theoretical philosophy, as whose representatives they were reckoned in this circle.[3] As I showed, too, the Academy also gave rise to that picture of Pythagoras, so determinative for later antiquity, which first takes

[1] Plato, *Apol.* 19 D.

[2] See the chapter on the *Protrepticus*, above, pp. 80 ff.

[3] Arist. frg. 52 (p. 59, 3 Rose).

form for us in the well known story told by Plato's pupil Heraclides of Pontus. He said that Pythagoras was the first to use the words 'philosophy' and 'philosopher' and to explain the nature of the philosopher by means of the famous comparison with the 'pure' spectators of the games at Olympia. The comparison depends on the ambiguity of the word θεωρεῖν, which means both watching a spectacle and contemplation and research in the 'theoretical' sense. Since Aristotle in the *Protrepticus* also compares the activity of the student absorbed in pure science to the gaze of the θεωροί or onlookers at Olympia, it is clear that this analogy for the theoretical life had become classical in the Academy. The retroactive attribution of this ideal of philosophic life to Pythagoras as its founder is connected with the high esteem in which the Academicians held this man and the Pythagoreans; for they came more and more to see in them the real historical pattern of their own mathematicizing philosophy. It is a useless labour of love to want to save this pleasant story for the historical Pythagoras, to whom at just this time an abundance of apocryphal traits and anecdotes was attributed, and about whose life and utterances a whole literature of a purely legendary character arose in a short period.[1] We do better to follow the example of Aristotle, who avoids using the name of Pythagoras and prefers merely to speak of the contemporary 'so called Pythagoreans', because he believes that it is no longer possible to obtain trustworthy information about the real Pythagoras. On the other hand, he himself, in his dialogue *On Philosophy*, made use of the seven sages for the prehistory of philosophy—for we can hardly interpret otherwise the report that he there regarded them as 'sophists', naturally in the good sense of the word.[1] Indeed, the Academy even extended the conception of the 'theoretic life' to the Egyptian priests. Aristotle says in the early first book of his *Metaphysics* that they were the first to devote themselves to pure science, because their profession gave them leisure. And the *Epinomis* of the Platonist Philip of Opus, which undertakes to fit the 'theoretic life' as an appendix into the political structure of the *Laws*, sees the direct predecessors of this ideal in the astrologers of the Chaldees. Thus did the Academy during Plato's last decades create the historical framework that fitted its 'life'.[2]

There runs through the *Epinomis* a deep resignation that this 'life' is reserved for a very few exceptional persons. The same mood informs the but little earlier seventh letter of Plato, that great manifesto of his old age in which he for the last time took a stand on the question that had concerned him all his life, the question of the relation between politics and philosophical knowledge. The fundamental inner readiness to convert the thoughts of philosophy into creative action, and to take part in the life of the state, remained even in these last years of Plato's the same as it had been at the beginning of his intellectual course, notwithstanding the shipwreck that his favourite pupil Dion had suffered in Syracuse in the first serious attempt to realize the Platonic Ideas. But it was now impossible not to notice a strong tension between this originally all-controlling aim

[1] See my *Aristotle*, above, p. 98. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[4], p. 98, seems inclined to consider Heraclides' story historical, and to carry back to Pythagoras the doctrine of the three 'lives' (the 'apolaustic', the 'political', and the 'theoretic') which it presupposes, and which we find in Aristotle's two *Ethics*. But neither the name of Heraclides, who was a byword for romancing, nor the story itself speaks in favour of this. The doctrine of the 'lives' is found in Aristotle as well as Heraclides, and they both owe it to the Academy (see Plato's *Republic* IX, 581 C ff.). Nor does the tale contain any other 'Pythagorean' element that points at all beyond the Platonic doctrine. When Cicero (*Tusc.* V. 9; other accounts in Diog. VIII. 8, Iambl. *Vit. Pythag.*, p. 58) tells us that Heraclides' account included the feature that, as celebrants come from various cities to take part in the great Greek panegyris, so men have wandered into this life from another one, that is nothing but Plato's well known doctrine of the soul. We cannot infer from it that the doctrine of the three 'lives' was Pythagorean, on the ground that the transmigration of souls is a demonstrably Pythagorean view. Certainly there was a 'Pythagorean way of life', in the same sense as there was an 'Orphic way of life'; but that is something quite different from a division and classification of 'lives' such as we find in Plato and Aristotle. The 'lives' are three because there are three τέλη or purposes in life in which according to Plato and Aristotle various men place their happiness, namely either pleasure or virtue or *phronesis*. It is therefore not an accident that they are three, and not an accident that they are precisely these three. They correspond to the three systematic foundation-pillars of Platonic–Aristotelian ethics. This is very clearly expressed in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* I. 1, 1214^a 30: 'Happiness and blessed living would reside in three things most, the three that seem to be most desirable. For some say that *phronesis* is the greatest good, some virtue, and some pleasure.' (The same in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in Iambl. *Protr.*, c. vii ff.; see my *Aristotle*, above, pp. 65 ff.) On this trinity of the objects of choice Aristotle then expressly proceeds to construct the three 'lives' (*Eth. Eud.* I. 2, 1215^a 35). The trinity of pleasure, virtue, and *phronesis*, is in him connected with Plato's doctrine that the soul has three parts, from which he derives the three 'lives' and the three sorts of pleasure (*Republic* IX, 580 D ff.). Apocryphal Pythagorean literature later naturally attributed the trichotomy of the soul also to Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans (along with nearly everything else), and even people like Posidonius, not to mention uncritical believers like Iamblichus or Porphyry, took such forgeries for genuine. Had I possessed a complete view of this sort of literature when I wrote my *Nemesius* (pp. 63 ff.), I should have treated these 'testimonies' to the Pythagorean origin of the trichotomy of the soul with less ceremony. I am glad, however, that even then I did not blindly trust them. Recently A. E. Taylor, in his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, p. 497, has come out again for a Pythagorean ancestry of this doctrine.

[1] According to Arist. frg. 3 Rose, the seven sages occurred in the dialogue *On Philosophy*. Rose is therefore probably right in referring to the same dialogue the statement, in *Etymol. M.* s.v. σοφιστής, that Aristotle called the seven sages 'sophists'.

[2] Arist. *Metaph.* A 1, 981^b 23; *Epin.* 986 E.

of his philosophizing[1] and the actual dedication of his old age entirely to pure theoretical study. Thus gradually arose a set of problems which were inherited by Aristotle in their full gravity, and which threatened the essential unity of scientific knowledge and practical action that had been since Plato's Socratic period the presupposition of his research and therefore a foundation-pillar of his idea of the 'theoretic life'. Plato's personal development and the inner tendency of Platonic science worked in the same direction. The passionate Socratic drive for knowledge was aimed, to speak Platonically, purely at the 'vision of the Idea of the Good'; and action was to Socrates identical with the knowledge of the Good. Plato's early philosophy had then pressed still more determinedly towards participation in actual life and in the state. But in the course of Plato's development the drive towards knowledge had immeasurably extended its range. Late Platonic science did indeed appear to have developed quite organically out of the Socratic seed, by a process of constantly incorporating richer theoretical content; but its field was no longer exclusively political ethics as it had been in the writings down to the *Republic*. Ethics had become a mere 'part' of philosophy, co-ordinate with logic and physics;[2] and when Plato in his old age lectured 'on the Good', he understood by that mathematics and metaphysics and heaven knows what else, but definitely not a doctrine of the goods of human life, as Aristotle used afterwards to tell his students, according to the well known report of Aristoxenus, who heard him. That Plato's philosophy, originally very close to life, had changed into pure theory is symbolized by the story that the announcement of the old subject 'On the Good' attracted great crowds of hearers, but that general disappointment reigned as soon as Plato began to lecture on numbers and lines and the highest One which is the Good.[3]

The ideal of the theoretic life did not at first appear to be threatened by this development. On the contrary, it seemed that pure science, as the late Plato understood it, was triumphing over the onesidedly

[1] See my address 'Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter des Plato', in *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge*, p. 105; and 'Platos Stellung im Aufbau der griechischen Bildung', op. cit., p. 158.

[2] It was so in Xenocrates' well known division of philosophy (frg. 1 Heinze), which held for the later Plato too. Aristotle was not the first to differentiate philosophy in this way.

[3] Aristoxenus *Harmon.* 30 Meibom (p. 44, 5 Marq.): 'as Aristotle always used to tell happened to most of those who heard Plato give his lecture on the Good: everyone came expecting to learn something about those recognized human goods such as wealth, health, strength, and in general some wonderful happiness; but when it became plain that his discussion was about mathematics and numbers and geometry and astronomy and finally that Good is One, I think it seemed an absolute paradox to them. Thereupon some of them despised the matter and others condemned it.'

practical tendency of Socrates. Aristotle was the first to bring this tendency to complete victory; he enlarged Plato's 'doctrine of Ideas' into a universal science of being founded on experience. In a certain sense he is an even purer representative of the theoretic life than Plato. The difficulty for this new science was to take care that it did not, in the course of its unimpeded development on the theoretical side, lose its root connexion with Socratic–Platonic ethics; for it was precisely its services to actual living that had given the theoretic life according to Plato its moral dignity and its sacred rights. Aristotle's philosophic being was rooted, even after he had given up the doctrine of Ideas, far too firmly in the *ethos* in which he had grown up in the Academy for him to sacrifice one jot or tittle of Plato's belief in the educational and moral mission of science, and he had himself proclaimed it in the *Protrepticus*. Though he separates ethics from metaphysics and makes it a special discipline, at the decisive point he connects the two together as Plato did: he holds fast to the significance of intellectual cultivation and knowledge for the moral culture of the personality. He assigns the theoretic life the highest rank both in the state[1] and in the orders of the moral world; and the individual human being's happiness, the aim of human striving, is achieved on his view not in moral perfection or at any rate not in that alone, but only in the full development of the intellectual powers of human nature.[2] In the end, indeed, exactly like Plato, he makes specifically moral insight dependent on the knowledge of the ultimate source of reality. The primacy of the theoretical over the practical reason is his enduring Platonic conviction. And this is not only because intellectual activity (νοῦ ἐνέργεια) is independent of the sensuous side of human nature and of our external needs, and constitutes a portion of the eternal blessedness of God carried within ourselves, of the omniscience that timelessly knows itself; it is also because moral knowledge is also positively imbued and coloured with the metaphysical world-view of the scientifically thinking man.[3]

[1] Aristotle, *Pol.* VII. 2–3, discusses the aim of the best state and the education of its citizens, and adopts a position on the question whether the best life is the political and practical or another (meaning the theoretic life). He rejects each of the extremes, both the view that only the political life is manly and free, and also the withdrawal from politics on principle and the complete rejection of every sort of rule as mere tyranny. To him the 'theoretic life' is by no means synonymous with the '*xenic* life' or life of the alien, but is at the same time 'practical' in the highest sense Philosophers and men of knowledge are creative, for him, in that they are 'architects with their thoughts' (see esp. 1325^b 14–23).

[2] Happiness in the highest sense is secured only by the theoretic life, according to *Eth. Nic.* X. 7, 'and in secondary degree the life according to the other sort of virtue'. In the next chapter this subordination of ethical to intellectual virtue is established in more detail.

[3] The independence of the mind from man's sensuous nature, in contrast to

But at this point there arises for Aristotle a problem that did not exist for Plato in such sharpness. It throws an abrupt light on the inner difficulties that Aristotelian Platonism has to contend with here. Although the moral and scientific spheres touch each other, and the latter leads into the moral, this happens only at one point, whereas in Plato the moral was still completely contained in the scientific. Science has now separated itself into numerous disciplines; and each one of them is striving for independence from the whole. Metaphysics or ontology has also separated itself, once in Plato the totality of the philosophic consideration of the world, but now only the queen of the sciences, also called 'theology'. And it is this science that is pre-eminently intended, science as world-view, wherever Aristotle lets the ethical sphere come into contact with the theoretical. Nowhere else is this so clearly expressed as in the earliest form that we possess of Aristotle's *Ethics*, the version edited by Eudemus, at the end of which we read that the natural goods of life are moral goods for man only so far as they help him to serve and know God. The knowledge of God is thus the way to the true service of God and the criterion of earthly values, which hold their value in fee from its value.[1] But now does this mean that the whole gigantic structure of particular theoretical knowledge, built up by Aristotle in his system and culminating in theology, is presupposed here and is therefore an indispensable condition of the correct moral conduct of life? To put the question is to perceive that, while this is in a certain sense so for the philosopher, who in his metaphysical survey of the whole can fit the totality of knowledge into a unity, it can hardly be so for the mere specialist with his gaze fixed only on a limited area, and the man morally active in the affairs of life can absolutely not be thought of as depending on such a condition in his decisions. Every attempt to determine the power of theoretical reason over moral insight, of *sophia* over *phronesis*, more exactly in detail than is done in that decisive passage of the *Eudemian Ethics*, must inevitably lead to a weakening of this power and a strengthening of the relative independence of the moral sphere from 'theory'.

ethical virtue, whose whole sphere is nothing but the relation of the impulses to reason, is emphasized in Aristotle's *Eth. Nic.* X. 8, 1178^a 16–22. From this it follows that the theoretic life is also less dependent on 'external provision' than the practical; see from 1178^a 24 to the end of the chapter. With regard to practical and moral thought and action being shot through with *sophia* and 'theory', compare the differences between the two *Ethics* in what follows.

[1] Arist. *Eth. Eud.* VIII. 3, 1249^b 16: 'Therefore whichever choice and possession of natural goods will produce the most contemplation of God, whether goods of the body or wealth or friends or any other, that is the best and this is the finest standard; and whichever either by defect or by excess prevents one from serving and contemplating God, that is bad.' See my *Aristotle*, above, p. 243 and the whole preceding section.

Plato had attached moral insight, the *phronesis* of Socrates, to the contemplation of the Idea of the Good. They were conflated to such a degree that the concept of *phronesis*, which in ordinary usage was purely ethical and practical, came in Plato always to include the theoretical knowledge of the idea, became, in fact, finally synonymous with expressions that had long meant nothing but pure knowing and contained no relation to the practical, such as *sophia*, *nus*, *episteme*, theory, and the like. This Platonic sense of the word *phronesis* is still to be found in the early Aristotle. It appears in his *Protrepticus*, where it means the theoretical science of being, or metaphysics, and where Anaxagoras and Parmenides are named as typical representatives of 'this *phronesis*'.[1] In the *Eudemian Ethics*, *phronesis* is still often the name for the intellectual organ of the theoretic life; and Anaxagoras is cited as the prototype of a life of pure *phronesis* because he devoted himself entirely to the astronomical study of the sky.[2] On the other hand, in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the later version of Aristotle's ethics, we find this Platonic conception of *phronesis* critically broken up into its original elements; the expression is narrowed to mean only practical moral insight, and all theoretical content is removed from it. Aristotle now recommends *sophia* as the proper word to indicate theoretical knowledge of reason; he explains that *phronesis* concerns only human affairs, but *sophia* also divine affairs and the whole cosmos; that is why we call Anaxagoras, Thales, and such people, *sophoi*, but Pericles and people of his sort *phronimoi*.[3] *Sophia*, he says, studies only the general, like all true science. *Phronesis*, on the other hand, concerns itself also with the application of general moral knowledge to the particular practical case.[4] Thus politics, which once in Plato had not merely been the

[1] On the development of the conception of *phronesis* see my *Aristotle*, above, pp. 83 ff.

[2] See *Eth. Eud.* I. 4, 1215^b 1 and 6; I. 5, 1216^a 11 ff. On the conception of *phronesis* and its significance in the *Eudemian Ethics* see my *Aristotle*, above, pp. 236 ff., 239 ff.

[3] *Eth. Nic.* VI. 7, 1141^b 2: 'From what has been said it is clear that *sophia* is both science and intuition of the things that are most valuable by nature. Hence men say that Anaxagoras and Thales and such persons are *sophoi* but not *phronimoi*, when they see them ignorant of their own advantage, and they say that the things which these men know are exceedingly marvellous and difficult and divine, but useless, and that they do not seek human goods. But *phronesis* concerns human affairs and matters that can be deliberated. For good deliberation is, we say, the most essential function of the *phronimos*.' 1140^b 7: 'Hence we think that Pericles and such men are *phronimoi*, because they can see what is good for themselves and for men; and we think that household-managers and statesmen are persons of this sort.' Clearly Aristotle is here arguing against his own earlier and still purely Platonic statements in the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemian Ethics*.

[4] *Eth. Nic.* VI. 7, 1141^a 9 ff., and 5, 1140^a 24 ff.

than the conception of intellectual 'virtues' is naturally Aristotle's view that there are 'virtues' not only of the rational and irrational parts of the soul but even of the 'nutritive' part. The tradition of the school and the wording of Aristotle's *Ethics* compel him to mention this peculiar view; but he obviously expects no sympathy for it from his hearers or readers, and declares that the question whether such a kind of virtue is to be assumed had best be dropped from ethics.[1] As little as he grasps the culmination of Aristotle's ethics in metaphysics when he asks what *sophia* is doing in morals, does he understand its anchoring in the teleological system of nature when he can no longer grasp human virtue as the next level above the virtue of plants and animals.

One gets definitely the impression that the *Great Ethics* is tacking apprehensively between the steep contradictions that rent the Peripatetic school asunder during the generation of Aristotle's earliest pupils. They concerned precisely the point on which we have found the author vacillating between independent criticism and pupillary fidelity to the tradition, namely the determination of the value of the theoretic life and the 'intellectual virtues' in elevating human life, and their place in ethics. We still know the name of the enemy within the gates who attacked Aristotle strongly and rejected his high estimation of the theoretical life; it was Dicaearchus of Messene. Tradition makes him in this matter the polar opposite of Theophrastus, who, as Aristotle's successor in the direction of the school and his truest adherent, but also undoubtedly out of his innermost convictions as a researcher, held fast to the doctrine of the primacy of the theoretic life. The controversy between him and Dicaearchus must have been celebrated, for in Cicero's time the contention

rate denied that they were praiseworthy. It is believed that the influence of this man is also to be traced in the avoidance of the Aristotelian technical term 'intellectual virtues' in the *Great Ethics* (cf. the Peripatetic writers on ethics in Stob. II. 137, 19; but to the contrary 118, 1, and 145, 17). Later Peripatetic ethics, of course, regards the intellectual 'virtues' as not properly and the ethical 'virtues' as properly so called. This departure from Aristotle begins in the *Great Ethics*; or at least that is where we can first demonstrate it.

[1] *Gr. Eth.* I. 4, 1185^a 23: 'What, then, someone may say, does this part of the soul also have a virtue?' And ^{a} 26: 'Whether or not there is a virtue of this part is another question.' On the contrary, *Eth. Nic.* I. 13, 1102^b 2 ff.: 'The virtue of this part [i.e. of the nutritive faculty of the soul] seems to be not human but common.' *Eth. Eud.* II. 1, 1219^b 38: 'Hence the virtues of the nutritive and growing part are not virtues of man.' In both places Aristotle is working on the assumption that the view that the nutritive part has its own peculiar virtue is perfectly current. The astonished question of the *Great Ethics* reminds one in its Epigonic nature of the author's astonishment at the introduction of *sophia* into ethics (I. 34, 1197^b 28). His way of putting the question aside is similar to his way of putting aside the problem whether God thinks of himself, II. 15, 1213^a 7.

between the theoretical and the practical lives for the first rank was still attached to these two names.[1]

Dicaearchus was the Peripatetic who declared that not *sophia* but *phronesis* is the ruling power in the human soul; that follows necessarily from the fact that he found the essence of man in action, not in contemplation.[2] He must have severed the connexions that Aristotle, following Plato, had held to exist between moral action and the knowledge of the highest questions, and reached the logical conclusion of which we hear the echo in the author of the *Great Ethics*: 'One must wonder what *sophia* has to do with ethics', since the latter concerns character and action.[3] He must have put *logos* after character in significance; and we can also be confident that he completely denied the quality of virtue to the intellectual powers and confined this conception to ethical and political action. And who but he can have been capable of that argument, most heretical for a Peripatetic, which the author of the *Great Ethics* cites as very remarkable: the famous conclusion (of Aristotle) must be false, to the effect that God can have no other object of thought than himself, because he can think only the most perfect and there is nothing more perfect than he. Since even a man who was entirely occupied in the contemplation of himself would be blamed as a heartless being, the idea of a God who contemplates himself is absurd.[4]

The dissolution here proclaimed of Aristotle's conception of the world and of God is based on an argument at the bottom of which

[1] Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* II. 16: 'Now I have definitely decided that, since there is such a controversy between your associate Dicaearchus and my friend Theophrastus, yours far preferring the practical life to everything and mine the theoretical, I will appear as having paid my dues to both of them. I think I have adequately satisfied Dicaearchus, and I am now turning to the school that not only allows me to rest but rebukes me for not always resting. So let me address myself, dear Titus, to those famous studies, and return at last to what I should never have left.'

[2] Above, pp. 446–8.

[3] Above, p. 446.

[4] Theophrastus, of whom one might think in this connexion, appears, however, to be out of the question. In his metaphysical fragment he obviously regards God's activity, and his influence on nature and on the motions of the spheres in particular, exactly as Aristotle does in *Metaph.* Λ 7. The highest principle is 'immovable in itself'; it causes the motion of other beings through another sort of influence, namely their 'appetite' for the best. For this they need soul and thought, from which appetite takes its start. All the more, therefore, is the primary being to be conceived as mind, and as the thought and will for the most perfect, which, however, it itself is in its perfection. The expression, 'the primary and most divine being, desiring all the best things', does not in my opinion contain anything that goes beyond Aristotle's doctrine. God thinks himself as the best there is, and he must also will this goodness of his. On the other hand, if we do away with God's thought of himself we alter the object of the divine will also and give it another direction.

lies the ultimately indemonstrable value-equation: Life is action. The selfcontemplation of the Aristotelian *Nus* had to cease being the most sublime ideal of human and divine life as soon as its earthly model, the theoretic life of the philosopher, was no longer capable, in the actual feeling of contemporary persons, of justifying this high claim against other ways of life. Aristotle himself had already taught that the theoretical life has pre-eminence over the practical only because the philosopher at the same time occupies the highest level of creative activity: he is the 'architect' of the intellectual and social world.[1]

The more theoretical, in our sense of the word, science became in the course of this development, the more it turned away from life, the less could it wholly appropriate Aristotle's ideal of the theoretic life. Through its onesidedness it gave prominence to the antithesis, the ideal of the practical life. Dicaearchus showed the followers of Aristotle that they were definitely not the highest flowering of humanity, and that history nowhere offers us such a supremacy of mere intelligence above creative action.

At this point our inquiry turns back to its beginning, the ancient tradition about the 'life' of the earliest philosophers. Owing to the radical change in the philosophic ideal of life they suddenly appeared in a wholly new light. Dicaearchus himself wrote *Lives of the Philosophers*. Isolated fragments of them are preserved, concerning precisely the earlier thinkers; and they show clearly how the author's ethical view is everywhere reflected in his view of the past. The earliest representatives of philosophy are obviously for him, too, the representatives of an ideal by which to measure the philosophers of his own time. Whoever, like Dicaearchus, saw the end in active living for human society would inevitably come either to despise all study altogether, or to oppose to the onesided life of contemporary philosophy the picture of a greater past in which thought had really still possessed the power of constructive action. When one looked at the scanty accounts of the earlier thinkers from this point of view, there appeared, in addition to that devotion to pure contemplation which Plato and Aristotle had emphasized exclusively, a close connexion with public life, which was strange to contemporary thinkers and had not been called attention to. These men had really fulfilled in their 'lives' the ideal of Aristotle that the bearers of the highest thought should be at the same time the 'architects' of active life. It was clearly incorrect of Aristotle in the dialogue *On Philosophy* to interpret the seven sages in modern guise as 'sophists'. Precisely these revered personages, who had continued to live in the mind of the Greek folk down to the present time, incorporated the most

[1] *Pol.* VII. 3, 1325^b 23.

complete unity of thought and action. They were lawgivers and men of politics, so Dicaearchus declared;[1] and he must have found his view confirmed not merely by Solon and Pittacus, but also by Thales, for example, whom Plato had made a pure representative of the theoretical life. Evidence for his view was easy to collect from the best historical sources, and also from the realm of anecdotes. Tradition connected Thales with the greatest technical achievements of navigation and astronomy. According to a report preserved in Herodotus, he was an engineer in the service of King Croesus when the latter led his army against the Medes; and by a special device was able to show how to divert the river Halys and lower its level, in order to put the Lydian army across it without bridge or boat.[2]

Though Herodotus as a rationalistic critic doubted the trustworthiness of the report, Thales obviously was to the Greek people in general a practical man rather than an otherworldly scholar. As statesman, too, he had taken part in the life of the Ionian cities; for Herodotus has heard of his advice to the Ionians to make a common parliament and place it on the island of Teos, which lay in the middle of the Ionian cities, and to subordinate the previously independent cities to this central control as members of a unified state. This tradition gives him a political reputation reaching far beyond his own city; and it is certain, though not expressly handed down to us, that Dicaearchus did not let this and similar traits escape him.[3]

In the tradition of late antiquity concerning the earlier thinkers we find reports of this kind, and completely opposite traits intended to prove that the great sages were absorbed in science and uninterested in practice, occurring side by side, for the most part quite peacefully, as befits the compilatory character of Diogenes and the sources akin to him.[4]

[1] *Fragm. Hist. Graec.* vol. ii, p. 243 Mueller (frg. 28). Diog. I. 40: 'Dicaearchus says they were neither wise men nor philosophers, but lawgivers and men of understanding.'

[2] The crossing of the Halys, Herod. I. 75 (*Vors.*[5] 11, A 6). That the Peripatos adopted the tradition of Thales' astronomy is shown by Eudemus frg. 94 Spengel. It occurs already in Herod. I. 74.

[3] Herod. I. 170 (*Vors.*[5] 11, A 4). Diog. I. 25 (*Vors.*[5] 11, A 1) ascribes to Thales also the political advice to the Milesians to reject the alliance offered to them by Croesus, which saved them later when Cyrus was at war with Croesus.

[4] Thus immediately after the story of Thales' political advice (see the previous note) we read that Heraclides of Pontus (frg. 47 Voss) made Thales, obviously in the same sort of way as he made Pythagoras himself tell of his previous incarnations (Diog. VIII. 4), say of himself that he was an individualist and lived for himself (μονήρης καὶ ἰδιαστής). That, of course, fits only the theoretic life. One is reminded of Aristotle's description of himself as 'solitary and isolated' (αὐτίτης καὶ μονώτης, frg. 668 Rose), on which Demetrius remarks in interpretation: 'the isolation indicates a more individualistic habit', &c. (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μονώτης ἰδιωτικωτέρου ἔθους ἤδη ἐστί κτλ.). That explains the

We may with great probability suppose, what we can still directly prove in the case of the seven sages, that the reports which make the early philosophers lawgivers, politicians, and practical men, were first introduced into the stream of the tradition by Dicaearchus. Such are the accounts emphasizing the active part taken in political life by Anaximander, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, and especially Empedocles.[1]

Thinkers of the type of Anaxagoras and Democritus naturally fell into the background for Dicaearchus as definitely as they had occupied the middle position for the adherents of the contemplative life. Their practical cosmopolitanism made them necessarily unattractive to him. For Heraclitus it was not difficult to reveal the political side

association of μονήρης with ἰδιαστής in Heraclides. Perhaps Aristotle actually had the latter in mind. To Heraclides Thales was just as selfevidently a typical representative of the theoretic life as was Pythagoras, of whom he relates the conversation with the tyrant Leon of Phlius (see above, p. 432).

[1] Anaximander led a colony from Miletus to Apollonia on the Pontus (*Vors.*[5] 12, A 3). Parmenides gave laws to his fellow-citizens (ibid. 28, A 1 = Diog. IX. 23). Zeno was a fanatical partisan of freedom and a member of the conspiracy against the tyrant Nearchus (others give the name as 'Diomedon' or 'Demylus'); he maintained his political attitude on the rack (*Vors.*[5] 29, A 1 = Diog. IX. 26; 29, A 6–7). Melissus was a statesman and led the Samians in the war against Pericles as naval commander (*Vors.*[5] 30, A 1–2). The tradition is particularly detailed about Empedocles' political activity (ibid. 31, A 1, Diog. VIII. 63 ff.). This goes back to the historical activity of Timaeus, whom we shall meet below as the transmitter of the Dicaearchan tradition about the political activity of Pythagoras. The accounts themselves are certainly in part older than Dicaearchus. Thus the one about Parmenides' lawgiving is quoted from the *On Philosophers* of Speusippus, who was probably looking for a precedent for Plato's similar efforts. But there must once have been some individual historian of philosophy who presented the thinkers systematically in the light of their political and practical life and collected the reports of this kind; and such an interest in the practical life of the philosophers in particular is not likely to have existed in any one but the man who found the greatness of the earlier thinkers in their practical influence above all, and dealt with them only for this reason—Dicaearchus. It is not for nothing that we find this member of the earliest Peripatos not, like Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Meno, among the doxographers, but interested only in the lives of the philosophers. But what is called 'biography' did not arise out of mere interest in individuality as such. It sought in the life of the individual representatives the expression of the type, of that which philosophical ethics understood by βίος or 'life', and the varieties of which it developed. Whether, and how far, the collection of politically active philosophers and their deeds in Plutarch, *Adv. Colot.* c. 32, goes back directly or indirectly to Dicaearchus cannot be determined. The list embraces the philosophers down to Aristotle and Theophrastus, but it lacks precisely the seven sages and Pythagoras, who are known to have been important for Dicaearchus. And that he would have mentioned Theophrastus as a representative of the political life is improbable, especially as the reason that Plutarch gives for him as for Aristotle proves little, and both of them seem to be added more for the sake of completeness.

in his thought, and to show that he was not a pure physicist, although he felt himself detached from the political life of his own city. The philosophy of Socrates and Plato had a directly political intention. Dicaearchus seems, however, to have regarded the ideal type of philosophical reformer and lawgiver as being realized in Pythagoras rather than in Plato. Through the work of the Peripatetics and of the Academy Pythagoras had long been in the centre of philosophical interest; and concerning him there flared up now an all the more vivid strife of opinions, the more vaguely and ambiguously his image flickered in the oral tradition.

In the middle and the second half of the fourth century B.C. the name 'Pythagorean' referred to two entirely different groups of men. When Aristotle speaks repeatedly of the 'so called Pythagoreans' he means the scientific circle of Archytas of Tarentum, with whom Plato had had personal intercourse. He seems, however, to have possessed no definite indications as to how far back this tradition went in southern Italy, still less to have considered it permissible to refer its beginnings to Pythagoras himself, after whom the circle named itself. But another sort of men also called themselves 'Pythagoreans', men whose peculiar way of living is often mocked in the Middle Comedy, and must therefore have been known to the people at that time. This was a strictly ascetic and pious order that derived its religious symbols and ideas from Pythagoras and honoured him as the founder of a religion and a worker of miracles.[1]

Quite early, in the fourth century at latest, we find these two conceptions of Pythagoras at war with each other; and naturally the two groups, which then, at any rate, had nothing in common and therefore might have existed peaceably side by side, were driven by their description as 'Pythagoreans' or 'Pythagorists' into controversy as to which were the descendants of the genuine Pythagoras and whose attitude was the truly Pythagorean one. Archytas' mathematical and astronomical school appears not to have followed that commandment to abstain from meat and some other foods that was sacred to the other party; and presumably it was they who introduced the version according to which Pythagoras did not preach abstinence. To them also must be due the assignment of certain of their fundamental scientific notions and of particular mathematical and physical propositions to the person of Pythagoras.[2]

[1] See the fundamental discussions of Erwin Rohde in his classical article 'Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie des Pythagoras' (*Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii, pp. 102 ff.). Rohde explains the existence of the two movements as due to a split in the school, and thus makes them to have been both united in the personality of Pythagoras. Similarly J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[4], p. 86. The evidence of the Comic poets is collected in Diels's *Vors.*[5] 58, E, p. 478.

[2] The representative of this worldly conception of Pythagoras is Aristoxenus;

These scientific students could not but find it distasteful to think of their founder as a wandering medicine-man and miracle-worker. Their conception was best suited by the picture of Pythagoras as the founder of the theoretic life, a picture which we first came across in Heraclides of Pontus. But how was one to explain the fact that men of such different types derived their ideals of life from one and the same founder? This problem was by no means solved by the two conflicting conceptions of Pythagoras' personality. Not until Dicaearchus put forward his point of view did it seem to clear up. To Dicaearchus it was easy to see in the archaic thinker not a mere theorist in the modern style, but a lawgiver and founder of states, who made both religion and knowledge serve creatively in the establishment of life.

We do actually find in our late and entirely legendary tradition about the life of Pythagoras, whose chief representatives, the Neo-Platonists Iamblichus and Porphyry, reproduce at second or third hand old sources like Aristoxenus, Heraclides, and Dicaearchus, a third picture in addition to those of the student and the miracle-monger, namely that of the lawgiver and founder of states. Although it is quite uncritically intermingled with the other two, some thoroughly characteristic traits are expressly referred to Dicaearchus, and they confirm Erwin Rohde's conjecture that Dicaearchus made Pythagoras into an ideal picture of the practical life as he himself taught it and tried to realize it in his own person.[1] In doing this he must have been especially encouraged by the example of the Pythagorean Archytas, who was also statesman and student both.[2]

From Dicaearchus comes our tradition that when Pythagoras arrived at Croton in South Italy he was commissioned by the council to give educational political addresses to the men, the women, and the children, of the city. And although Aristoxenus preceded Dicaearchus in declaring that Pythagorean ideas had had a great influence on political relations in southern Italy and Sicily, we can show that Dicaearchus adopted this view and tried to establish it more exactly in detail. The political conception of the influence of Pythagoras found especially welcome fuel in the tradition that the order suffered a violent catastrophe because of its growing political unpopularity and the master fled to Metapontum.[3] But now the political inter-

and in this he was following, according to Gell. IV. 11, 7 (*Fragm. Hist. Graec.*, vol. ii, p. 273 Mueller = Aristox. frg. 7), the view of his Pythagorean scientific friends (cf. Rohde, op. cit., p. 108).


[1] See Rohde, op. cit., p. 110. In modern times Dicaearchus' view has been revived by Krische, *De societatis a Pythagora conditae scopo politico*, 1830.

[2] See George Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. iv, p. 405.

[3] For Dicaearchus on the various speeches of Pythagoras at Croton, see Porphyry's *Vit. Pyth.*, §§ 18, 19. The wording of the speeches is given by Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.*, §§ 37–57, from another source, in which these speeches

vention of Pythagoras in Croton on his arrival in southern Italy would have come without any transition after the miracle-hungry

were freely invented from the indications given by Dicaearchus (see Rohde, op. cit., p. 132, who infers that Timaeus originated the speeches). Dicaearchus frg. 31, Mueller, also presupposes that Pythagoras intended political reforms; for it says that, when Pythagoras in his flight from Croton came to Locri, the Locrians sent messengers to the frontier to tell him that they valued his wisdom, but they had no objection to their laws and no intention of altering the existing condition of the state, so would he please direct his steps elsewhere. The account of the legislative influence of the Pythagoreans on the cities of Sicily and southern Italy differs in Porphyry, § 21, and Iamblichus, § 130 (the latter repeated § 172 with only minor variations). As an intermediary source for what Dicaearchus had said about the addresses to the Crotoniates, Porphyry used Nicomachus (§ 20), and obviously borrowed from him also the section on the legislation of the Pythagoreans in the cities of Sicily and Magna Graecia, which follows immediately and is very closely connected with the preceding both logically and verbally. Nicomachus got this section (§ 21) not from Dicaearchus but from Aristoxenus, i.e. from a source of equal age and value. Porphyry himself says this in § 22, so far as concerns the political influence exerted on the Lucanians, Messapians, Peucetians, and Romans, that is, the surrounding barbarians; from which it follows that it is also true of the previously listed Greek cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily. Now Porphyry, following Aristoxenus, tells us that the Pythagoreans gave laws to Croton, Sybaris, Catana, Rhegium, Himera, Acragas, Tauromenium, and other cities, and he ascribes all of these laws to two supposedly Pythagorean persons, Charondas and Zaleucus. Iamblichus, on the other hand, reports (§ 130) that Charondas gave laws to Catana; for Locri he names a certain Timares (or Timaratus, § 172) in addition to Zaleucus; for Rhegium, obviously basing himself on copious local traditions, he begins with the οἰκιστής or founder Thucles (see Thuc. VI. 3, 3), and names a whole list of persons who were connected with changes in the constitution, § 130 Phytius, Helicaon, Aristocrates, and in § 172 (where Thucles is missing) Theaetetus also. It cannot be that Aristoxenus' original version contained these same details and Porphyry (or his intermediary Nicomachus) merely made careless excerpts. Iamblichus must be here following some source other than Aristoxenus and Porphyry. That Aristoxenus' version was old and intact is evidenced by Aristotle's catalogue of lawgivers, which, as I have previously shown (*Entsteh. d. Metaph.*, p. 45, and *Aristotle*, above, p. 285), is a subsequent appendix to the second book of the *Politics*. We read there (1274ᵃ 22) that Zaleucus was lawgiver to Locri, and Charondas was lawgiver to Catana 'and the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily' (Porphyry's language is less precise; but he obviously means the same, when he designates Zaleucus and Charondas together as the originators of all lawgiving in Sicily and southern Italy.) For Iamblichus' local tradition about the lawgivers of Rhegium we must therefore seek some other source than Aristoxenus; and in the circumstances that can only be an author as well informed about the neighbouring city as the Messenian Dicaearchus, who is one of Iamblichus' sources and also, as was shown above, often one of Porphyry's in addition to Aristoxenus. The erudition of Aristotle's catalogue of lawgivers about Zaleucus and Charondas, which gives them so much wider an influence than do Dicaearchus and Iamblichus, is certainly drawn from Aristoxenus, for he wrote early while this appendix was added to the book quite late. He tells us in Iambl., § 233, that he heard the story of the devotion of the two Pythagoreans, Damon and Phintias (known to us from Schiller's ballad *Die Bürgschaft*), from the mouth of the



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